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Towards a New Era of Nation-States

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Preface: Towards a New Era of Nation-States

The foremost issue of our time is Western globalization. Dispensing with a great deal of useless chatter about the economic advantages or disadvantages of globalization, let us get to the main point, which is political power. Shall we acquiesce to global hegemony by financial oligarchy or shall we oppose this dangerous concentration of political power?

The implications of globalization for the European nation-states are fairly obvious. They are to gradually disappear. At present, 80 percent of the laws passed by national parliaments originate in the European Commission, which is part of the machinery of international control. The national parliaments are permitted to exist so that ordinary Europeans might believe that they still enjoy democratic rights.

The EU technocrats are determined to implement an open border regime for the European nations. The ultimate goal is the fusing of European nation-states into a Euro-Afro-Arab conglomeration. In 2015, German Chancellor Merkel arbitrarily opened the gates to 1.5 million impoverished inhabitants from Middle-Eastern and African countries. The popular uproar in Germany over this sudden, massive influx of poor people was such, that the authorities have since then scaled back the intake of migrants to a tenth of the 2015 rate; but they are still allowed to come.

The open border regime with regard to presumed refugees also applies with varying levels of rigour to the other European states. Of note is that the newly-installed Biden administration is also embarking on a Merkelesque immigration policy that will allow millions of poverty-stricken migrants to cross the US-Mexican border.

The implications of globalization for the material welfare of the individual, however, are not as apparent as the consequences for the sovereignty of the nation-states. In this book I have tried to illustrate how the globalists' ambition to integrate billions of Third World inhabitants into their global economic space has resulted in a massive drain of jobs and wealth from Europe and the US to the developing world. A major redistribution of wealth has been in progress since at least 1970, but ordinary Europeans and Americans have not been invited to express their position in this connection.

Fortunately, organized opposition to uncontrolled immigration and EU federalist ambitions is emerging in many countries in Europe. I have outlined some ideas on how the new opposition forces might proceed in their struggle against the destructive influences of globalization.

In particular, I emphasize the need for a modern ideology of nationalism. The time remaining to us before the globalists inflict irreversible damage to the European nations must be used to develop a new and more durable concept of political life. The world as we know it rests on specific political institutions, established political practices and a certain way of conducting economic activity, which are grounded in principles shared by the elites and tolerated by broad masses of people.

If we want to escape from our current troubles and find a better life, we need to thoroughly understand the flawed ideas which underpin the present world order – their origin, development and ultimate failure. We need to replace these outdated notions with more rational concepts regarding the nature of man and society, the individual's needs, and the role of the state. Paraphrasing Nietzsche, we must re-evaluate the values which have up to now decisively shaped our lives. If we are uncertain as to ultimate aims, our opponents will take advantage of this confusion and lead us astray.

Nationalism is the antithesis of universalism. It assigns to the individual service to his particular national community, and not mankind in general, as the highest necessity. Universal doctrines dissipate energy through indiscriminate advance into unending space, while nationalism consolidates force by directing outward thrusts back to the point of origin.

Internationalism is obliged to pay tribute to individual liberty both to mask its thirst for world domination and to undermine the basis for group consolidation, which could threaten its hegemony. Nationalism calls for solidarity, which must limit individual freedom to a certain extent, but ultimately makes him strong in a real sense.

Modern nationalism would define meaning in life as the search for the strong and durable through the pooling of individual power in a national community. The individual, no matter how well endowed with health, intelligence and experience, cannot consider himself as the ultimate purpose of his life-long exertions, if only on account of the consciousness of his mortality.

He must realize that nature places limits to the growth of individual organisms, no matter how highly developed. As the repository of a tremendous accumulation of past energy, acquired through years of study and experience, the mature mind is the prisoner of very powerful forward momentum. The thought that years of study, labor and striving will come to a complete end after death is unbearable, even inconceivable.

The mind therefore needs to find an outlet, which inevitably leads to the human associations that the individual has established or joined. The same instinct which impels the individual to magnify force through attachments to other people and which requires the recasting of individual consciousness into a collective outlook also provides a bridge of continuity into the future. To merge one's aspirations into a unity of wills means to mitigate the sense of futility inspired by the prospect of death.

The Promise and the Reality of Globalization

The adherents of globalism believe they are closing in on the achievement of their grand design – the unification of mankind, sometimes also referred to as the New World Order. This still incomplete project – which Alexander the Great, the Roman Caesars, Napoleon, Leon Trotsky, Joseph Stalin and other megalomaniac conquerors dreamed about, but never fully realized – is being carried forward resolutely, and at the same time, carefully, gradually, even stealthily.

Unification by bureaucratization. For the most part, the globalists' vision is being implemented not by military force, but by huge bureaucracies, which for over 70 years, have been functioning unobtrusively in the realms of finance, international trade, foreign investment, diplomacy and security. A host of international institutions advancing the globalist agenda have sprung up in the post-war period, including the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the like. The one-world project receives quiet, but effective support from a wide spectrum of public and private elites active in the financial, corporate, governmental, journalistic, cultural and ecclesiastical fields.

Curiously, the architects of globalism seem at times reluctant to boldly proclaim the necessity of global governance, much less do they speak of global domination or conquest. Instead, they prefer a *sotto voce* approach, drooping on about international cooperation, multilateralism, partnerships, shared values and shared sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the long-term aims of the internationalists do on occasion percolate through to the surface. For this project is not an entirely secret affair; it could never be fully concealed, given the enormity of its consequences for all of us.

Speaking on September 11, 1990, to a joint session of Congress on the eve of the Gulf War, the Republican President of the United States, George H. W. Bush, declared that: "Out of these troubled times...a new world order can emerge...An era in which the nations of the world...can prosper and live in harmony. A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavour. Today that new world is struggling to be born..."

In the summer of 1992, Joe Biden, the US Senator from the State of Delaware, at the time an influential member of the Democratic opposition, addressed the subject of the New World Order in four speeches given to the US Senate. Biden pointed out that "We are on the threshold of a new world order, and the present administration [of George H. W. Bush] is not sure what the order is...But I would like to suggest how we might begin to reorganize our foreign policy...My theme is that we must rescue this concept from negligence and pursue an active new world order agenda..." Of course, the then Democratic Senator from

Delaware has now become the President of the United States. President Biden, early on in his administration, has clearly signalled his determination to accelerate the process of global integration, following the uncertain hiatus initiated by his Republican predecessor, Donald Trump.

Globalism represents a mortal danger to European nation-states and to the indescribably rich and profound cultures that the nation-states are still safeguarding, to the extent that global governance allows. The drive to unite mankind in reality is all about extending the power of incredibly wealthy individuals at the expense of the power of everybody else, especially of the European nation-states and their citizens. But if this fact were sufficiently appreciated, the internationalists would run into great difficulties in gaining the Europeans' support for their dreams of world hegemony. Thus, logically, the leading globalists need to disguise their thirst for power and present their megalomaniac project as a blessing for Europe and humanity in general.

The globalists' public agenda. Although they are strangely circumspect in this matter, the internationalists have written and talked enough about their plans to give us some idea of the benefits that globalism will supposedly bring us. Let us take a closer look at three of their key, declared goals, while also recognizing that there are other items in the internationalist program.

- Probably the most important of the promised blessings of unification is the prospect of universal peace, to which President George H. W. Bush alluded in 1990. With the elimination of so-called national egoisms – which the globalists identify as the main instigators of wars – humanity will finally be in a position to concentrate its enormous potential on peaceful aims, rather than on mutual destruction.

- The second positive outcome of globalization would be of an economic nature. With the elimination of national boundaries and national regulation, investment capital theoretically should be free to find optimal opportunities for generating new wealth on a global scale. As a result, millions of Third World inhabitants would be given the chance to escape extreme poverty. The World Bank and UN bureaucracies have apparently been playing an important role here.
- The third theoretical advantage of world unification might be a successful conclusion of the war against human-induced climate change, which allegedly can only be accomplished through international cooperation and such multilateral vehicles as the UN Paris Climate Agreement of 2016. The battle against global warming is now being presented as a virtual Crusade both in Europe and North America. The European Commission, guided by its President Ursula von der Leyen, and the new US Administration, headed by President Joe Biden, have adopted this as a top priority. Significantly, even some of the wealthiest oligarchs and financial magnates, like Bill Gates of Microsoft and Larry Fink of Blackrock, have joined in the campaign for urgent action on the climate front. Some observers even speculate that it is the super-wealthy financial oligarchs who are setting the tone for the narrative on impending climate catastrophe.

Before proceeding to a more extensive discussion regarding the ideological foundation of internationalism, it would be helpful to briefly evaluate what the globalists have been up to, especially during the last half-century of intensified globalist economic integration. What have the internationalists accomplished so far? Are ordinary citizens in Europe and North America satisfied with the integrationist policies of their ruling elites?

A unified world endowed with permanent peace?

What is the most significant result of a half-century of hyper-integration in international economic relations? In essence, the most significant thing that the Western global empire builders have achieved is to facilitate the rise of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Thanks to consciously guided, massive Western investments, a free trade regime and outsourcing of production, the PRC now has an economy that, by some measures, is already larger than that of the US. And it is growing twice, or three, or even four times, faster than the economies of Europe and North America. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the PRC had by 2019, received 1.8 trillion USD in foreign investment (FDI), the largest such boost to growth that any developing country has ever been given. The real, unofficial total of Western FDI is likely several times larger, given that investment often flows surreptitiously into China via third countries, such as Singapore.

If the economic trends of the last 40 years continue, China will push aside the Western empire builders and become the dominant global power. The Chinese, and not the Western globalists, could very well become the ultimate arbiters of the fate of humanity.

This unsettling prospect has already prompted senior officials in the US to make fundamental reassessments of America's global security stance, witness President Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy. Subsequently, President Trump turned the US pivot into more aggressive thrusts, including the imposition of significant customs duties on Chinese exports, in an effort to begin chipping away at China's growing strength.

Some foreign affairs analysts have begun discussing future US-Chinese relations within the context of a “Thucydides Trap”, which highlights the historical tendency towards inevitable war between a rising power and an established hegemon. Many foreign policy analysts expect tensions between the US (the established global power) and the PRC (the rising global power) to remain high for years to come. Some Australian and Southeast Asian leaders have even started talking about the real possibility of a major shooting war in the region. Obviously there is no need to underline the gravity of a potential war between two states armed with nuclear weapons and supported by powerful allies.

The fight against Third World poverty at the cost of de-industrialization of Western societies. The second declared goal of the globalists – the commitment to free millions of Third World inhabitants from economic distress – is also closely related to the astounding story of China’s ascent. Meanwhile, the economic advancement of millions of poor people has had unintended consequences in other fields. There has been a dramatic spill-over effect on global energy consumption levels and, by extension, on dramatically increased levels of air pollution.

On the face of it, the globalists can already point to significant achievements in eradicating economic hardships in the Third World. The first of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), proclaimed by the United Nations (UN), has been reached ahead of schedule. The first MDG provided for a 50 percent cut in the 1990 level of extreme poverty by 2015. This worthy goal was accomplished in 2010, five years faster than planned. According to World Bank calculations, 1.1 billion individuals managed to escape extreme poverty during the period 1990 to 2010.

Among those rescued, at least 200 million were Chinese citizens who benefitted from unprecedentedly generous flows of Western investment. But this figure encompasses only the very poorest, those who were earning less than 1.90 USD per day. The number of PRC residents who have attained middle class status now exceeds 700 million.

As a result, hundreds of millions of newly affluent people have been dramatically increasing purchases of a dizzying array of consumer products, including automobiles. China now assembles 28 million automobiles each year, which is more than the combined production total of the US and Japan. As Chinese GDP expanded 40 times (from 306 billion USD to 14 trillion USD) in the past 40 years, so, too, did the number of gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles. Approximately 330 million autos are currently in use in China.

But government planners and very helpful Western automobile executives from Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, BMW, Ford and Toyota are working to double or triple this gigantic total. It is hoped that the number of cars for every 1 000 Chinese residents (currently 145) will eventually approximate Western ownership ratios (for example, 570 autos for every 1 000 in Germany).

The industrialization of China and India heavily impact global air pollution levels. Since it is a well-known fact, that every 1 percent growth in GDP carries with it a corresponding rise in energy use (as well as increases in climate-changing pollution), it is obvious that the globalists' declared plans to eliminate poverty are colliding head-on with their stated aim of attaining a carbon-neutral world by 2050. For, if China's industrial growth were not enough, consider the globalists' development plans for India, which

has a comparable population of 1.3 billion people. And then there are other populous, recipient nations, such as Brazil, Indonesia and Bangladesh, not to mention the continent of Africa, with its over 1 billion inhabitants.

In working to reduce Third World poverty, the technocrats have also contributed significantly in placing China in first place as the largest emitter of CO₂ in the world. The PRC accounts for about a third of the global total. The US is in second place with a 14 percent level, while the EU is in third with 10 percent. India's carbon dioxide emissions are smaller (7 percent), although this proportion will grow in line with current, globalist development strategies.

Back in 1980, the Chinese „contribution“ to aggregate global CO₂ output was only 7.5 percent, while the total for India amounted to a mere 1.6 percent. Thus, in the last 40 years, China and India together have expanded their share of global carbon dioxide production four times, and currently both countries account for the greatest part (40 percent) of the world's carbon dioxide problem.

With regard to the burning of coal, it must be stressed that the PRC consumes 51 percent of the world's entire extraction of this highly polluting energy source. China annually produces about 3.5 billion tons of coal from its own mines. Although the PRC leadership committed itself to radically reduce coal burning by signing the UN Paris Climate Accord, China has since then continued planning and building new coal-fired power plants. In the three years following Chinese adherence to the Paris agreements, the PRC government has issued permits for new installed capacity of coal-generated electricity (120 gigawatts) that

equals the entire current installed capacity of coal-powered electricity production in all of the EU countries.

During the past 40 years, European countries have reduced their CO₂ output by 16 percent. By contrast Chinese and Indian air pollution continues to grow rapidly. China's emissions of this greenhouse gas rose 4.7 percent in 2019, before the coronavirus struck.

We are therefore confronted with the outrageous fact that the globalist elites are to a great extent the cause of the presumed global warming crisis. And the very people who have profitted enormously from the massive outsourcing of industrial activity are now clamoring for even stricter limits on carbon emissions in the EU and US.

Despite appearances, this corporate-supported campaign for a carbon neutral future is only secondarily concerned with averting climate catastrophe. The chief purpose is political and financial. By constantly warning about the world-wide dangers associated with greenhouse gas emissions, the architects of globalism hope to evoke a sense of international solidarity that will absorb the altruistic impulses of many well-meaning people. The global Crusade to save Mother Earth is really meant to deflect attention away from more relevant national concerns, such as the de-industrialization of European societies that was engineered by the globalists. The public relations campaign that stimulates concern for global issues like atmospheric warming hopefully will displace concern for national aspirations, thus educating citizens of nation-states to become citizens of the world. And, of course, the leading globalists want to show that they really care about the environment, and not just about their profits.

The fight against global poverty and the outsourcing of well-paying jobs. When the most powerful and wealthy financial and corporate leaders take the podium to advocate environmentalist policies, they are in reality drawing attention away from the financial and corporate operators' enormous profits deriving from global economic integration. Ordinary people in Europe and North America should be incensed by the fact that the outsourcing of their industrial jobs has led to stagnating GDP growth and worsening economic prospects for the middle classes in their countries.

Instead of questioning the sanity of the globalists' development plans in the context of environmental sustainability, the corporate-inspired media focuses public debate on how Europeans and North Americans could further reduce their carbon footprints in their own countries. The financial elites might well be pleased to watch the EU nations pursuing the will-o'-wisp of a climate-neutral Europe by 2050, while they continue profiting from growing investments in China, India, Vietnam, Mexico and many other Third World countries where environmental protection is more often declared rather than implemented.

Finally, the first signs of organized, political opposition to world government. But, fortunately, the limits to deceptive public relations are becoming evident. As President Lincoln reportedly said: "You can fool all the people some of the time and some of the people all the time, but you cannot fool all the people all the time."

And, in this light, it is becoming apparent that public support for the international integrationist policies of the elites is slowly crumbling. The very regions that have been hit the hardest by de-industrialization (the East of France,

the Eastern provinces of Germany, North East England, the Midwestern US) have given the most support to the turbulent rise of opposition to globalism, witness the rise of Le Pen, the Alternative for Germany, the Brexit movement and the Trump phenomenon.

President Trump's 2016 campaign rhetoric resounded very strongly among the de-industrialized middle classes. At one point, he remarked that: "Since China joined – that's another beauty – the WTO in 2001, the US has lost many more than 60 000 factories." For now, the internationalists are clearly satisfied that Trump has been deposed, but the very causes of the growth of the so-called populists have not disappeared, but rather they will proliferate with the deepening of globalist integration.

Energy bottlenecks to the continued advance of globalism. The attempt to transform the most populous nation on earth into a society of motorized consumers helped bring about the oil price shock of 2008, when world oil prices surged from 50 USD per barrel to 140 USD per barrel. China's steadily growing appetite for oil imports put ever increasing strains on available production capacity, and one significant outcome of this was an energy crisis followed immediately by a severe financial crisis. The PRC in 2019, consumed 14 percent of the world's entire petroleum production, and it is the second largest global consumer behind the US, which uses 20 percent of the total.

As some economic observers have noted, the task of raising the living standards of 2.6 billion Chinese and Indians to the level of the American middle class would require four additional planets to supply the natural resources (oil, gas, metals, water and farmland) required for such

a transformation. Nevertheless, these two countries, and the multinational corporations and banks which are financing their industrial expansion, seem determined to continue on the present course.

As Jeff Rubin, the author of an insightful book on energy and globalization, pointed out in 2009, surging world-wide demand depleted readily available stocks of petroleum and brought about persistently high prices of energy. Rubin maintains that expensive energy was the major cause of the economic contraction of 2008-2009.

The globalized economy and free trade depend heavily on cheap petroleum to facilitate the movement of commodities and people around the globe. If oil prices rise above 100 USD per barrel, then transportation costs become prohibitive, and it becomes uneconomical to purchase goods far away from home. According to Rubin, four out of the last five economic contractions were caused by surges in the price for petroleum. The recession of 2008-2009, however, was the worst because the oil price rise that caused it was far more dramatic than on previous occasions.

Rubin believes that the net result of tightening access to cheap oil will be a reversal of the globalization process and a return to local economies. Those who assumed that global unification through ever closer economic integration is the wave of the future, will find their dreams receding as the increasing scarcity of inexpensive petroleum forces a reorientation to local economies.

In truth, the significant price increases of oil which commenced in the 1970s, coincided with the early phases of the surge in foreign investment and global trade. As glo-

bal economic integration gathered momentum, so too did the demand for oil. Petroleum production over this period more than doubled to 100 million barrels per day in 2019. At the same time, living standards in the Western democracies began stagnating, and later they fell.

In the 1980's, the Soviet Union also began feeling the first effects of scarcity of raw materials. Gorbachev, who presided over an East bloc version of globalization that he wanted to preserve, talked about this impending crisis endlessly. He warned that the USSR's extensive economic development, which consumed and wasted prodigious amounts of raw materials and labour, should shift to a policy of intensification.

This term meant organizing production with a greater reliance on more advanced technology and better management methods. After the intensification campaign failed to produce satisfactory results, however, Gorbachev pushed for „glasnost“ and rapprochement with the West in hopes of gaining access to Western technology, investment and markets. Gorbachev probably calculated that the over-centralized Soviet economy could not hope to deal with looming shortages of accessible raw materials, and he therefore embarked on “perestroika“, the long road of reforms that he felt would bring Western efficiency to the USSR. Seen in this light, Russia's acquiescence to the independence of the Soviet republics is comprehensible as a way of eliminating claims on supplies of cheap, centrally-subsidized resources – like oil and gas – by the non-Russian nations of the USSR.

The fracking intermezzo. The major factor that has halted the collapse of the globalization project on account of energy factors was the introduction of large-scale fracking in 2003. The modernized fracking techniques helped open up vast petroleum deposits that were previously considered uneconomical. But they represent an extraction method that is much more expensive than conventional oil production, and it damages the environment far more significantly. The new drilling processes facilitated a remarkable boost in oil production from 85 million barrels before the 2008 price shock to 100 million barrels per day in 2019, prior to the coronavirus pandemic.

It is notable, however, that, since the 2008 crisis, nearly all of this growth in oil output has been accounted for by fracking and other unconventional, and more expensive production methods. Conventional oil deposits continue to provide a stagnating level of output at about 80 million barrels. Over time, however, the conventional wells are expected to show steady depletion.

Since these new production techniques are far more expensive than conventional methods, their stimulus to increased oil extraction has not resulted in significantly cheaper energy. The world oil price has remained at historically high levels, hovering near 50 USD per barrel in the past few years.

It is worthwhile pointing out that the best years of dynamic economic growth in Western societies (from 1950 to the oil crisis of 1973) coincided with a petroleum price level that remained close to 20 USD per barrel, as calculated in current USD values. Present-day prices, although

they are dramatically lower than at the time of the 2008 price shock, nevertheless are twice the level that facilitated the buoyant post-war years in the West. Hence, stagnating GDP growth levels at rates close to 1 percent will likely remain the norm for the foreseeable future, with all that this implies for rising social discontent, to the accompaniment of surging wealth disparities.

Therefore, there is good reason to believe that globalism, and the empire builders' dream of unifying humanity, rest on a faulty material foundation – unsustainable exploitation of finite resources.

Chapter II: **Assessing Fifty Years of Turbocharged Globalization**

At this point the reader might ask if the architects of globalism care at all about the economic welfare of the hard-working people of Europe and America. The globalists, having triggered world-wide energy and environmental crises by facilitating Third World industrialization on a massive scale, are now foisting costly green policies on Europeans and Americans. The trillions earmarked to wage the climate change war will burden the de-industrialized Western economies with heavier taxes and mountains of new debt. The Western oligarchs' global ambitions are pushing the middle classes down a path leading towards scarcity.

The elites running the European Union and the United States claim they are defending the interests of their citizens, but the truth is that the EU and the US bureaucracies are merely part of the machinery designed to bring disparate parts of the globe into an economic, and later, a political union. The EU represents an intermediate phase of a much broader process of global confluence that aims to interlink the economies of Europe, North America and the Indo-Pacific region.

Setting the stage for the current phase of globalization. It would be useful to outline the beginnings of what could be termed the supercharged phase of global economic integration, which lifted off in the 1960s, and began gaining momentum in the 1970s. This is not the first time that the world has witnessed a surge in international trade, finance and investment. Economic historians occasionally refer to the period 1870-1914, as the first “golden age” of globalization, which was interrupted by World War I. We will discuss this first globalization phase in a later chapter.

The second surge in globalization started in the mid-1960's, with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which opened the way to ruthless elimination of national controls over international commerce. Over the following years, tariffs and other measures protecting local markets and producers were dismantled to give a powerful impetus to the unconstrained, world-wide movement of goods, capital, labor and productive capacity.

This laid the groundwork for colossal shifts in economic relations that emerged in the following decades. International corporations needed to first establish a global free trade regime, if they were to launch their subsequent massive outsourcing of production from North America and Europe to low-wage countries. The globalists would not have moved productive enterprises abroad, without first creating a legal and diplomatic framework that ensured their right to export their outsourced production back to Western markets. This migration of capital and factories, often euphemistically referred to as liberalization of economic activity, proved to have highly damaging effects for millions in industrial communities throughout Europe and the US.

Western investment activity undoubtedly had a strategic/security component during the Cold War stage of turbocharged globalization. At some point in the late 1970s, US foreign policy experts convinced Western plutocrats to invest heavily in the PRC and build its economic power so that China might become a counterbalance to the feared Soviet Union. Or was it the oligarchs who nudged US policymakers towards this outcome?

In any case, both the Western and Soviet elites diverted enormous wealth generated by their citizens to poor countries to draw the latter into their respective spheres of influence. As might be expected, there was no serious debate involving ordinary Soviet workers on sharing their wealth with countries like Cuba, Angola or Egypt. On the other hand, Western elites were also derelict in consulting with ordinary citizens on the wisdom of building up poor countries into industrial powers. The reason for this strange coincidence is that both the Western and Soviet elites were internationalists with regard to their priorities. For them the most important consideration was not the welfare of their citizens. Their main task was to extend their own brand of globalism over as much of the planet as their unconsulted citizens could bear.

Globalism unilaterally imposes major social dislocation on Western societies. Although the corporate media are reluctant to disclose the true scale and social cost of outsourcing manufacturing activity, the appearance of extensive “rust belts” in many formerly prosperous industrial regions in the US and Europe underlines the massive dimensions of deindustrialization. According to the Economic Policy Institute, outsourcing costs America 300 000 jobs each year. Since 1997, over 91 000 manu-

facturing plants have closed (in large measure because of their relocation abroad), and 5 million production jobs have been lost. From the 1960s to the present, the share of manufacturing in total US employment was cut in half, from 22 percent to less than 10 percent.

In Europe, de-industrialization has proceeded at a somewhat slower pace. Nevertheless, UK trade union sources note that as many as 600 000 manufacturing positions in the UK were eliminated over the past decade. As in the US, the share of manufacturing in total UK employment also fell by half to less than 9 percent in the decades that globalization gained momentum.

A visit to any European hardware center or shopping mall will reinforce the popular consensus that most of the electronic devices, household tools, utensils, toys, clothes and the thousands of other items that European consumers purchase daily are mostly made in China. Europeans are now beginning to see through the corporate propaganda. Facing an economic future darkened by globalization, millions have been voting for globalization sceptics like Italy's Salvini, France's Le Pen and the Alternative for Germany.

Corporate economic publicists and professional economists engage in elaborate interpretations of the "pros and cons" of outsourcing, which in essence serve only to obfuscate the real issues involved. Mainstream assessments of deindustrialization studiously avoid making the connection between the "flowering" of globalization from the 1970s to the present day and the stagnating living standards of most people in the West over this same period.

Oswald Spengler understood the dangers of outsourcing industrial production ninety years ago. We will have more to say about declining economic prospects later, but here it would be useful to cite the words of a profound student of Western civilization. The German philosopher Oswald Spengler – who is best known for his majestic *The Decline of the West*, which was first published in 1918 – warned presciently about the dangers of outsourcing productive capacity and industrial know-how. Ninety years ago, Spengler made the following observations in his *Man and Technics*:

“The immense superiority that Western Europe and North America enjoyed in the second half of the nineteenth century, in power of every kind – economic and political, military and financial – was based on an uncontested monopoly of industry... The role of the rest of the world was to absorb the product, and colonial policy was always, for practical purposes, directed to the opening-up of new markets and new sources of raw material, not to the development of new areas of production...

And then, at the close of the last [19th] century, the blind will-to-power began to make its decisive mistakes. Instead of keeping strictly to themselves the technical knowledge that constituted their greatest asset, the ‘white’ peoples complacently offered it to all the world, in every Hochschule [higher education institution], verbally and on paper, and the astonished homage of Indians and Japanese delighted them.

The famous ‘dissemination of industry’ set in, motivated by the idea of getting bigger profits by bringing production into the marketing area. And so, in place of the export of

finished products exclusively, they began an export of secrets, processes, methods, engineers, and organizers.

And so presently the 'natives' saw into our secrets, understood them, and used them to the full. Within thirty years the Japanese became technicians of the first rank, and in their war against Russia [in 1904-05] they revealed a technical superiority from which their teachers were able to learn many lessons.

Today more or less everywhere – in the Far East, India, South America, South Africa – industrial regions are in being, or coming into being, which, owing to their low scales of wages, will face us with a deadly competition. The unassailable privileges of the white races have been thrown away, squandered, betrayed.

The others have caught up with their instructors. Possibly – with their combination of 'native' cunning and the over-ripe intelligence of their ancient civilizations – they have surpassed them. Where there is coal, or oil, or water-power, there a new weapon can be forged...

The exploited world is beginning to take its revenge on its lords. The innumerable hands of the coloured races – at least as clever, and far less exigent – will shatter the economic organization of the whites at its foundations. The accustomed luxury of the white workman, in comparison with the coolie, will be his doom."

Many contemporaries of Spengler dismissed his forebodings concerning the rise of non-Western nations as exaggerated fears. Ninety years after the publication of *Man and Technics*, however, we can only marvel at Spengler's insightfulness, as the West grapples with the con-

sequences of China's ascent. Reading Spengler's long-term interpretations of historical processes, we can better comprehend the overarching implications of globalization on Western living standards.

The post-war prosperity driven by cheap petroleum.

As a matter of fact, Spengler's warnings about the fragility of Western living standards only assumed concrete reality four decades after the publication of *Man and Technics*. First, the West was to experience a blossoming of post-war consumerism. The US and Western European countries achieved unprecedented levels of prosperity from about 1950 to 1973 (the year of the first Arab oil boycott). Unfortunately, much of this material abundance – such as the appearance of hundreds of millions of private automobiles and millions of new homes in the spreading suburbs – rested on the ruthless exploitation of natural resources, especially petroleum. Economic activity could expand for several decades, unburdened by costly energy. The ill effects of turbocharged globalization had not yet become apparent.

During this boom, oil prices remained at a range of 20-26 USD per barrel (measured in current USD), which many experts consider optimal for a buoyant economy. From 1950 to 1960, the first decade of post-war affluence, GDP growth in Western countries remained strong and at times exceeded 5-6 percent annually. From 1960 to 1970, GDP increased at slightly lower rates, but still remained historically high at 4-5 percent per year.

Annual increases of GDP slowed considerably after the first oil boycott of 1973, subsequently hovering in a range between 3-4 percent. An important reason for this decline was the tripling of petroleum prices. In 1978, following yet

another war in the Middle East, the oil price shot up again – this time by 200 percent. As could be anticipated, the price shock caused a very painful economic contraction that lasted several years. GDP growth eventually resumed, but at slower rates, barely rising higher than 3 percent per year.

Chinese demand puts heavy pressure on energy prices. By then, the globalists' investment and lending activities in the so-called developing countries were contributing to significant increases in global demand for energy. The industrialization of the PRC triggered an explosive rise in Chinese demand for oil during the decade following the year 2000. This led to the record surge in oil prices to 147 USD per barrel in 2008 – and yet another recession hit the Western countries. Economic activity eventually rebounded, but increases in GDP slid appreciably from 2010 to 2020, barely exceeding 1 percent annually in the economically advanced European countries.

It is important to bear in mind that maintaining even this frail GDP growth required massive government and private borrowing. In other words, once the cost of petroleum rose several times higher than the previously indicated optimal levels, consumption could only be sustained by piling on debt. The US, Japan, France, Italy and Spain began accumulating government and private debts at ever faster rates. The level of indebtedness of all these states now exceeds 100 percent of their yearly GDP.

We can now appreciate how globalization has squeezed the working and middle classes of the West in at least two important respects. On the one hand, the diversion of US and Western European capital to the Third World, measured in trillions of USD, helped power a surge in indus-

trial development in the emerging economies. This massive transfer of wealth triggered huge increases in energy use globally, and, as a consequence, petroleum became an expensive commodity. The disappearance of cheap oil, which had upheld the post-war prosperity of the West until 1973, has since then put a serious damper on GDP growth in Europe and the US.

At the same time, the outsourcing of tens of thousands of manufacturing plants to the developing countries has eliminated millions of well-paid positions in the West. The rising service sector, which the corporate media and academics tout as the antidote to deindustrialization, has generated much smaller wages than production employment. Millions of US voters supported Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election because they disagreed with the orthodox view that a growing service sector would make deindustrialization irrelevant to concerns about declining material welfare.

Sinking economic standards decimate Western demographic prospects. The gradual decline in economic fortunes that we have traced over the past half-century has coincided with an alarming weakening of the demographic potential of Western countries. The number of deaths in Europe has consistently exceeded the number of births during this 50-year period of hyper-globalization.

Young people generally want to bring children into the world when there is widespread confidence in the future. The end of World War II ushered in such an optimistic atmosphere that helped produce the baby boom, during which the number of live births exceeded deaths for a sustained period. In the US, post-war prosperity allowed working and middle class people to raise large families, purchase private

homes, buy cars and send their children to college – all at a reasonable cost without crushing debt and often on the basis of only one family member earning a wage. Families with two or three children were a common sight in the US and Western Europe during the post-war era of plenty.

Reasonably-priced housing increasingly becomes a distant prospect for young people. One vital requirement for starting a family is the availability of affordable housing. Unfortunately, this is one dimension of economic well-being that the globalized economies of the West are clearly failing to deliver. Although mainstream economic analysts manipulate economic data masterfully to create the impression that we are still relatively affluent, the reality is that in the US about 52 percent of young adults up to the age of 30 still live with their parents. The European statistics are about as dismal as those for America.

The corporate media are skilled in painting cheerful pictures of happy consumers enjoying the benefits of inexpensive household appliances, personal computers and marvelously versatile telephones. But owning a home or an apartment without having to pay half of one's income for rent is a prospect that eludes more and more young people.

Patrick Buchanan's The Death of the West. According to the US author Patrick Buchanan, European countries are dying. Buchanan sounded the alarm in 2002, in his book, *The Death of the West*, which graphically illustrates the disastrous demographic trends of countries in Europe and the West in general. Making use of UN data, Buchanan warns that if the decades-long negative birth rates continue, all of Europe from Iceland to Russia will contract from 728 to 556 million inhabitants by about 2040.

Over the span of another 50 years, only 207 million Europeans would be left, which is less than a third of the present population. Europe has never experienced such a period of demographic collapse, save for the Black Death epidemic of the Middle Ages that carried away one-third of the continent's inhabitants.

The consequences of negative birth rates (when deaths exceed births each year) are no longer a distant threat to be waved away by superficial observers. They are making themselves felt even now. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and France slashed social welfare payments not only because their financial systems were in poor condition, but also on account of unfavorable demographic tendencies. In practically all Western countries health and pension payments are becoming a growing burden because the ratio of working age to retirement age populations is steadily worsening. If present trends are not reversed, a third of the people born in Europe will be older than 60 years by 2050.

The globalists see mass immigration as the panacea for the graying of Europe. As the average statistical age of Europeans increases, so too does the flow of illegal and legal immigration. In 1999, half a million illegal immigrants arrived in the EU countries, which was ten times greater than the inflow of 1993. In the summer of 2015, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, without warning, signaled that her country was ready to welcome practically unlimited numbers of real or presumed refugees. News of this incredible prospect for economic advancement spread like wildfire over many impoverished countries, and Germany unsurprisingly was inundated with an influx of 1.3 million destitute immigrants from Asia and Africa.

Many observers thought that Merkel's actions were ill-considered, or worse, given the massive problems and expenses that German authorities were immediately confronted with in providing the immigrants with housing, health services, welfare payments and schools for their children. In actual fact, Merkel and the EU elites welcomed this development, as it rather unexpectedly moved forward their agenda for facilitating mass immigration into the EU.

The UN statistical reports that Buchanan cites, the EU recommendations on the subject, and the general tenor of media discussion of this issue generally point in one direction. The key problem highlighted is the alleged economic necessity of keeping the ratio between working age and pension age people relatively stable. According to these orthodox experts, the only way of doing this is to permit unprecedented levels of immigration. If Europe is to maintain the current 5 to 1 ratio of working age to pension age inhabitants up to the year 2050, then it supposedly must facilitate an immigration of hundreds of millions of working age people from the Third World.

Only Africa and the Middle East countries can be expected to provide such a huge quantity of "human resources" that the UN and EU population experts believe Europe requires. In summarizing the problem, Buchanan comes to the conclusion that either Europeans will be forced to radically downgrade the quality of their pension systems or the Old Continent will become a part of the Third World. All indications are that the European elites have resigned themselves to the latter course.

A third alternative, namely a program of massive support for young families, combined with measures to incre-

ase youth employment opportunities, is not included among the policy options under serious consideration by the globalists or the UN and EU apparatchiks. Some of the more radical members of various green parties and movements are advocating the thesis that the citizens of wealthy countries should abstain from raising children as a sacrifice they can make in the climate change war, since children will grow up and only add to population pressure on the environment.

State support for young families: an issue neglected by West European nationalists. It is the author's view that the demographic collapse of Europe is the gravest issue confronting our future. The graying of Europe is already weighing heavily on prospects for economic growth, the solvency of welfare systems and defense capabilities.

If young Europeans are looking for a common challenge, a sense of general purpose and an outlet for their altruism, then the globalists' war on climate change is not the issue that will satisfy their longings. The green agenda is a red herring and must be exposed as such. The main reason that Europeans are being pushed to sacrifice their material well-being is the globalists' need to somehow lessen the pressure on world energy prices. If the Western countries can be induced to further reduce their consumption levels, then the globalization enterprise of industrializing the Third World can continue for a while. If energy prices rise too much, then this ill-conceived project of shipping commodities over thousands of miles from distant factories to stores will come to a standstill.

The real challenge for Europe is demographic collapse. What Europe needs is a solid commitment by the

state to help young people decide on raising children without worrying about a descent into poverty. The rising Green Party of Germany is heavily supported by young people up to the age of 30, who are ginned up by the thrilling prospect of saving the planet's ecosystem through greater international cooperation. It should be the task of European patriotic movements to demonstrate that it is precisely the internationalists' commitment to equalize economic conditions in the world that is a major reason why we are facing a climate crisis.

European patriots should call for policies that stop the hemorrhaging of national wealth abroad, return manufacturing activity to Europe, support local producers and give young people material incentives to start families. The governments of Poland and Hungary have made some determined moves in this direction, particularly regarding assistance to young families, and the political results of these positions have been very good for the ruling parties. There is no reason to doubt that the Western European "populists" should embrace similar policies. Nationalists could take away the greens' youth electorate by showing that they care about the specific, unmet needs of young voters.

True to form, the globalists probably will oppose serious pro-natalist programs, fearing that they might strengthen patriotic sentiments and national cohesion, while also diluting international solidarity. It would be logical for the countries providing generous support to families to expect that these recipients of aid would reciprocate by living and working for the benefit of their nations, instead of emigrating.

Poland and Hungary face huge problems with youth emigration, which is one important reason for the strong

support that both countries offer to their young co-nationals. The success of the pro-natalist policies of these two East-Central European countries will not be welcomed by the Western European internationalists, who are counting on a continuing immigration of working-age people from the East.

Although the demographic picture Patrick Buchanan painted is a depressing one, there is a positive side to the bad news. At least Buchanan's numbers and prognoses show us with striking clarity the vision dreamed up by the globalists – namely the gradual union of the EU with Africa and the Middle East.

Mass immigration keeps a lid on average European and North American incomes. One other important reason for the stagnation in incomes of ordinary people in Europe and the US is mass immigration, which the globalist elites support for financial as well as ideological reasons. Although the one-world architects have registered remarkable achievements in facilitating the so-called free movement of commodities and capital, they remain unsatisfied with what mainstream commentary refers to as progress in liberalizing the movement of labour on a global scale.

Those who plan and work on unifying mankind ultimately conceive of a globalized mass of people no longer separated by significant ideological, racial, national, cultural and economic differences. The basic idea is that homogenization facilitates unity. Thus, the removal of the distinctions underlying group identity eliminates the solidarity of associations. Disorganized, atomized people are much easier to manage. Thus, the globalists are waging a relentless ideological war against all varieties of nationalism.

The creation of a single global market lays the groundwork for this process of homogenizing humanity. Already, Lithuanians can see that a major part of the Chinese workforce earns more than the average Lithuanian worker. Fifty years ago, Lithuanians were accustomed to think of China as a country of extreme poverty, while they at least had the basic amenities of civilized life.

In the rest of the world, globalization has tended towards a slow, but gradual equalization of standards and wage levels. In fact, European and American employees are constantly reminded – perhaps warned or threatened would be more appropriate words – that they must be globally competitive if they want their companies to maintain market share. In practice, however, this means that European and US workers must look on as their real incomes slowly approach Third World levels, while Third World incomes creep up toward European or US levels.

It is significant that the multilateralists are gradually introducing into public discussion a new element of what constitutes human rights, namely, the recently-invented right that all people everywhere should be able to freely choose their country of residence. The UN Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration is supposedly non-binding, but it contains no less than 50 references to the signatory countries' obligations to provide migrants with living and working opportunities that are equal to those of the receiving nation's citizens.

Each year millions of poor migrants come to the EU or the US and compete for a stagnating pool of jobs with local workers. The globalist elites welcome mass migration of economic migrants, and they are working towards

facilitating this homogenization process. Mass migration limits wage growth and helps boost company profits. But over time, migration may transform European nations into immigrant societies lacking the ethnic bond of solidarity to defend them against further inroads on their sovereignty and cultural distinctness.

The super rich appropriate ever greater shares of wealth for themselves. So far we have discussed several aspects of the decline of living standards that globalization has palmed off on the average citizens of US and Europe. But it is also crucial to understand that globalization has been a godsend for the very top of the financial pyramid. Outsourcing production to countries where working people only earn several USD per day can be exceedingly profitable, particularly if the production from the relocated enterprises is exported back to Western markets.

The elimination of national controls on the movement of capital abroad – which is also a vital element of the globalization project – has opened the gates to widespread evasion of taxes through the agency of offshore accounts. Studies show that as much as 10 percent of global GDP is hidden in tax havens for the benefit of the super-rich. Since total global wealth is estimated to amount to 400 trillion USD, we can see that we are talking about roughly 40 trillion USD that the planet's wealthiest inhabitants have removed from their home countries. As a result, tax revenues are significantly compromised, meaning that more of the tax burden falls on the middle classes.

Concentrated wealth translates into concentrated political power. The extreme concentration of wealth and political power which drives globalization and which in turn

feeds the super wealthy, has gravely undermined the capacity of communities to sustain organized opposition to its excesses. Neither the press nor the major political parties of Western democracies seriously oppose the progressive misappropriation of a community's wealth by the financial and corporate elites because the media and political parties are owned or financed by the super rich.

In 1983, fifty major corporations dominated the Western world's media. Nearly forty years on, consolidation has reduced this number to about ten. The result is the propagation of a worldview that is uniformly corporatist and internationalist.

The super rich are out of control. As the financial and political power of the super-rich balloons, so does their appetite for more wealth. If the directors of major Western corporations were generally satisfied with yearly salaries of up to one million USD in the 1970s, then in the 1980s the maximum rates had reached 40 million USD. By the 1990s, the top salary levels had already exceeded 100 million USD, and in 2019, at least half a dozen US executives were earning about 100 million USD a year or slightly more. In the same year, Elon Musk of Tesla Inc. received a yearly salary amounting to almost 600 million USD.

The heads of US corporations are currently paid approximately 400 times more than workers with an average income. By contrast, in the 1960s, the top company heads were less greedy, receiving "only" 30 times more than average wage earners. Statistics available in 2019 show that executive officers of private corporations made 940 percent more than they were earning 40 years ago. During the

same period, middle-income workers were paid only 12 per cent more than in the early 1980s, although health care and education costs had exploded in the meantime.

Although European banking executives and corporate chiefs are not rewarded as extravagantly as in the US, nevertheless American business institutions set the tone regarding the narrative of what constitutes fair compensation for economic performance. The more egalitarian traditions of European national governments dampen income inequality in Europe, but the overall trend is toward a global standard of gross aggrandizement.

Measured in global terms, the proportion of the entire planet's wealth owned by the richest one percent, amounts to 45 percent. Since the 1970s, this concentration of economic assets has been accelerating. If present-day trends continue, some analysts expect that the world's most affluent 1 percent will be in possession of 66 percent of global wealth by 2030. Since 1989, the top one percent of US residents increased their assets by 21 trillion USD, while during the same period the lower 50 percent lost 900 billion USD in wealth.

In conclusion... Having analyzed the deleterious impact of 50 year of globalization on economic and social conditions in the West, we can proceed in the next chapter to a discussion of alternative ideas, values and principles. The best way to escape from the clutches of the one-world fanatics is to identify the weakest points in their propaganda armor and subject these to analytical criticism. But it is not enough to be an anti-globalist. European patriots must develop and agree on an alternative ideological framework, a positive program for action, which will guide them in confronting the harsh realities of the coming decades.

Chapter III: **Challenging the Declared Values of Universal Doctrines**

Why we need a nationalist ideology. Populist leaders like Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen are right in zeroing in on the economic damage that the globalists have inflicted on the working and middle classes. The two charismatic leaders understand that economic issues are what matter the most to broad masses of potential voters. The populists have thus successfully drawn millions of discontented people into the ranks of their supporters.

But the focus on economic issues, though important, cannot monopolize nationalist thinking. More than anything, we need an articulated world view with which we can engage internationalists on a much broader front. The reason so many well-meaning people fall for internationalist utopias is that the universalists have taken the trouble to elaborate plausible (though deeply flawed) concepts regarding the really broad questions of human existence, such as the purpose of life and what is good or evil and what constitutes progress or decline in human history.

Armed with comprehensive explanations for all of the complexities and problems of life, secure in their belief that they have the right solutions and convinced of the

moral superiority of their cause, the internationalists are primed to follow orders and do battle with their misguided or iniquitous foes.

The whole point in developing a vast literature of Marxist ideology and encouraging endless discussions of Communist ideas is to create the impression that this ideology covers all the bases. The unfounded certainty that Marxist ideologues instill in their followers easily merges into righteousness, the belief that one's values are necessary and morally justified. Airtight convictions bolster the will to fight.

By contrast, European nationalists of the 19th and early 20th centuries generally assumed that patriotism and national solidarity were natural phenomena that did not require great intellectual exertions to codify into self-sufficient state doctrines. The patriots of that time did not try hard enough to demonstrate that nationalist ideas would ultimately benefit the individual more than class struggle or laissez-faire economic principles, which opened the door to oligarchic rule.

Patriots evidently believed that it was only proper that the individual should subordinate himself to the patria. By neglecting the sphere of individual self-interest, however, patriots provided liberals with important advantages. The advocates of individual freedom had a better comprehension of the growing significance of individualism that accompanied the industrialization of European societies. The same applied to the Marxists, Socialists and Social Democrats who could exploit the urbanized workers' personal dissatisfaction with the gulf separating their living standards from the luxurious life styles of the economic elites.

Nationalism as an ideology has not developed well enough to withstand the polemical attacks which are directed against it today. If it could be called an ideology, nationalism is still a rather loosely defined doctrine. There have been many attempts to synthesize nationalism with liberal democracy, Christianity, authoritarianism, imperialism, socialism and capitalism. The fact that nationalist concepts could be paired with so many diverse political ideas, suggests that nationalism is less developed theoretically than other doctrines, such as Communism, Social Democracy, Christian Democracy or liberalism.

Moreover, when nationalist ideas are linked to other political tenets, the former often end up as auxiliaries to the tenets of other doctrines. Even Communist China exploits patriotic sentiments, although it is clear that Marxist ideas still have an official status in the ruling councils of state. Two important exceptions were the ideologies of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, whose ideas and disastrous historical experience we will discuss separately.

The reason for the relative weakness of nationalism as an ideology is not difficult to grasp. A national community is a natural, self-reinforcing association. Group consciousness arises from the simple fact of geographic proximity and its consequence – long-term interaction among the members of a national community. Extended past interaction creates an accumulated force in the consciousness of the individual members of the community, which generally impels them to continue acting in concert. This is what accounts for the cohesive force of national sentiment.

Shared attributes, like the preference of Italians for spaghetti and wine, are not decisive factors in uniting people in nations. More properly, the perceived similarities act as a constant reminder that a distinct nation is an association which has been working together for common goals for a long time. A lengthy period of interaction in roughly the same compact territory does give rise to easily recognizable common traits, including language, historical memories, nostalgic attachment to a region, shared views on life, racial types and others. How could mutually comprehensible dialects and languages have developed if not through lengthy association within a circumscribed territory? A given mass of such perceived similarities reinforces the feeling of belonging together.

This virtuous circle of geographic proximity and a momentum born of shared experiences fosters common purpose, and in the past this did not require extraordinary efforts to stimulate. For homogeneous composition of an association facilitates predictable forward movement. One could imagine that a Russian troika, a team of three horses pulling a sled, would advance without great difficulty. But if, as in Krylov's fable, a carriage were hitched to a swan, a pike and a crab, it probably would go nowhere, as each of the animals would pull in a different direction.

Political entities aiming to incorporate disparate peoples in one state therefore need elaborate ideological underpinnings to animate a common spirit. The defunct Soviet Union left few opportunities unexploited to spread the teachings of Marxism-Leninism among its citizens for decades. But when the homeland of the international proletariat was attacked by Nazi Germany in 1941, Soviet

leaders quickly realized that their only chance of survival lay in ditching Communist slogans in favor of nationalist appeals to the Russian people.

The Roman Catholic Church, which aspires to a spiritual unity of all possible peoples, spares no efforts to subject children of the faithful to years of education in its doctrines. By contrast, shared national affinities and memories of common endeavors naturally give rise to a disposition for unity even among the less reflective common people. Prior to the turbocharged phase of globalization, the ordinary citizens of European nation-states sensed that they shared a common past that impelled them into the future; they felt a commonality. They did not need to expend great mental effort to understand the basis for national unity.

But if patriotic Europeans wish to oppose the assimilation of their nations in the 21st century, they must identify those ideas which animate their most determined opponents and challenge these concepts on an ideological level. For the process of the international division of labor, which global financial interests are driving forward with all their considerable might, is pushing many formerly self-contained communities into heavy dependence on foreign markets and suppliers.

The pervasive feeling of interdependence is undermining the confidence of national communities to influence enormously significant economic processes, such as unrestricted international trade or the transfer of productive enterprises abroad. The sense that major economic decisions are totally beyond the control of national governments weakens national cohesiveness because the citizens sense that their governments are not defending their vital, material interests. Some Europeans are losing faith in the idea of

nation-states. Significant elements of European business and academic elites have a financial stake in cooperating with or joining multinational corporations or international bodies such as the EU.

For these reasons, European nationalists no longer can rely on automatic solidarity based on the momentum of past interactions. The citizens of the Old Continent are better educated, more self-conscious of their rights and more individualistic than their parents and grandparents. Appeals to patriotic sentiments are often disregarded as irrelevant. The self-conscious individual requires a rational elucidation of the merits of national solidarity. The relevance of a strong national community to individual welfare must be demonstrated. Consequently, there is a need for an ideological foundation of nationalism.

Re-evaluating the values we are given. Globalization rests on values that the elites sanctify and broad masses of people accept. If we want a better life for ourselves, we need to thoroughly understand the defective ideas which underpin the present world order – their origin, development and ultimate failure. We need to replace them with a more rational understanding of man as an individual and as a social being. Invoking the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, we should re-evaluate core values.

If we neglect the philosophical issues that preoccupy thoughtful people, we will be uncertain as to our long-range goals; and this uncertainty will percolate down to the broader membership. If we fail to develop well-grounded nationalist principles, the globalist elites will almost certainly exploit our ideological distraction and lead our supporters astray.

By way of illustration, it should now be clear that anti-globalist nationalists share some common ground with traditional leftists, who claim to oppose gross inequality of wealth and the concentrated power of big business – which we know drive globalization. Hence, sincere European patriots, demoralized by the globalists' depredations on their countries, might be tempted to side with left-leaning parties allegedly combating inequality. But, traditional leftist parties, like the German Social Democrats or even the German Greens – who started out as radical leftists – are, in fact, dyed-in-the-wool internationalists. Their ultimate aims are global, like those of the financial oligarchs pushing globalization. These self-appointed fighters against injustice will relegate to the backseat the national and regional concerns of Europeans and pursue global unification *ueber alles*.

Our internationalist opponents will never support the harsh necessity of controlling mass immigration, which inevitably will make millions of impoverished people profoundly unhappy. Committed as they are to international solidarity, the adherents of universal doctrines would certainly oppose putting an end to outsourcing of industry to poor countries. They will do nothing to lessen our dependence on imports of consumer goods from developing nations.

We must competently understand how the intellectual edifice of liberal democracy and capitalism was conceived, how it evolved, and how it has come to its present crisis. Liberal democracy is still thought of as the dominant political ideology in the world – particularly after the dramatic collapse of Soviet Communism thirty years ago.

Yet, Marxist ideology has not been banished from the world scene. Marxist notions still influence Western politi-

cal parties, intellectuals and culture. And let us not forget that Communism still enjoys an official status as the guiding doctrine of China, the second most powerful state in the world. Communism is a universal doctrine, like the ideas that sanctify globalization. This means that its exponents will be only too happy to take over the empire building project of Western globalists, should they stumble and fall. Thus, we must also critically review the fundamental principles of Marxism.

We will examine three profoundly influential universal doctrines and explain how they have deflected our attention away from what is close at hand, manageable and truly relevant, to what is distant, metaphysical, obscure – and ultimately unattainable.

Christianity as the point of departure of Western political thought. Christianity dominated Western intellectual life for well over one thousand years after the birth of Christ. Although in our time this religion generally refrains from direct intervention in politics, nevertheless, Christian morality retains its influence in many indirect, yet significant ways.

For example, Christian solicitude for the poor provides a good measure of the moral underpinning for policies that redistribute resources to the Third World. Christian spiritual leaders, like the present Pope, have played an active role in legitimizing mass immigration from the Third World. Pope Francis raised eyebrows when he publicly washed and kissed the feet of 12 migrants during Holy Thursday celebrations in 2016, in the middle of the “refugee crisis” unleashed by German Chancellor Merkel.

In her youth Merkel was deeply influenced by her father, a Protestant pastor, also known for his Marxist sympathies. US President Biden, who has declared his commitment to hyper-liberal immigration policies, is by his own characterization a devout Catholic.

We will begin our critical examination by delving into the Christian ideas that profoundly shaped modern political thought. The narrative will then review how Christianity, Marxism and liberal democracy interacted in a historical framework. The advance and regression of liberal democratic ideas will be examined as they evolved over several centuries. Finally, we will outline an alternative worldview that could serve as the basis for a more rational and natural relationship between the individual and his country or people.

The Christian faith is not in accord with human nature. Throughout its long history, Christianity has labored mightily to reshape the essentially egoistic nature of the individual human being. Admittedly, the desire to check self-aggrandizement as such is noble, since untrammelled egoism would frustrate any common enterprise. But the rationale for socially responsible behavior that the Roman Catholic Church devised was defective and ultimately harmed the subsequent development of Western political ideas.

Faced with the realization that the reformation of human nature was exceedingly difficult, the authors of Christianity decided to sidestep reality by inventing an unending after-life that would eclipse the importance of earthly existence to man. This was useful in that a contrived existence could be skillfully manipulated by the authors, while cold reality stubbornly resisted clerical influence.

Christianity proclaimed the following: (a) the body is not as valuable as the soul; (b) the rewards and punishments of physical existence are insignificant in comparison to the delightful (or frightful) conditions that await man in the everlasting life of heaven or hell and (c) it is not worth struggling too earnestly for worldly goals or prestige. A passive or fatalistic attitude would be preferable.

The practical result of the Church's doctrine on the eternal life was the blunting of the self-assertion drive of the naive, thus slowing their progress in this world. At the same time, the cynics could exploit their trusting neighbors' passivity and thereby more readily seize power in the here and now.

This supernatural expedient served the Church well during the centuries when most Europeans were peasants and had minimal educational opportunities. Nevertheless, it pandered to the lower instincts of man – the tendency toward sloth, passivity, sensual enjoyment, envy of what is superior, and timidity in the face of aggression.

For the relentless dissemination of the heavenly ideal encouraged the longing for a utopian existence, a cessation of human labor and strife, a state of permanent, universal love. The promise of paradise naturally appealed to millions who were confronted with the harsh challenges of life in the Middle Ages. It is one thing to daydream about heavenly bliss as an escapist diversion, but it is another matter when an authoritative institution like the Catholic Church cultivated baseless longings for a utopia.

Over time and with the spread of mass literacy, however, Christian theologians began to soft-pedal the supernatural aspects of their faith and doubled down on the essen-

tial principles contained in Christ's preaching – love for all mankind and universal peace. As secularization advanced, educated people gradually turned away from the magical elements of Christianity. But the basic principles of the Catholic Church took root in Western minds.

The idea that man should strive for an end to struggle, for a historical terminus of peace and plenty, became embedded in the consciousness of Europeans. People worn down by daily exertions, discord and misfortunes understandably would like to believe that the end result of all of their work could be a relaxed state of peace, satiety and freedom.

Drawing on Christian theology, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the early 19th century German philosopher, posited his concept of human history as a process inevitably tending toward a final outcome in which mankind will realize the ideal of freedom. Hegel had a strong influence over Marx, who in turn theorized about the “inevitable” development of history leading to a utopian conclusion. Marx seized on the general longing for an end to struggle and crafted a program ideally suited for the millions who felt oppressed, dissatisfied, or simply longed for an easier life.

The German philosopher Oswald Spengler called Christian theology the grandmother of Bolshevism because he perceived that universal Christian ideals formed a significant part of the ideological baggage of Marxism. The Marxists borrowed from the Christians their concept of heavenly paradise, transforming it into the terminus of the class struggle, namely the stateless Communist society of material welfare, peace, equality and sharing.

It is not too big a stretch to hear echoes of heavenly paradise when the globalists talk about ascending from the dismal swamp of feuding nationalisms to the shining peaks of the New World Order. And in 1992, Francis Fukuyama, in his renowned *End of History and the Last Man*, could not resist the siren song of Hegel and the Catholic Church. Fukuyama solemnly announced that humanity had finally reached a blessed denouement in its historical development with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the consequent triumph of liberal democracy.

Permanent peace is a utopian idea. There is no religious dogma, political order or ideology capable of removing the factors of power, intervention and opposition from human relations. The difficulty here is not so much related to the methods employed, for nothing worthwhile can be achieved without intervening. One often hears that Christianity and Communism are in principle good ideas, which regrettably are forever being compromised by clumsy implementation.

The root cause of the misfortunes brought upon people by the Church, when it was ascendant, and the Communist regimes of more recent date, lies in the doctrines themselves. The goals are defective constructions. It is a mistake to aim at a permanent state of affairs, an end as it were. There can be no end, for everything is in process of becoming and will continue to change. Human beings are extremely dynamic creatures that will never stay put.

A political ideology or religious creed that promises paradise, or an end to strife, is inherently dishonest and therefore must endlessly lie to its followers. Hence the big lie that underlies a religion or a political movement inevitably drives a wedge between the rulers and their followers.

Sooner or later the leaders will acquire a condescending attitude towards their gullible subjects, while the latter must eventually awake to the gap between gleaming ideals and sordid, daily practice.

Universal ideals serving imperial ambitions. Another dubious aspect of Church doctrine was the encouragement it provided to the striving for hegemony. If we perceive of hegemony as a state in which competing powers have been subdued for the benefit of the hegemonic force or idea, then we will see the connection between the ideal of permanent peace and the necessity of world domination. For the universal implies the supremacy of the one over the many. Those who doubt the wisdom of striving for world peace must therefore be kindly asked to leave the church premises so that the celebration of the universal mass might proceed without interruption.

Despite centuries of religious indoctrination, we see in our time that the pathologies of greed, exploitation and corruption are getting worse and not better. It is obvious that people will continue sinning against their fellows, despite the unceasing educational efforts of Christians through their media outlets, political parties, schools, youth organizations and the hundreds of thousands of clergymen preaching from their pulpits.

The sad fact is that those who achieve positions of influence are among the worst offenders against Christian morality. Once they have seized a measure of control, Christian and non-Christian elites alike tend to crave and amass even more power, often to the point of exploiting vulnerable individuals.

If Christianity accomplished anything in its long history, it demonstrated the tenuous boundary between proclaimed ends and the means employed for their realization. For declared goals, no matter how benevolent and compassionate they may appear, cannot be achieved without resorting to power, which at bottom is the capacity to overcome resistance. Even a movement striving for global peace and love will find itself in conflict with the established norms and routines of communities outside its sphere of influence.

Conversion, whether by the pulpit or the Crusaders' sword, was and remains a highly invasive procedure involving the breaking down of traditional bonds of obligation and loyalty. The experience of the Church shows that ends and means merge into each other, for both incorporate the fundamental drive for power. The advance towards a goal, even a noble one, requires the use of power against a status quo. Once the goal, which inevitably involves the accretion of influence over people, is achieved, success will draw the power holder into an ever wider sphere of human interaction, bringing with it more intervention and provoking resistance in turn. In short, the means define the ends.

History shows that the leaders of the Roman Catholic Church started violating their most treasured values once they had established some measure of authority. In the medieval period and beyond, the Christian Church used the secular power it possessed to trample on the destinies of millions. Guided by a lofty moral compass, it sanctioned highly destructive religious wars, gross internal abuses of power by favored rulers, a murderous Inquisition and heavy-handed domination of learning and culture, which translated into centuries of intellectual underdevelopment.

The cynical Bolshevik leader Trotsky observed that one cannot make an omelette without breaking some eggs. But it is clear that an omelette can keep hunger at bay only a short time. Following Trotsky's logic, a leader, or a movement, would be forced to break eggs constantly in order to stay well-fed or on top of the heap.

A short history of Catholicism as a universal doctrine.

Catholicism eventually prospered under the protection of the *Pax Romana* and later became the official religion of the empire. It is therefore not surprising that ecclesiastical leaders reoriented their thinking away from the Church's earlier support for small and autonomous communities of believers to more ambitious notions of world dominance.

The very word Catholic, which originated in the Greek language, means common to all humanity. In his preaching, Christ declared that God was equally concerned about the fate of all souls. Calling himself the good shepherd, Christ urged all people, without regard to race, gender or social standing, to enter the kingdom of love and justice that he proclaimed. Citing the parable of the shepherd who made heroic efforts on behalf of a single, lost sheep, Jesus expressed the hope that not a single human being would remain outside the protective embrace of his kingdom.

The very concept of an Almighty God contained within itself universal characteristics. If this God had unimaginably great powers and he loved all souls, surely he would not be satisfied with proselytizing that reached only a few people. The targets of Christian enticements were told that unification under the benign rule of God would free them of the usual earthly concerns about material scarcity and provide the security that is always thought to reside in

great numbers. Within the common herd of humanity there would be safety from predatory attacks and joyous sharing of bountiful wealth.

For a very long time after Christ, this seductive utopia continued to mesmerize impressionable people weary of the unavoidable burdens of real life. It also fed the deeply-rooted psychological need for a father figure, for a powerful political center ruled by a wise, just and kindly spirit. Needless to say, this attitude did not and cannot foster an independent outlook or confidence in one's own powers, or the flourishing of initiative.

The *Pax Romana* aided the progress of Christianity in that the adherents to the new faith found it easier to move about the unified political space of the Empire rather than across a multitude of feuding political entities. Roman roads of the time appeared to be wonders of the world, while Roman armed might ensured a relative degree of physical security.

It was then that the hierarchs of Christianity perceived the confluence of interests between the spiritual universality of the Church and the imperial standing of Rome. Despite initial persecutions, the Christian faith by the fourth century AD had attained the status of the dominant religion of Rome. In this way the spiritual hegemonists of the Catholic faith and the secular globalists of the Empire found common ground.

It was no accident that the Popes established themselves in Rome and thereby continued to identify themselves with the prestige of imperial Rome even after the collapse of the Empire. Neither was it a coincidence that the Catholic hierarchs chose the centralized administrative model of the Romans to manage their ecclesiastical and secular

affairs. The Roman Catholic Church thereby hoped to draw strength from two sources – the unlimited power of God and the surviving prestige of the once-mighty Roman Empire.

In the Middle Ages the Catholic faith extended its influence over virtually all of Western and Central Europe. Growing influence in the spiritual realm was accompanied by the spectacular growth of the Church's temporal power. By the 13th century Catholic popes, cardinals, bishops, monasteries and humble parishes owned no less than one-third of Western Europe's land area. For a brief period it appeared to contemporaries that the Catholic Church would become the dominant political force on the Continent.

The Popes initiated a series of Crusades against Muslims, pagan tribes and rulers still beyond the reach of the true faith. In Lithuanian history the Crusades are remembered for the duplicity, cruelty and avarice of the “defenders of the faith” and the desperate and heroic resistance of the pagan Balts – the last European pagans to be Christianized.

Nevertheless, the power of the Roman Catholic Church gradually gave way to secular rivals, namely French, Spanish and English monarchs, who were turning their gaze to the task of creating their own national states. The English King, Henry VIII, even founded a separate Anglican Church in response to the Catholic popes' meddling in his country's affairs.

Despite these setbacks, the vision of a unified Christian kingdom on earth persisted in the form of the Holy Roman Empire, albeit more as a symbol than a real center of power. The Holy Roman Empire lived on for a thousand years until it was finally buried in 1806, when Napoleon came up with the idea of founding his own European empire.

The Christian concepts of individual salvation and the immeasurable value of the individual soul played a role in the evolution of European thought even after the medieval period, the apogee of Roman Catholic influence. The Christian world view served as the ambience that nurtured the 17th and 18th century ideas of a rationally thinking individual. It pointed the way towards liberal democracy, socialism, communism, capitalism and present-day free market globalism.

Subsequent secular doctrines of political equality could be traced back to the New Testament's teachings about Christ's protective disposition towards his sheep. If every soul is equally precious in God's eyes, then each person ought to enjoy equal rights throughout this world. For the proponents of a unified world, a global political order would be the ideal means to ensure equality for all.

It is therefore not surprising that the Lithuanian bishops were strongly in favor of Lithuania joining the EU. In the rest of Europe, Church spokesmen defend the rights of both legal and illegal migrants and generally oppose strict measures of national governments to curb uncontrolled immigration into their territories. Universal norms rooted in Christian dogma are so deeply embedded in the Western world that it would require a considerable mental effort to imagine that people could live according to other standards.

Chapter IV:

The Ancient Greeks and the Jews: Two Nations that Eluded Universal Doctrines

The most important issue of today: internationalism vs. nationalism. The chief threat to the viability of European nations is extreme concentration of private wealth, which the globalists have parlayed into political influence on a global level. Fortunately, there are signs that Europeans are beginning to reject globalization. It took decades for this awakening to materialize because the globalists skillfully managed the slow descent of living standards from the booming post-war years to the stagnation of today.

From here on out, however, mass discontent can only get worse, for the process of draining European wealth to sustain Third World industrialization, and to feed the super-rich, has gained too much momentum. Globalization will lead either to a great political upheaval or the complete derangement of civilized life in Europe. The masses imagine that what is at stake is their material welfare. Important as this issue is, however, it must be positioned within a broader ideological context.

The chief point at issue is whether 700 million Europeans will stand aside and allow a tiny minority to fuse their

European identity into a global mass of humanity. Today the chief prize of the struggle for power is not just dominion over Europe or the Western Hemisphere; it is global political monopoly. The real struggle is between two opposed political conceptions – the universal and the particular.

We have already identified the globalists and their auxiliaries, and we have briefly described the levers of their power. But as great as the globalists' manifested influence is, it pales in comparison to the potential power of hundreds of millions of discontented Europeans, who may yet make use of their latent strength.

For the internationalists, the main task will be to uphold the widespread delusion that universal goals are more progressive and morally superior to national aspirations. The patriots, for their part, will argue that the limited resources of man should define the horizon of his aspirations. We ought to pursue goals that are realistic, and not take on the burden of saving all of mankind.

History provides us with at least two examples of nations that lived according to what we would consider as a nationalist outlook on life. The historical experience of the early Greeks and the Jews bolsters the thesis that limited goals are more achievable than universal ambitions.

In the following pages we will briefly examine the worldview of the ancient Greeks and the religion of the Jewish people. Their ideas came into the world thousands of years ago, but they have great relevance today. Both the ancient Greeks and the Jews were confronted with the threat of assimilation by great, multinational empires, and they met this danger with varying degrees of success. There is much that we can learn from their long experience.

Ancient Greek values contrasted with Christian doctrine and modernity. As Nietzsche so colorfully demonstrated in his *The Birth of Tragedy* and other works, early Greece flourished under the aegis of values quite contrary to Christian ideals. Nietzsche was an enthusiastic admirer of the invigorating Greek spirit, which in his writings served as the foil to the depressingly servile outlook of the Christian tradition. The Greeks loved this world, sought out its beauty and managed to extract great quantities of joy from their earthly existence. They celebrated strength, courage, self-reliance and beauty, while the Christians paid homage to weakness, servility, pity and suffering.

In the years of their greatest cultural achievements, referred to as the Classical period (510 to 323 BC), the Greek city-states heroically resisted the attempts of empire builders to subjugate them. Despite their miniscule size, the city-states managed their affairs independently for centuries, until stronger regional city-states like Athens, Sparta and Macedonia started consolidating their regional power, thereby bringing the weaker polities into their orbit.

The ancient Greeks were inveterate provincials, and by “advanced” Western standards, they were irredeemably, politically incorrect. They looked upon those who did not belong to their clans or city-states with suspicion and coined the term barbarian, meaning one who spoke no Greek or someone who was ignorant of Greek culture. It was considered normal that slaves, often captured prisoners of war, should provide menial services to the wealthier members of the community. In their arts and politics the early Greeks fostered the patriotism of their city-states so that these tiny political units could more effectively mobilize their inhabi-

tants against outside aggression. Sparta gained fame for its inordinate attention to military training, which typically commenced as early as childhood.

Plato's Republic clearly identified the citizen's duty to fight, if necessary, for his city-state, and not for universal norms or humanity in general. Aristotle's Politics and Nicomachean Ethics characterized the city-state as an independent association which stood above the interests of the individual citizen. Aristotle believed that a citizen could best realize his potential as a rational, social and moral being by serving his city-state, and not some universal deity.

We owe so much to the creative spirit of Classical Greece in the fields of philosophy, political thought, natural science, poetry, drama, sculpture and architecture. What is truly noteworthy is that such insular and tiny polities could have given birth to such a considerable part of the heritage of Western civilization.

A self-confident spirit permeates the arts and politics of the ancient Greeks. The contemporaries of the classical period did not pay much heed to foreign consultants or world fashions when they set about creating their works of art, philosophy or history, though some foreign artistic influences were creatively absorbed by Greek styles. Greek patterns of culture evolved gradually over centuries through the unbroken transmission of knowledge and skills. Foreign influences complemented, but did not overwhelm, local initiative in the classical period.

The unruly lives of the Greek gods paralleled the competitive existence of the over 1 000 separate city-states. The gods of Ancient Greece continually bumped into each

other as they pursued their individual agendas, without bowing down to any one specific, super deity. Sometimes these irreverent gods joined in the intrigues and enterprises of the mortals, thus demonstrating that rulers should not remain too aloof from their subjects.

The early Greeks lived as if everything depended on their own efforts, wits, solidarity and courage. Perhaps this is the key to their remarkable achievements that successive generations have admired for so long.

Greek architecture bolsters collective identity. Here it would be appropriate to dwell on the remarkable architectural accomplishments of the ancient Greeks, which is a readily visible emanation of their communal pride. The ancient city-states devoted extraordinary attention to the artistic design and construction of public buildings, including theaters, stadiums, city squares, mausoleums and temples. Although the Greek city-states were ridiculously small by our gargantuan standards, weak in terms of population size and material and technical resources, they nevertheless managed to produce architectural masterpieces that overshadow our artistic accomplishments.

Even the weaker Greek polities, which encompassed merely a few thousand inhabitants, competed with the stronger city-states in building impressive public structures. Athens, one of the largest city-states, numbered only 100 000 free citizens. More than 2 000 years later, this Greek legacy, now reduced to only fragments of its past glory, nevertheless still draws millions of admirers from around the world.

The Parthenon temple, constructed 2 500 years ago in honor of the Athenian deity, is considered to be one

of the most outstanding expressions of the Greeks' aesthetic spirit. This sublime house of worship is notable not only for its monumental dimensions and artistic harmony, but also for its durability, which is to say, its power to withstand the ravages of time.

Building this architectural marvel required a fine artistic sensibility as well as 9 years of hard, physical labor, 20 000 tons of expensive marble and a monumental expenditure of funds equal to about half of the income of the city-state of Athens. As if this were not enough of a challenge, the Athenians at that time were building a number of other impressive public structures and defensive works for the city.

The Parthenon, like the other monuments which required huge financial sacrifices, was created to impress the viewer with its size, beauty and durability. Greek public buildings were meant to teach the local inhabitants the priceless value of their collective identity as well as pride and self-confidence in their own abilities.

Modern architecture reflects the anemic state of European identity. Most things in life which have meaning are inseparable from durability. Yet the inhabitants of our unifying world are satisfied with what is functional, cheap, comfortable, safe and entertaining. The Western world now builds public buildings, commercial and multi-apartment structures that require a minimum of effort to complete.

This is the state of things, even though modern, industrial states have access to incomparably greater material wealth and technological resources than the early Greeks. Nobody expects our functional structures to survive for long. Only God and our individual souls are supposed to be everlasting.

It bothers very few that the structures of the cities in which we spend our lives differ hardly at all from the millions of other buildings which have been assigned a specific portion of the surface of the earth, for we are all equal and unexceptional. God forbid that we should make fools of ourselves by reinventing bicycles. Creativity and important decisions are outside of our areas of responsibility. For this we have the wisdom of secular, centralized power, exercised by armies of bureaucrats and experts, and the Christian Almighty God in the spiritual realm.

The vast number of modern cities and towns that clutter Lithuania and the Western world in general appear standardized and tedious – suggesting that they are products coming off the same assembly line. They all have the same stamp of the provisional, which hints at the insignificance of our existence. Here and there, we may feast our eyes on surviving European old quarters that recall the architectural richness of the past. But the overall impression of our vast urban expanses is one of a hodgepodge of glass, metal and plastic.

Greek particularism under attack. During the period preceding the imperial conquests of Alexander III of Macedonia from 336 to 323 BC, the innumerable Greek city-states on the whole managed to preserve their independence – and their creative character. Exceptions were made in the case of military alliances as a protection against stronger enemies. From 499 to 449 BC, many of the Greek city-states banded together to successfully resist successive invasions by the multinational Persian Empire. Possibly in response to the overwhelming Persian military pressure, some of the more potent Greek states, such as Athens,

Sparta and Macedonia, started building up their regional power by encroaching on the territories and sovereignty of their weaker Greek neighbors.

The individual Greek city-states of 499 BC faced a dilemma, which is similar to that faced by the separate European nations of our time. In order to protect their independence against the overwhelming power of external actors, both the Greek city-states and the European countries found it imperative to augment their military strength through alliances. Yet the process of alliance building weakens the members' spirit of self-sufficiency and the range of independent choices.

History also shows that the process of enhancing military strength feeds on itself and often stimulates the desire for even more armed force. Military prowess is a genie tempting its possessor with the prospect of rapid and dramatic turns of fate. In this regard the Greek philosopher Heraclitus wrote the following: "War is the father of all, and king of all: some he has made gods, and some men; some slaves and some free."

Whereas building up the cultural legacy of Ancient Greece required centuries of patient, communal effort, a successful military campaign could in a few short years swallow up an entire foreign empire. Alexander the Great demonstrated the intoxicating – and fatal – attraction of military prowess in his campaigns against the Persian Empire. Initially, the Macedonian conqueror was probably motivated by defensive considerations, given the ongoing threat of further Persian invasions.

Imperial overreach. But when Alexander saw that his Greek hoplites were superior to the multinational forces of the Emperor Darius III, he moved in for the kill and decided to put an end to the Persian Empire once and for all. Although many of his men and officers urged their leader to end his campaign after their victory against Darius and return home, Alexander surrendered to the allure of universal visions. He could not stop, and he drove his reluctant fighters on to ever newer conquests. Egypt fell into Alexander's orbit, as did Afghanistan and parts of Central Asia beyond Persia. Alexander's forces even launched an abortive invasion of India, hoping to dominate all of South Asia.

Towards the end of his short career, Alexander the Conqueror began to act as if he were a new Persian Emperor, or a god. He kept augmenting his imperial power by constantly adding new, heterogeneous elements to his new state. In Susa in 324 BC, the Macedonian warlord even organized a mass wedding of his commanders with the daughters of high-ranking Persian notables to underscore his dream of a fusing of Asia with the Greek world.

Historical narratives indicate that Alexander's bid for world supremacy coincided with the end of the classical period of Ancient Greece. The creative energies of the Greeks were wasted on the battlefields of Asia, and Greece itself entered on a long period of decline. Centuries later when the weakened Greek city-states had been incorporated into the expanding Roman Empire, the Greeks still managed to dominate many aspects of Roman culture and learning. Although the Romans were very successful in copying, adapting and preserving the Greek heritage, they lagged behind the Greeks in their creative capacity.

This astounding quality of the Greeks was apparently extinguished for long together with the loss of the independent spirit of the city-states.

If we agree that long-lasting power is of the highest order, then we will grasp that Alexander's achievements were vaporous. In pursuing personal glory, this empire builder essentially disengaged his person from the true basis of his strength, namely the kindred Greek city-states, and more specifically, their demographic potential. The young conqueror should have turned his energies to consolidating his victories in many ways. If Machiavelli had been a contemporary, he would have counseled the warlord to populate the adjacent Asian territories with Greek colonists.

Instead, Alexander squandered the manpower of Ancient Greece to bolster his personal prestige. After his death at the very young age of 32, his empire was gripped by violent discord that lasted half a century. In the end, the early Greeks could not hold on to their imperial domain.

The Jewish people in their remarkably long history managed to avoid the seductions of uninhibited territorial expansion, although David is celebrated as a successful warrior king. In seeking to expand their power, the Jews very wisely abstained from attempts to assimilate heterogeneous populations. Growth was to come from their internal cohesion, their own demographic potential and the gradual accumulation of material wealth that could be put at the disposal of common goals. This was not the path to advancement that the Roman Catholic Church prescribed for the Christian faithful.

The Jewish faith provides its followers with better tools for advancement than Christianity. Although the ancient Hebrew religion served as the foundation of the newer Christian faith, it nevertheless differs from Church doctrine in several key respects. The most important difference is that Judaism does not actively seek converts in the way that the Christian denominations attempt to enlist followers from all over the world.

Unlike the universal Christian faith, which taught its adherents to serve God and all humanity, Judaism regarded God and the Jewish nation as a unity vis-à-vis the rest of mankind. God was the object of supreme loyalty to the Jewish nation, just as the advancement of the chosen people was the main concern of God. Yahweh and the Jewish people were joined together in pursuit of goals that would benefit the Jewish people. The energies of the Jewish nation were thus focused on a more restricted sphere of activities than those of Christians, namely actions that would strengthen the Jewish people.

The Jewish nation, one of the most successful on earth, is characterized by exclusivity of affiliation and an extraordinarily long and uninterrupted history. The Jewish faith and people have endured 4 000 years, which is twice as long as the Christian religion. Throughout its long history, the Jewish nation has been guided by the Judaic faith, which has provided it with a sense of unity, common purpose and momentum to overcome a long line of adversaries.

Historically, national communities have sought to establish their own states as a means of unifying their members and thus strengthening their collectivity. A nation absorbed

by a larger political entity always runs the risk of losing its identity in the greater whole. Yet the Jewish people was deprived of a state for several millennia, and still managed to live on as a distinct entity. This was long seen as a remarkable achievement likely to endure yet longer.

Israel, a modern state pursuing national goals. But in the late 19th century, Zionists came to the conclusion that the modern industrial world with its unceasing dynamism and mobility would eventually result in assimilation of their people, unless they succeeded in re-establishing a national home. The state of Israel was officially inaugurated in 1948, and since that time it has enjoyed the support of Jews around the world as well as powerful allies such as the US and the EU.

It is notable that the EU backs this project to strengthen the Jewish national community, while within the EU itself the predominantly Christian European states acquiesce in policies that are undermining European national communities. All of the EU countries in process of unification have had negative birth rates for decades, while Israel maintains a healthy surplus of births over deaths. Since 1948, Israel has managed to increase its population size by 800 percent, while European nations gradually age and descend into demographic catastrophe.

Religion as a substitute for the state. During the periods of foreign political dominance, the Hebrews created a substitute for the state, which is Judaism. Having suffered foreign occupation in their ancient homeland and subsequent deportations, this people established a religion capable of preserving a collective spirit and fashioning unifying, long-range goals.

The Hebrews found a solution to the persistent problem of surviving in a state of siege facing numerically superior forces – the invention of their own God, an almighty deity, able to overcome any and all enemies. At the time it was not very important if God existed at all. The crucial thing was to convince the Jews that there was such a divine being, thereby instilling confidence in their own strength. The profound psychological insight in all this was the realization that a person can overcome great adversity if he has confidence in his powers.

The key element in Judaism is the one and only Almighty God. By contrast, the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, Scandinavians, Teutons and Balts relied on a congeries of gods who exercised chaotic control over disparate spheres such as fertility, love, peace and war. Because they were constantly feuding, their worshipers were not always cognizant of which god had the upper hand. Sometimes this lack of unity at the top benefited the lower ranks, whose members could profitably play one leader against another.

In the case of Judaism there was no doubt. Only one God ruled, and he refused to share his dominion with anyone. Moreover, he demanded unquestioning loyalty among his followers. This concept of an authoritarian deity was carried over to the Christian faith. Can it be that subsequent European emperors, kings, dukes and later dictators modeled their arbitrary style of governing on the absolutist rule of the Judeo-Christian Almighty? Certainly absolutist monarchs claimed divine right as the legitimizing foundation of their authority.

If God and his chosen people were to form a harmonious tandem, with both sides sincerely supporting each

other, then the Hebrews should harbor no doubts as to the outcome of any of their major undertakings. No opposing force would have a chance against the Almighty. An individual or a nation that trusts in its prospects will be more likely to make the right decisions in pursuit of its objectives than someone who is unsure of his strength.

The importance of ideological work. The Jewish God furnished his chosen people with more than a good measure of self-confidence. The Almighty also provided an unequivocal and permanent purpose in life, namely to serve the God/nation duality. In order to ensure that this goal would not be lost amongst the individual believers' daily concerns, the religious hierarchs established an educational system for the young and communal rites for the rest that kept the members of the congregations in close and regular contact.

The Jews' unusual level of solidarity allowed them to cooperate and assist each other in dealing with many threats and challenges in succeeding generations. Each victory strengthened Jewish self-confidence and the sense of unity. This virtuous circle of positive reinforcement was further bolstered by strict, collective discipline.

The wrath of the Old Testament God is well-known in the examples of Adam and Even who were expelled from heaven for disobeying divine commands. And the massive flooding unleashed on mankind for a host of sinful actions is also recorded in countless books and sermons read by the Catholic priests. The destruction visited upon man was drastic; only the devout Noah and his family were spared. The essential point is not whether Noah and the flood were real. What is important is that the example of Noah posited

certain standards of behavior whose violation the Hebrews learned would be accompanied by dire consequences.

Economic power instead of territorial expansion. The Jewish millennial relationship with Yahweh taught the chosen people valuable lessons about the nature of power and its advantages. Aside from the power that would flow from communal solidarity, the Hebrews also grasped the significance of accumulated material wealth. Werner Sombart, the 20th century German economist and sociologist, wrote *The Jews and Modern Capitalism*, in which he identified the specific qualities of Judaism that accounted for Jewish economic success. Sombart described the role played by Jewish merchants and bankers in the creation of the capitalist system as a vital one. The fact that in the post-Medieval period Jewish money changers and traders were scattered about the world did not hinder their cooperation. Rather, their communal solidarity turned this circumstance to their advantage by developing international trade among them.

The Jewish ethic encouraged the pursuit of earthly goods, but even here individual wealth was not meant to serve only its individual possessor. A fixed portion had to be turned over for the benefit of the community.

By contrast, early Christianity maintained a sceptical attitude to earthly riches. Jesus Christ declared that the rich will face more obstacles on the road to heaven than the poor, thereby emphasizing that excessive interest in worldly goods would distract believers from the vastly more important afterlife. Hence, enterprising Christians did not receive the strong approval of their religious communities in the same way that the Hebrews provided mutual support in their pursuit of economic objectives.

Perhaps this legacy is the reason why the Lithuanian upper classes of today are reluctant to share their wealth with society and ungrudgingly support charity or cultural initiatives. Christian scepticism of material riches reinforces the jealousy of the less affluent towards the high and mighty. Resentment by the poor finds an echo in the upper classes' detached attitudes towards the disadvantaged.

As indicated previously, it is not unusual when a powerful means to the attainment of something desirable eventually becomes the goal itself. Therefore it is likely that the Jewish people, who benefited from the Almighty's guidance for millennia, shared his appreciation of the power that comes from a close-knit community.

Meanwhile, Europeans who were subjected to a millennium of New Testament teachings about love for all of mankind, toleration, humility and quiescence in the face of political oppression, have become a confused mass of individualists incapable of formulating or implementing long-term national goals. Instead of strengthening their demographic potential and national solidarity, they are addicted to entertainment and sensual pleasures, dreaming of personal riches that would finance vacation or retirement homes in some warm-weather paradise or new tourist destinations to exotic lands – all far away from home.

If centuries ago Lithuanians would have acquired a religion similar to Judaism, it is entirely possible that their country would not have become the perennial victim of stronger neighbors. They would not have submitted so passively to feudalism, which reduced them to the status of impoverished objects of exploitation of the aristocra-

tic classes. Fortified by a proud collective ethic, Lithuania would, like Israel, have grown ever more powerful instead of exporting hundreds of thousands of its working age people to other countries. The Christian religion did not encourage national consolidation in the way that Judaism taught its adherents to be loyal Jews. Instead, Catholicism urged the faithful to serve all of humanity and seek union in ever larger political entities.

Thus Lithuanians and other Europeans did not learn to sufficiently appreciate the value of their collective identity. That is why European aristocrats became accustomed to looking on their compatriots as merely tools to achieve personal or dynastic power and glory.

Ordinary Lithuanians patiently bore the feudal yoke and accumulated riches for their masters, who were thereby strengthened in their conviction that they were superior to the working peasants. Similarly the oligarchs of today do not regard the nation as a transcendent value or the Lithuanian people as allies in the competitive struggle with other peoples. On the contrary, they aspire to extract as much work from their employees as is humanly tolerable, treating the latter as though they were medieval serfs.

The post-Soviet oligarchs consider misappropriating financial assets or abusing the privatization process as normal business practices. The damage they cause to their national communities does not upset them in the least. Their homeland is the global economy. But is one to think that the object of globalization is the rehabilitation of feudalism?

Chapter V: **Liberal Democracy in the Service of Global Hegemony**

If the architects of globalization succeed in establishing the New World Order, they will have obtained a magnitude of concentrated power unprecedented in history. The globalists' steady accumulation of economic, bureaucratic, political, cultural, and many other forms of power has received determined support by the Western democracies. Policymakers of states which pledge allegiance to liberal democratic principles now regard the globalization process as synonymous with the national interest. It would not be an exaggeration to assert that globalization is advancing under the banner of liberal democracy.

Yet liberal democratic ideas were crafted to prevent the excessive concentration of political power. The principle of the separation of powers was incorporated into the US Constitution specifically to frustrate attempts at monopolizing power. We might therefore ask why liberal democracy continues to serve as the legitimizing agency of globalization, which is homogenizing the political will of disparate nations? Why have democratic governments failed to rein in the oligarchs, multinational corporations and financial institutions that have appropriated our political process?

We will discuss the manner by which financial capital enthroned itself on the world stage in subsequent paragraphs. But at this point it would be helpful to look more closely at the core mission of liberal democracy – which is the protection of individual liberty. The American Revolution of 1775-83 and the French Revolution of 1789 were all about freeing the individual from the oppression of British and French monarchs, aristocrats and clerics, who had procured for themselves a centuries-long monopoly of power. The men who inspired these democratic revolutions were intent on creating an alternative system of government that would prevent a resurgence of tyranny.

Clearly freedom has pride of place in liberal democracy; it is the highest ideal that we are enjoined to defend at all costs. Yet freedom, understood as the absence of restraint, is a derivative concept; it cannot stand on its own. The commitment to defend the concept of liberty depends on the presence of opposition to our will, the active functioning of restrictions, limitations or oppression. The motive to stand up for freedom arises as a reaction to oppression. Hence we need an oppressive force to rouse ourselves in defense of liberty. Once the oppression ceases, however, we find ourselves in the middle of a great, open field. Where do we go from here?

Lithuania's experience with liberal democracy. Lithuania's struggle for independence 33 years ago provides a good illustration of the utility of freedom in overthrowing oppressive structures. The period following the attainment of formal independence, however, has been marked by a gross failure of policymakers to defend national interests. The last three decades of formal Lithuanian independence have highlighted the inadequacy of the abstract principle of freedom as a governing principle.

After 50 years of brutal Soviet occupation, the 3.7 million people of Lithuania were ready for a change, and the pro-independence Sajudis movement was born on June 3, 1988. In a few short years, the leaders of Sajudis succeeded in mobilizing nearly the entire Lithuanian population against Soviet rule and for freedom, national independence and democracy. Hundreds of thousands of people enthusiastically joined in mass rallies, vigils, protest songs, processions and demonstrations, at times willingly sacrificing their lives in the face of intermittent crackdowns. The Lithuanians were the first to put forward explicit demands for independence in the former Soviet Union; they played an important role in bringing down the USSR.

But the half-century of ideological domination by Marxism-Leninism had prevented the emergence of a competing political doctrine, which might have served as the ideological basis of a truly independent Lithuania. As a universal doctrine aiming for global domination, Marxism-Leninism naturally permitted no competing socially integrating ideas in its existing sphere of control in the USSR. It insisted on total and unswerving fealty to its doctrine. In other words, Soviet rulers had blocked off any serious attempts to prepare intellectually for an independent existence.

And, of course, the Sajudis leaders were truly ill-prepared to run the country. Once Moscow relinquished direct control in late 1991, Lithuanian political leaders seemed at a loss when confronted with the economic dislocation attending the cut-off of established trade relations with Russia and the other nations of the Soviet bloc. Instead of effectively dealing with pressing economic matters and consolidating the declared independence of Lithuania, the

new heads fell to squabbling over government posts and maneuvering to gain access to the privatization process that was just then gaining momentum.

In the midst of an impending cut-off of Russian energy supplies to municipal heating systems in late 1992, the Lithuanian people voted in parliamentary elections – and they performed a spectacular volte-face. They returned the reformed, liberalized Communists to power. Though hardly loved by the people, these former Communists at least seemed to be competent administrators, and they might come in useful in somehow getting through the approaching winter. Lithuania was thus the first country in the Soviet bloc to bring back the old cadres to power through democratic elections; many of the other former Eastern bloc nations soon followed suit.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) comes to the rescue. Economic policy was quickly handed over to the control of Western international agencies. A Memorandum of Understanding with the IMF was signed in 1992, and Lithuania was well on its way towards absorption into the processes of international integration and globalization.

No consolidating idea has since emerged, in large part because Lithuanian political elites could not come up with any alternative to complete submission to the globalization agenda of the West. Having been subjected to a half-century of indoctrination in Marxist-Leninist internationalism, the local elites did not find the internationalism of the West to be an exotic innovation. The more self-serving bureaucratic and business elements soon found professionally useful contacts with their Western counterparts. The new compradors shunted aside the more idealistic Sajudis intellectuals so that they might not interfere with the profita-

ble process of „integration into Western structures,” which is the term the political class often uses to describe the surrender of national independence.

Neither the new opportunists nor the early Sajudis ideologues ever gave serious thought to how declared political independence could be translated into even minimal economic sovereignty. Unfortunately, economic matters matter very much, and the result of this grave omission was renewed domination, but this time by international capital.

Lithuania’s recent history shows how the idea of freedom served as a potent mobilizing force in overcoming Moscow’s oppressive domination. But it was ineffective in building the foundation of a durable state capable of resisting future inroads on the sovereignty of the Lithuanian people. The victory of the principle of Individual freedom essentially meant that ordinary Lithuanians were free to disengage from common concerns, thereby creating a political vacuum, which was rapidly filled by sharp-eyed opportunists and greedy operators.

Neo-liberalism remakes Lithuania’s economy and society. Thirty years of liberal democracy have facilitated a concentration of power in a bureaucracy and business class entirely devoted to the European Union, the US and international institutions. The neoliberal “recommendations” of these major power centers have been eagerly implemented. The Lithuanian economy was made sufficiently “open” in accordance with neoliberal wishes.

At present the financial sector is wholly dominated by foreign banks. Foreign capital controls most of Lithuania’s telecommunications, insurance, the news media and the

production and sale of automotive fuel. Local oligarchs have achieved a high level of concentrated ownership in retail trade, construction and transportation services, i.e., in sectors where foreign capital has not yet consolidated its hold.

Lithuania and the other former Soviet-bloc countries experienced the full brunt of late capitalism, which involves highly centralized forms of ownership and control and unrestricted foreign trade. The retail sector is highly centralized (and often foreign-owned) with modern food supermarkets, shopping malls, furniture centers and home hardware outlets dominating the urban landscape. Small family farms are rapidly losing ground to consolidation of land holdings in order to accommodate extensive grain growing enterprises. There is steady pressure to facilitate foreign land ownership, which would be the precursor to land consolidation by multinational agribusiness concerns.

Neoliberal reforms lead to demographic catastrophe. Lithuania's total embrace of the Western free trade regime, which followed the signing of the IMF Memorandum, suddenly opened the gates to a flood of consumer goods from China and Western countries. The result was a rapid collapse of local manufacturing firms that did supply, or could have supplied, the local market with a great variety of consumer products. Hundreds of thousands of production jobs were sacrificed, and a mass emigration of working-age people ensued.

Lithuania lost about one million people, mostly younger citizens, which constitutes nearly half of the pre-independence labor force. The most dramatic demographic losses were registered in the small towns and outlying areas. By contrast, Vilnius, the bureaucratic and business capital,

managed to increase its population and attract considerable wealth. To be sure, during the past five years the mass emigration of the workforce has eased somewhat.

If the US were to experience a demographic slump of similar proportions, it would translate into an outflow of approximately 80 million mainly working-age citizens over a period of about 25 years. No doubt this would be seen as a crushing indictment of a hopelessly incompetent government.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Incredibly, Lithuanian elites generally consider this phase of their country's development as a success story. At first glance, this kind of attitude would seem absurd. But it might not seem ridiculous to someone who is an internationalist at heart or who believes in the supremacy of the principle of individual liberty.

To an internationalist, the loss of one million younger citizens could conceivably be dismissed as no loss at all, for the unemployed emigrants would still wind up working somewhere else in the global economy for the benefit of all mankind. A neoliberal internationalist might even welcome this channelling of supposedly surplus labor to more efficient economies. Someone who considers individual freedom as the highest good might regard labor migration across national boundaries as the exercise of individual freedom. By this logic, an unemployed worker would win out by finding better professional opportunities in another country. The creation of a common EU labor market would therefore be viewed as a positive step towards expanding the range of individual choices.

The importance of declared political principles. We can see from the above that declared political principles, far from representing merely empty rhetoric, are absolutely vital in the life of a nation. Declared political goals are one of the chief means by which the citizens of a country can evaluate the performance of their governing class.

In Lithuania's case, its political class received a popular mandate to establish an independent state in which the Lithuanian people could finally have the power to run their country as they saw fit. This idea was the most potent in the modest arsenal of ideas that Sajudis possessed; it was what the masses wished for most ardently. The idea of national independence could have been infused with a more positive content, especially by a more concrete formulation of national economic interests. But this would have assumed that local political elites had the will to resist the globalists' agenda promoting an unrestrained flood of imports and the migration of labor from the poorer East to the affluent West.

Instead of charting an independent course, Lithuania's political class opted for total assimilation into Western society, whose elites, as we know, have long cherished hopes of destroying nation-state sovereignty. The local elites interpreted Lithuanian independence as a negative concept, one that is nearly exclusively directed against Russian influence. They maintain a public position which boils down to the idea that anything that could help prevent a return of Moscow's domination would be a blessing for national independence. Hence, the best way of banishing any prospect of a return of Russian control would be to become totally integrated into the West, which on account of its aggregate potency is more than a match for Russia's power.

Lithuanian official propaganda trumpets the notion that the country's independence is protected by membership in NATO, the EU and integration into transatlantic structures and the global economy. In reality, Lithuanian independence is merely formal. Officials give lip service to independence as a way of placating public opinion, which still upholds patriotic ideals.

The key principles guiding Lithuania's policies are the same as in the other Western states. Thus, the governing class has to a large extent succeeded in convincing ordinary citizens that the prevailing neoliberal policies, far from being disastrous with regard to the demographic viability of the Lithuanian nation, have been quite successful. Internationalist propaganda has effectively equated national independence with adherence to the newest permutations of Western liberal democratic notions. The political class asserts that fidelity to the current form of Western democracy represents the best way of protecting Lithuanian independence, ignoring the fact that today's liberal democratic governments are steadily sacrificing national sovereignty to world governance.

The vicissitudes of Lithuania and the other former members of the Soviet bloc demonstrate how the abstract and ill-defined concept of individual freedom has been exploited by local bureaucratic and business classes to obfuscate the reality of economic exploitation. Individual freedom in Eastern Europe in effect means that millions of working-age citizens can exercise the right of abandoning family members, friends, co-workers and neighbors in their native countries to find job opportunities in the wealthy, but rapidly ageing Western states.

There they are regarded as useful supplements to declining local labor pools and shrinking tax bases. Although the migrant Eastern European workers often receive more than a decade of free education in their countries at the expense of their compatriots, once educated, the young emigrants work in the wealthy countries and pay taxes to their new hosts. Henceforth the emigrants do not support the welfare systems of their homelands, but rather they help to maintain the solvency of welfare systems in their new countries of residence. The older inhabitants of Eastern Europe who remain behind find that their pensions are risibly meager in large part because there are fewer younger workers to support them in their old age.

Lithuania should have concentrated on building up the elements of national strength. The average Lithuanian would now be better off had Sajudis not relied so much on the abstract and malleable idea of freedom. Instead, the leaders of the independence movement should have propagated the vision of a strong, cohesive, demographically and economically viable nation, determined to defend its sovereignty. Individual freedom should have played an important role, but this principle would have been better placed within the context of a strong communal ethic. Sajudis should have emphasized that the welfare and freedom of the individual could only be ensured within a state that regarded its demographic stability, balanced economic development and sovereignty as priority goals.

Clearly, the Western institutions charged with engineering Lithuania's integration into the EU and the global economy would have opposed policies that could be labeled as "protectionist." The globalists naturally pressed for

a maximum of concessions, and the former Eastern bloc governments complied in varying measure. Regrettably, Lithuania's authorities were gripped by a kind of frenzy to join the EU faster than the other candidate countries during the accession period from 1994 to 2004. Partly this was because the Russian threat was artificially puffed up, and EU membership was consistently advertised as a vital security guarantee. Lithuanian officials cast aside any thoughts about saving jobs or protecting Lithuanian companies against unfair foreign competition and saw only one priority – namely “integration into the Euro-Atlantic community” as soon as possible and at all costs.

Having carelessly abandoned an alternative governing principle, i.e., the national interest, Lithuanian negotiators made a virtue of making as many concessions as possible when it came to speeding up the 10-year process of EU accession. The absence of any kind of ideological basis in competition with globalization gravely undermined Lithuania's bargaining position. The predictable result was that Lithuania achieved European supremacy in at least one field – the export of working age citizens, i.e., the demographic catastrophe outlined above.

If the citizens of this country would have been guided more decisively by the political principle of national strength, rather than individual freedom, they would have been better equipped intellectually to evaluate the first years of Lithuania's economic reforms. Confronted with policies that were depopulating large swathes of their homeland, more Lithuanians would have clearly perceived the need to mobilize against their officials' obtuseness, opportunism and betrayal.

Alas, the population was lulled into passivity by the globalist apologists who argued that Lithuania, despite appearances, was in reality putting into place the components of an economic model universally recognized as superior to all other models, namely the free market economy. The government and the systemic media painted the massive hemorrhaging of educated young Lithuanians in optimistic colors. The EU's support for labor mobility was supposedly creating wonderful, new opportunities for personal and professional development. And perhaps, one day, the young emigrants might return, probably older, but certainly richer in terms of Western experience and material wealth.

Hence faith in the latest permutations of Western liberal democratic policies blinded many to the enormity of the damage inflicted on Lithuania's country. Some elements of the ruling class even regard protecting local markets or Lithuania's demographic potential as irrelevant, given that the salient reality is the EU common market and the globalized world economy.

But many influential people in Lithuania who wish to emulate current Western economic and political policies are unaware that they are not the policies which gave impetus to the development of strong Western European and American economies. As economic historians well know, the US, UK, Germany, France, Japan and other industrially powerful nations developed their economies behind a protective wall of high tariffs and state assistance. The adoption of free trade policies followed later, only after the economic players of these states had become strong enough to compete internationally.

How concentrated commercial and financial power appropriated liberal democracy in the West. Here we may shift the focus of our investigation to the broader issue of how financial and corporate oligarchs managed to subvert liberal democracy since its inception over two centuries ago. We are mainly interested in determining how liberal democracy became a facade for the approaching tyranny of the New World Order.

The key to understanding modern politics is the concept of individual freedom and its development in the past 200 years. Freedom seemed to occupy the pre-eminent position among declared values in Western political thought until political correctness began steadily narrowing its operating sphere.

The pre-eminence of individual liberty is not surprising, given the supreme value Christianity placed on the individual soul. In religious doctrine the individual soul assumed a supernatural aspect, becoming detached from the physical limitations of earthly existence. Thus freed, the individual soul stood alone – infinite and priceless.

Although the Roman Catholic Church upheld family life and paid homage to temporal authorities, the emphasis of its saving mission was on the individual soul. Protestantism later sharply accentuated the individual, rational aspects of the Christian's obligation to commune with the Deity on a personal basis. Human associations like family, clan and nation were given their due, but their importance clearly receded in the face of the ultimate goal – accession of the individual soul to heaven. In the final analysis, the choice between salvation and perdition was an individual affair.

Here the Almighty revealed a totalitarian streak in his personality by insisting on one-on-one dealings with the individual. He will admit those deserving of his grace to heaven, but they must enter alone – leaving behind life-time friends, beloved spouses, treasured children, in short anyone who might dilute the individual's devotion to God. The successful applicants to heavenly paradise might eventually be reunited with their loved ones, or they might not. And this state of affairs could last no less than an eternity!

Over time, the concept of the individual soul underwent substantial revision in the period when European civilization was freeing itself from the dead hand of Catholic control over intellectual inquiry. European writers of the Age of Reason and the Enlightenment, such as Galileo, Newton and John Locke, began indirectly challenging Church doctrine concerning the physical world in the 17-18th centuries.

The evolution of the notion of individual freedom. Nevertheless the social thinkers among them remained unconsciously attached to the Christian concept of the supernatural soul. In accordance with the rational character of the age, these writers substituted for the religious aspects of the soul its conscious, rational essence, or reason. To these rationalists it seemed that unfettered reason would unlock the door to unending progress, or infinite possibilities for good. It was assumed that any agent which held so much potential for good, could not, in justice, be repressed.

The individual and his unbounded potential were therefore deemed worthy of freedom in the same way that the infinite soul of Christianity was believed to be worthy of salvation. Although the European intellectuals of this period gradually applied empirical investigation to virtu-

ally the totality of the natural world, they were unable to break free of Church assumptions concerning the exceptional character of the individual soul as an object beyond physical phenomena.

What eventually emerged was the concept of the individual as an infinite potentiality, with a God-given right to freedom. This divinely-inspired dignity and freedom of the soul, comprehended in our time as the ideal of individual freedom, still more or less remains the axis around which many Western political ideas revolve. Thus we must thank Christianity for having given a strong impetus to later notions about the supremacy of the individual in society, the idea that societies exist to protect the rights and property of the individual member.

The concept of individual liberty arose as a challenge to the divine right of hereditary monarchs and aristocrats to exercise absolute state power over their subjects. It opened the way to the French Revolution of 1789, which gave birth to the democratic form of government that is still considered the norm in our time.

The framers of what came to be called liberal democracy conceived of a form of government in which state power would be intentionally diminished by splitting it into executive, legislative and judicial branches. The well-known system of the separation of powers envisaged a kind of controlled anarchy in which perpetual opposition between the three branches of government would prevent the domination of one against the others. A free press, independent of the state, would provide additional protection to the individual from excessive state power.

Individual freedom tempered by the idea of the common good. Despite their love of liberty as an absolute value, the crafters of the liberal democratic idea declined to concede absolute liberty to the individual, just as they opposed the absolute power of kings and emperors. The age of pure individualism had not yet dawned. It would have to wait until the rise of consumerism in the post World War II period had taught the individual his supposed primacy over society.

A century earlier it was still recognized that the unbridled egoism of one individual would transgress the rights of others, thereby undercutting the basis for cooperation and social life. Man's social nature and the existence of mutual obligations were acknowledged as a fact. The state was to act as a kind of referee in adjudicating private disputes and maintaining a balance of power and rights among its citizens.

Some of the original authors of the modern concept of individual liberty like Rousseau and Jefferson believed that freedom could prosper only in small, homogenous political units, in which great disparities in income and power would not exist. The citizens of independent republics should preferably be free tillers of the soil, masters of their own economic destinies. A republic bound together by the principles of equality, liberty, and fraternity would create a durable and cohesive community, hopefully strong enough to defend itself against external enemies.

The incompatibility of freedom with empire. A continuous thread running through the writings of the creators of liberal democracy was a suspicion of great concentrations of power appropriated not only by individual rulers,

but also by individual states. The more insightful thinkers believed that great empires could not serve as the home of democracy and individual freedom.

Nevertheless, during the 19th century the ruling classes of the United Kingdom and France proceeded with the expansion of their respective overseas empires, confident that their democratic forms of government would remain intact. But when their colonial subjects gained access to literacy, the British and French found it impossible to maintain control so long as democratic principles remained the ideological foundation of the mother countries. The Europeans' African and Asian subjects naturally claimed their rights to live by these same universal principles – and the British and French empires were no more.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, liberal democracy was allied with the idea of nationalism and periodically came into conflict with dynastic, multinational empires, such as Czarist Russia, Habsburg Austria and Ottoman Turkey. The creators of modern democracy assumed that a single person could only be free so long as his country was free. National independence was considered a prerequisite for individual liberty. Following the armistice of World War I, a dozen or so new national states emerged from the ruins of the European and Asian multi-national empires. Their appearance was celebrated by the West as a triumph of democracy and national self-determination.

Similarly in the field of international relations a balance of power among the major players was generally considered to be an optimal state during the 19th and early 20th centuries. In the same way that the unchecked egoism of one man undermines the freedom of other individuals so, too,

does the unrestrained national egoism of one state compromise the liberty of other countries. A balance of power among states would ensure the continued independence and freedom of each country and its citizens.

It can be seen from the above that the fathers of liberal democracy regarded power and freedom as generally opposing concepts. Elaborate safeguards against state power were devised because, at that time, it was assumed that the greatest threat to personal liberty originated from oppressive governments run by absolutist monarchs and aristocrats.

The ideal of freedom appropriated as a political weapon. As so often happens in history, the abstract ideal of freedom proved admirably suited to demolishing existing, oppressive structures. But victory often was accompanied by an interregnum, a political vacuum, which ruthless men, keen on monopolizing power for themselves, quickly filled. French revolutionary leaders embraced freedom, equality and fraternity, and then proceeded to inaugurate the terror, which swallowed up the lives of tens of thousands in their own country. A few years after the overthrow of the monarchy, the new ruling class discovered Napoleon, a charismatic dictator who managed to put an end to revolutionary upheaval in France. The latter seduced the champions of liberty in satisfying his thirst for personal power and glory and his foreign military adventures that would expand French influence abroad.

Napoleon, who carried the ideal of liberty in his saddlebags during his military campaigns, saw that it could serve as an admirable means in attracting popular support among peoples tired of oppression from local princes and dukes. Hundreds of thousands of lives were sacrificed in the name of freedom.

Likewise, the United States won its war of independence against England, and began a 170-year period of economic expansion, territorial conquest and acquisition of overseas possessions that ultimately propelled it into the status of a superpower. To maintain its preponderant position in the world, the US intervened militarily in foreign countries more than one hundred times since it achieved independence from British rule. Of course, all of these interventions could be justified as having been undertaken selflessly in defense of freedom.

The ascension of the new industrial, commercial and financial elites. The rising middle class of Western Europe and North America seized on the principle of freedom as a way of mobilizing the masses against aristocratic rule. Freedom became a battering ram of the new industrial and commercial elites fighting the old order that blocked access to the new riches and power of the coming age of industrialization.

Unfortunately, the framers of democracy could not adequately appreciate the consequences of the rise of the new industrial, commercial and financial elites in the 19th and 20th centuries. The latter found in liberal democracy a useful means to weaken the hold of the old order and provide legitimacy for their entrance into active political life. The industrial revolution gave rise to previously unimagined levels of production and wealth, which in the course of the 19th century, became concentrated in the hands of the new elites - monopolist industrialists and financiers. By the beginning of the 20th century, these moneyed interests clearly had become the dominant political force in the most powerful industrial countries: Great Britain, the United States, Germany and France.

In the beginning of the industrial revolution, the source of the new wealth derived mainly from production of commodities such as textiles, iron, coal and machinery. Production at first was carried out by a relatively large number of competing firms. Over time, however, the stronger producers bought up or pushed out many of their competitors, thus permitting greater control over prices and profits. By the second half of the 19th century, the industrial landscape was characterized by cartels, in which small numbers of consolidated firms accounted for the bulk of turnover in such vital spheres as coal, steel, chemicals, railroads and shipping. Finance capital was rising in importance relative to industrial capital.

The new industrial and financial magnates soon acquired many of the trappings of the aristocracy, including palatial homes, country estates, extensive art holdings, yachts. Scores of servants catered to their personal needs and physical comfort. The Krupps, Rothschilds, Vanderbilts, Mellons and Rockefellers were courted by painters, actors, dancers, writers, academics and politicians, who saw in their fabulous wealth the means to accomplish their own non-material ends. The super rich founded colleges and universities or purchased newspapers, thereby acquiring new dimensions of social power.

In the beginning of the 20th century the US had acquired its first officially recognized billionaire in the person of John D. Rockefeller, the oil magnate. His personal holdings alone were estimated to equal about 3 percent of the US GDP in 1913.

Private companies hired as many as tens of thousands of industrial and clerical employees, who were dependent on the new elites for their livelihood and who thus were

obliged to treat the owners' will as law. No democratic spirit was in evidence either in the internal workings of the new investment banks, corporations or factories or outside in the markets which were dominated by the cartels. The rising industrial and financial oligarchs soon became accustomed to their power over their employees and their expanding influence over broader social spheres.

New technological processes greatly increased the diversity and quantity of commodities produced by industrial firms, while also intensifying the velocity of wealth creation. At the same time, industrial activity required an ever growing variety and quantity of inputs such as raw materials, machinery and labor. All this provided an impetus to exchange relations over an ever wider territorial base, which meant that the importance of money rose.

The rise of money power. Money is an abstract, represented form of wealth and power, which, as a representation, is seemingly detached from the limitations of real physical power such as land, raw materials or peasant labor. Freed from physical limitations, unburdened by the physical weight of concrete objects, money facilitates exchange and movement. It can fairly easily and quickly be transformed into raw materials, machinery, energy, labor power, foreign exchange and back into its original self again. Being a portable, mobile and transmutable form of wealth, money also lends itself more easily to accumulation, not only vertically within a specific sphere of industrial or investment activity, but also horizontally over an ever wider geographical sphere.

As a detached form of wealth, money power therefore feels less of a moral obligation to a community or even a

country in which it chooses to operate. Petroleum, mining and timber corporations, financed by the growing investment banks, descended on African and Asian colonies to plunder their raw materials, and then departed for other objects of exploitation.

By contrast, the traditional aristocracy derived its wealth and power from concrete, fairly static and geographically circumscribed sources, namely landed estates, forests, bodies of water and, of course, peasants. The production cycle of the estates was incomparably slower than industrial output, often coinciding with the growing seasons of major crops or the natural maturation of forest stands.

As a result, the power base of the aristocracy was more stable and fixed, hence harder to expand or consolidate than bank deposits or stocks and securities. Generations of aristocrats and their peasants lived on the same land, and could not be easily moved to another location. Landed estates could not be sold or exchanged as quickly as a trainload of coal or a ton of cotton fiber because a long-established community depended on it for existence.

Banks, which at first merely acted as intermediaries and facilitators of industrial and commercial activity, took advantage of their strategic position to quickly accumulate holdings of industrial and commercial enterprises. By the mid-19th century, the French banker James de Rothschild, a member of the legendary Rothschild dynasty with branches in England, Germany and Italy, had amassed assets totaling 600 million francs by investing heavily in France's surging railroad and mining sectors. This sum reportedly exceeded the aggregate wealth of all other French bankers at the time.

In Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, the nine largest Berlin banks had succeeded in appropriating over 80 percent of that country's total bank capital. These financial institutions had also through stock ownership and extended loans obtained effective control over wide sectors of German industry and commerce. German, French, British and US banks also exercised enormous influence at home and abroad by providing credit to sovereign governments.

Capitalism breaks out of its national confines. Newly-acquired financial power of unprecedented magnitude allowed the nouveau riche to buy influence through ownership of the press and contributions to political parties. The super rich eventually dominated national governments, although political power was supposedly controlled by the citizenry as a whole.

As the power of the corporations, trading houses and financial institutions steadily grew, their owners became international players who soon considered national markets too petty for their ambitions. Industrial, mining, steel, railroad and shipping magnates ranged over the globe in search of raw materials and markets. Close behind followed their national governments, which in the 19th century established for the benefit of banking, mining, industrial, and shipping interests vast colonies in Africa and Asia, and incorporated them into their respective national economic areas.

By 1914, Great Britain had acquired a total of 33.5 million sq. km. of colonial territory, while France possessed 10.6 million sq. km. and Germany had 2.9 million sq. km. Millions of colonial subjects toiled for the profits of the super wealthy. The capitalists' growing rivalry over colonies and

access to overseas trade and markets was one of the chief causes of World War I. The immense consolidation of private economic power unceremoniously shoved aside the prevailing idea of balance, and opened the way to the drive for global hegemony in the 20th century, which we today recognize as globalization.

Although the second half of the 20th century was marked by extensive decolonization, which ended formal rule of European states over their colonies, the largest investment banks and corporations did not relinquish economic control over the economies of many newly-independent African and Asian countries. As national state control over the colonies further receded, many large national companies became multinational corporations through the sale of company stock to foreign subjects and mergers and acquisitions. In the period of dramatic economic expansion after World War II, these multinationals continued to grow, becoming so large in many cases that their operating budgets exceeded the revenue totals of governments of former colonies, or even their GDP levels.

In Western Europe itself during the post-war era, multinational corporations and banks began working diligently to weaken national control over the movement of goods, services, persons and capital across national boundaries. In the process of stimulating trade and investment without regard to national economic interests, the new multinational elites progressively undermined the power of democratically elected governments and ultimately the reason for being of national states.

Globalization is gradually supplanting individual freedom. The rise of the European Union and the free trade association under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) are prime examples of how international business interests are undemocratically shaping the economic, social and political destinies of hundreds of millions of inhabitants of Europe and North America. This process of undercutting the power of nation states, and simultaneously consolidating private economic and political power on an international scale, is the essence of globalism. Although the outward forms of national sovereignty and democratic consultation have still been preserved, the most important decisions are reached by the international financial and business elites meeting in private boardrooms, clubs and conferences.

It is apparent that globalism and its architects will not rest until the whole of mankind is herded into a world community administered by a world government avowedly concerned with global welfare, but in reality subject to the control of unchecked international business interests. Over two hundred years after its establishment as a ruling ideology, liberal democracy has essentially become a cloak behind which powerful corporate and financial interests are making a serious bid for world hegemony.

The original concept of individual liberty, anchored in egalitarian, self-sufficient republics and possessing sovereign rights vis-à-vis other nations, has lost its bearings in the age of globalism. Unrestricted capital and labor mobility, held up as essential preconditions for economic progress, have produced an atomized individual who is losing his ability to consolidate power in durable associations and

communities. Without the support of stable, self-confident associations and communities, the individual is powerless against the concentrated might of international business interests and their agents in international organizations.

If the earlier defenders of individual liberty resolutely opposed excessive accumulation of government power, then in our time the ideologues of pseudo-freedom have unconditionally surrendered to the concentrated private power of international money interests. The concentration of financial power continues relentlessly in our day, as could be seen by the emergence of three investment management corporations (BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street), which together have not less than 15 trillion USD in assets under management, which equals 75 percent of the total US GDP. These three financial institutions have significant holdings, and thus a powerful influence, in 88 percent of the 500 largest companies traded on American stock exchanges.

Caution has been thrown to the winds, and a new course has been set – the subordination of mankind to the unrestrained power of moneyed interests. To be sure, the apologists of globalism continue to pledge loyalty to the principle of individual freedom. But they have begun the process of diluting its potency as the pre-eminent governing principle. It is not yet clear what slogans or principles the hegemonists will embrace to supplant or complement freedom as the legitimizing idea of state power. For now, the globalists insist that only global economic and political integration can ensure that the individual will have the widest possible scope of freedom in which to work, trade, invest, study, travel and vacation.

Thus the notions of global unity, peace and prosperity have emerged as indispensable preconditions for the advancement of the individual, the protection of his rights and, ultimately, the securing of his freedom, at least formally. Faith in internationalism is fortified by rosy visions of heaven on earth, in which national antagonisms and war will be banished, and the resources of the earth will become available to all races.

Chapter VI: **The Will to Power as a Governing Principle**

Distant rumblings. The average European is not yet very concerned that his country is slowly sinking in the quicksand of the globalist system. Demographic collapse and deindustrialization are truly deadly threats, but their effects manifest themselves gradually. One can make adjustments and ignore impending danger, much like the proverbial frog being slowly boiled alive.

For now, broad segments of European societies remain satisfied with their narrow, personal spheres of comfort, security and entertainments. Many Europeans consider themselves apolitical. Anywhere from one-third to one-half of eligible voters regularly abstain from voting in local and national elections. Most of those who do exercise this emblematic democratic right tolerate the predominant liberal democratic system that legitimizes globalization.

As the decomposing effects of globalization make themselves felt, however, middle and working class Europeans will become increasingly politicized. Throughout Europe, populist and nationalist movements will have greater opportunities to expand their base of supporters from the current range of 10-30 percent of eligible voters to 40-50 percent, which will put them within striking range of national power.

Ad hoc solutions versus systemic change. Should the current crop of nationalist leaders get elected, however, they will likely confront only the isolated afflictions that attend globalization, like uncontrolled migration, ecotyranny, the promotion of gender ambiguity and political correctness. The Trump Presidency dampened the flow of illegal migrants, cut back on US engagement in multilateralism and highlighted the deleterious effects of outsourcing manufacturing jobs. But President Trump did not redirect the flow of US jobs to China and Mexico back to the US. This would have produced a major dust-up with the oligarchs, who earn handsomely from their Chinese and Mexican investments. Trump, the billionaire, balked, and his rust belt constituency found it had gained few concrete benefits during the four years of his tenure.

Similarly, there is nothing to suggest that Italy's Salvini, France's Le Pen, the Alternative for Germany or the Freedom Party of Austria are planning to overhaul the internationalist economic system that massively drains wealth from Europe to developing economies around the world. This would require nationalist governments to reorient business activity away from globalization towards a new model focused on national and European regional development. The corporate and financial oligarchs would immediately condemn any such moves as statism or *dirigisme*. We can be certain that the corporate-controlled press would unleash a furious artillery barrage on those who would dare infringe on the sanctity of private property, the free market and personal liberty in general.

Hence the return of Trump to power or the electoral success of the European populist forces, were these events to occur, should be regarded only as partial victories. The

globalists would reluctantly make tactical retreats – as they did during the Trump Presidency – wait for their opponents to stumble, and return to the attack at a convenient moment. If the Trump experience taught us anything, it showed that winning a national election only scratches the surface of the globalist power structures.

Decades devoted to the steady accumulation of power have given the globalists enormous influence across the board – horizontally and vertically, in government as well as the private sector, and more besides. Defeating globalism will therefore require intervention on a vast front.

Attacking the ideological bastions of globalist power.

Only an ideology confronting the totality of the issues raised by globalization can assure success. We need a nationalist doctrine that will focus our supporters' attention on the essential issues – demographic contraction, youth unemployment, mass immigration, outsourcing of manufacturing jobs and the excessive economic and political power of the super-rich. A comprehensive, nationalist worldview would help patriotic forces avoid getting bogged down in faux issues, which the system is so good at generating.

Since the upcoming clash will be a confrontation between ideologies, we must have a worldview that goes beyond merely negating globalism. If anti-globalist ideas were to triumph, the outcome could yet be similar to the outcome of the Cold War anti-Communist crusade. It is true that the Eastern European anti-Communists were successful in rolling back Communism during the popular uprisings of 1989-91. But their lack of a concrete reform agenda opened the door to domination of their countries by the globalists. The ideal of freedom played a potent role

in the democratic upheavals of that time, as it often does in revolutionary periods, but it failed to consolidate meaningful independence.

If nationalists want to be ahead of the curve, they must think about developing a follow-through concept, an adequately concrete vision of how the individual citizen will interact with his nation-state; how European nations will separately interact among each other; and how the Europeans will deal collectively with the rest of the world.

The nationalist opposition will need a consolidating idea not only to wrest power out of the hands of the internationalists. When and if the new patriotic forces triumph in national elections, they should already have in their possession credible plans to remake the dilapidated landscape of Europe. And, last but not least, the new nationalists will have to produce a concept of political life that will withstand future ideological challenges from the internationalists, who will certainly not surrender.

An alternative governing principle tied to observed natural phenomena. Now that the Middle Ages are well behind us, it is finally time to organize our societies in conformity with natural laws, and not theology. The alternative ideal we are looking for must therefore be firmly centered on the logic of life and the nature of man.

The first thing we need to realize is that there are no universal, God-given human rights. The belief that a supreme being cares about us and looks after our welfare is a dangerous delusion. It breeds the longing for a benevolent protector, a powerful force for good who will redress our grievances. History shows that all too often power-hungry leaders and regimes have posed as protectors of the

downtrodden, when in reality their main concern was to lure distressed people into their spheres of control.

The cultivation of faith in divinely-ordained rights in Western civilization has only served to make trusting people vulnerable to the enticements of false saviors and universal doctrines. Tens of thousands of young Lithuanians waged a costly guerilla war against Soviet domination that dragged on for over five years after the Russian occupation in 1944-45. Through clandestine means, Western governments provided a modicum of aid and encouraged the fighters to keep up their armed struggle. The Western clandestine services held forth the prospect of an imminent military showdown between the democracies and the USSR. The Lithuanian insurgents believed in the Western governments' promises to defend freedom, and continued their hopeless war in the vain hope of Western military intervention.

About 30 000 young men sacrificed their lives for the cause. In the course of the fighting, the Soviet forces rounded up approximately 100 000 civilian inhabitants residing in contested rural areas and deported them to Siberia. No apocalyptic showdown between democracy and totalitarianism was ever in the cards; the cold warriors of the West were only seeking tactical advantages vis-à-vis Moscow.

The only right we truly have is the one and only right that all living beings possess, which is to struggle as best we can against the inevitable obstacles to our will. This inborn propensity to oppose or change external phenomena is the natural consequence of the supreme instinct governing all life – the will to power. All living beings seek power, for the attainment of strength overcomes resistance to what is desired.

In contrast to the lofty principle of freedom, whose implementation is held up by Hegelians as the culmination of history, the concept of the will to power, developed by Friedrich Nietzsche, contains within itself an objective characterization of man as a continually intervening agent. If there is something that best describes what man in essence seeks, it would be power. The triumph of freedom results in disengagement from that which opposes, or inertia, while the will to power leads to continuous intervention, the achievement of a dynamic state that only ends with the death of the subject.

Whenever we initiate contact with someone, we necessarily impose on his freedom. Even a casual greeting to a friend, who may be immersed in his thoughts, will interrupt the exercise of his will. It is fairly obvious that virtually any move we make will affect, deflect or oppose that which is outside of our self.

Opposition, or the contrariness of life, is not something that we should decry. Opposition is an inevitable consequence of the life force; the tendency to confront the external world defines life to a great extent. In fact, were it not for the presence of opposing forces, such as gravity on earth, man could do very little. Even going for a walk would be impossible without the contrary force of gravity. Freedom from atmospheric pressure would result in a condition in which the body would run out of oxygen to continue breathing. Liberation from hard, physical exertions might easily transform the human body into a flabby mass of infirmities. And the absence of obligations to family and friends could ultimately mean a life of loneliness and depression.

It is therefore posited that the will to power, unlike the thirst for freedom, can stand alone as an absolute, permanent goal. The quest for power most fully delineates the scope of man's true aspirations. If we keep our eyes open to the overall direction of life, if we accept life as an objective reality and as the starting point of our present inquiry, then we cannot fail to see that life and the will to power are inseparable, indeed, nearly identical in many respects.

It is true that freedom is a desirable state, but mainly as the gateway to exercise of power. And even the achievement of freedom from an unwelcome restraining influence is impossible without some effort or struggle. If life is action, will, power, then the conscious individual should not embrace the principle of individual freedom as the highest political ideal.

Life aims at gain. As a peculiar fusion of matter, charged with penetrating energy, life thrusts against external objects, capturing, transforming and absorbing resources from the environment. As life interacts with the environment, it extracts from it the means for growth. This is the fundamental difference between living and non-living things. The chief purpose of every living being is gain, or an increase of its power relative to the outside world.

As a living organism, the individual human being is essentially in the same position as all the other life forms. Man is driven by instinct to constantly increase his power from his interactions with physical phenomena, other people, and the world of knowledge, i.e., the representation of physical reality.

If we remain true to our basic nature as living beings and acquire power in a focused, sustained manner, we

can aspire to happiness in our lives. If we violate biological laws and dissipate our strength, we will wind up profoundly dissatisfied. The Greek philosopher Aristotle, writing in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, identified happiness as the overriding purpose of an individual's life. Friedrich Nietzsche in his *Will to Power* enhanced our understanding of man's nature by demonstrating that only a strong person can truly be happy.

Instinct is more compelling than rational consciousness. At a basic level we must accept the primacy of this fundamental life instinct over our intellectual capacity, as amazing as the latter may be. As Nietzsche pointed out, the great mass of biological processes which occur in human beings can be traced to unconscious instinct, and not the conscious will. Our body's metabolism and blood circulation are as unconscious as the life processes of plants or bacteria. In man consciousness appropriates only 20 percent of the organism's overall calorie intake. At the same time, the conscious sphere of a human being's existence is decisively influenced by sub-conscious drives.

Every day our consciousness is pervaded by feelings that clearly originate from the primal instincts and appear to have little in common with rational thought. The mind is urged to seek out distractions, amusements, sex, games and a great variety of intoxications.

The purpose of life. Despite its astounding variety, life is at bottom a simple proposition. There is one supreme commandment, which reads as follows: do your best to become stronger. If you fail to do this, you will lose the competition and drop out of the game. If you succeed, you as a conscious person will be rewarded with a feeling of

satisfaction, pleasure or intense joy. The feeling of reasoned contentment that comes with the knowledge that we have fulfilled our potential is the reward for a lifetime of striving.

We can count on the external world to offer resistance to our aims, but we must regard this as a part of nature. The more formidable the obstacles to success, the greater the victory, the deeper will be the personal satisfaction. There is no other reason for living. Here the conscious mind can end its probing; it must acknowledge the dominance of nature and instinct.

The will to power transcends the instinct of self-preservation. Yet we often hear that the strongest force in our lives is the instinct of self-preservation. If we carefully consider what is implied in the term preservation, however, we will realize that we are dealing with a concept that leads us to a defensive attitude. Preservation aims at the protection of the status quo against outside interventions.

A person preoccupied with self-preservation will avoid risk and consequently restrain his own initiative and spirit of attack. Dwelling on the status quo encourages passivity. This attachment to stability is more appropriate to inert objects that merely endure outside pressures, but cannot initiate change.

Nietzsche was perhaps the first thinker to assert that the dominant life instinct is not self-preservation, but rather the drive for power, the constant urge to increase strength. The German philosopher was right because he realized that a single, living being confronts an environment whose potential power to wear it down, or even absorb it, is infinitely greater than what the individual could mus-

ter against the outside world. Thus, the survival of a living being or species is only a by-product of the will to increase power; living things survive only to the extent that they are successful in pursuing power.

Following this logic, if the living organism would be concerned only with the preservation of its existing strength, it would inevitably succumb to the steadily intruding and eroding forces of the outside world. For example, if Western countries were to accept the continuation of the free trade regime with China – which allows Chinese strength to surge at the expense of European economies – the West one fine day will find itself at the mercy of Chinese hegemony. What is imperative now is a clear-headed determination to begin reversing the flow of economic power from the West to the East.

Even the state of rest involves energy expenditure to maintain life functions, and this net reduction of energy cannot continue indefinitely. Life is therefore obliged to turn the tables on the environment and intervene against the external world, appropriating energy and resources in a constant manner.

History provides us with convincing proof of how decisively the instinct to augment power has influenced human behaviour. In our time the internationalists who are intent on fusing European national identities into a unity of all mankind are simply acting at the prompting of this most basic of drives. The only thing that distinguishes the globalists' bid for power from those of all previous tribal chiefs, warlords, dukes, kings, emperors and conquerors is the breathtaking scale of their enterprise.

What is history if not a chronicle of conflict, intrigue and war that is an inescapable consequence of ambition – the desire of strong leaders to consolidate and augment their power? It is always the same story. Modest-sized political units subjugate weaker neighbours and then use the conquered human and material resources for yet further conquests. Principalities and duchies grow into kingdoms; kingdoms are consolidated into empires; the empires eventually collapse – and the game starts over again.

The rational mind may counsel moderation in the pursuit of power and glory, but quite often instinct prevails. Open-ended ambition apparently characterized the policies of Alexander the Great, Charles V of Spain, Napoleon Bonaparte and the British imperialists. But these conquerors did not possess godlike powers; they eventually exhausted themselves and their subjects. The outside world with its limitless resources eventually brought them down to earth.

Similarly, in the world of business we note the predominance of the acquisitive instinct, the desire for more. The 19th and 20th centuries featured company amalgamations, corporations, cartels and the ascendancy of financial oligarchies. A person in possession of one billion USD might very well be content to enjoy a secure and stable existence. Nevertheless, the 2 000 billionaires of the world continue to increase their holdings at a relentless pace. Some US wealth management companies have now extended their control over the stupendous sum of trillions of USD in assets, and there is nothing to indicate that their owners are retrenching.

The same principle of growth applies to bureaucratic entities. Prior to World War II, the US officials who ran Ameri-

can security and foreign policy could nearly fit into the White House and the Old Executive Office Building. At present the US State Department alone has thousands of employees working in 48 separate buildings in the Greater Washington Area. The EU (previously known as the EEC, or the European Economic Community), was originally created to coordinate economic and trade relations between European nation-states. It now has a gigantic apparatus of 40 000 bureaucrats who daily meddle in the economic, political, social, educational and cultural spheres of the member states.

The art of acquiring power. Thus, if we are in accord with the proposition that happiness cannot be attained without striving for growth, our next task would be to identify more precisely the characteristics of the power that we should be seeking. We might just as well investigate how to become stronger, for the means and the end with respect to power appear strangely intertwined. The same principles seem to govern both the acquisition and use of power. This circumstance further demonstrates the centrality of the role of power in life.

We need to make the right choices in the course of our relatively short lives. Our choices must be based on an adequate assessment of our capabilities on the one hand, and the kinds of external challenges awaiting us, on the other.

Three vital aspects of power. An individual pursuing power and influence must do the following: (1) focus intense efforts on only one or a few objectives; (2) ensure that focused and intense efforts be sustained over the long term and (3) aim at objects that can reciprocate, compensate, or bring a net return on expended energy.

Regarding the aspects of focus and continuity, it is self-evident that any notable achievement will require carefully aimed and sustained efforts. One resigns oneself to years of professional training or extended education in pursuit of only one or a few goals. We must learn to set aside a mass of frivolous yearnings and passions that intrude into our thoughts. The basic problem is that we are not god-like, in possession of limitless quantities of vital energy. The achievement of serious goals requires enormous expenditure of the limited strength that we possess.

The perversity of unbounded altruism. As regards the concept of compensation, reciprocity or net gain, nature will simply not allow selfless, open-ended expenditure of energy on objects that cannot, or will not, make a return for the investment of our energy. An otherworldly sense of altruism will probably lead to penury, exhaustion or simply disillusionment.

Unfortunately, far too many educated Europeans lavish their efforts on objects that cannot adequately requite their love. All European nations are experiencing a slowly-unfolding demographic catastrophe in which young people are increasingly reluctant to bring children into the world. Instead of raising children, many young European professionals have been lavishing attention on their cats and dogs.

More recently, Europeans have begun worrying about climate change. Some climate idealists have even expressed their determination not to have children because the latter will simply increase demand for consumer products, whose production, transportation and use will inevitably result in more atmospheric pollution. Obviously the rejoin-

der to this argument is that we should all exit life, and the sooner, the better. Our non-existence will surely be much appreciated by Mother Earth.

There is nothing wrong with having pets, but the problem is that the life-span of domestic animals generally is one-fifth of human life expectancy. In a relatively short time our cats and dogs will leave us. It is much the same with a person's dedication to protect the earth's climate. The planet is an inanimate object that is unable to appreciate our help. It is true that we must protect the climate, on which all life depends.

But this goal must remain secondary in relation to our existence. The financial magnates who call on Europeans to lower their CO₂ emissions should stop trying to industrialize the entire world. The trillions that these hypocritical oligarchs have invested in Third World enterprises are the chief cause of skyrocketing greenhouse gas emissions. Their megalomania is draining the wealth of Europe, impoverishing former production workers and heavily contributing to European demographic collapse. The globalized economic model imposed on European nation-states has robbed far too many young Europeans of the chance to raise families.

Raising a family empowers the individual. Our children are a fundamental aspect of our power as individuals. Unlike pets, they most likely will outlive us. Our progeny are an excellent (though not guaranteed) insurance policy against loneliness in old age. On a social level, our offspring will grow up, learn a profession and join the workforce, which is very good for those who will eventually retire from work. Ultimately, none of our life-long goals and achievements will make any sense without children to ensure the continuity of our values.

A family is one of the most important human associations that nourish the individual. But we depend on a host of other association as well. In truth our personal power depends most of all on our close interactions with or investments in our children, our neighbors, colleagues or fellow citizens. For man is a social being that is utterly helpless if cut off from family interactions and his innumerable human associations. The individual cannot even acquire an identity without profound and long-lasting bonds with his more intimate human environment.

The individual in interdependence with his associations. The great paradox of our lives is that significant individual power can be achieved only by surrendering much of our conscious individuality to our associations. We are strong through our associations. Man creates and maintains associations by alienating some of his essence, i.e., by sharing his time, energy, creativity, knowledge and intellect with others. We as nationalists must therefore engage thinking individuals to help them perceive on a deeper level the social nature of their personal power. The will to power instinctively prods the individual to join or form groups, because it senses where the sources of the greatest potential power are located: the intellectual and moral resources of other human beings. The pooling of resources and potential greatly augments the strength for pursuing common aims that in turn benefit the individual. Cohesive, intimate and long-term human associations contain tremendous potential for mutual benefits.

The reciprocal surrender of will gradually creates a new phenomenon, a mental construction, in short, an association, which grows stronger as its members continually add

new contributions on its behalf. The same principle of accumulation of power which underpins the life instinct of individual beings also governs the corporate life of associations.

Whether the individual will be successful in life will depend to a considerable extent on the strength of his attachments to the institutions which shaped him. Even a revolutionary anarchist will rely on the discipline, application and knowledge instilled in him by family life and formal education, if he wishes to be an effective agent of political change.

The cohesion and strength of associations exercise an enormous influence on the individual's fate. Compare the chances to advance in life that children have who are born into a European middle-class existence or someone else growing up in the dirt-poor conditions of African village life. The well-being of our closest associations should therefore be of vital importance to all of us. Our investments in our families, local communities, political parties or the nation are in a real sense the most important investments we could make in our own well-being.

Significant groups such as families, religious communities, classes and nations, are characterized by years of intense interaction. At some point the accumulating mass of interactions produces familiarity that flows into intimacy, which at length can be transformed into sentimental attachments, patriotism or love. This is the true source of the strength of national communities. Their members can fall back on centuries or even millennia of close association.

The virtue of exclusivity. The building of bonds of love between people requires a great deal of time and effort, i.e., personal interaction that is focused and of long dura-

tion. Since time and energy are in limited supply, there will only be enough time and energy to forge selected bonds. Again, discrimination is inescapable.

Thus, the globalists' sustained efforts to undermine the bonds between an individual and his nation will not produce a universal brotherhood in which the individual will feel secure. In fact, the leveling process initiated by globalization, its accompanying neoliberal economic model and open-ended migration, have eroded the high levels of education, social security, personal freedom and safety to which Europeans had become accustomed.

We nationalists should therefore stress that it was the 19th century nation-states that gave Europeans their social security, universal literacy, access to affordable higher education and their dignity as educated and free individuals, not the European Union. Germany under Chancellor Bismarck was the first country in the world to introduce a broad package of social welfare measures, including old-age pensions and disability payments. Why? Bismarck needed the support of the working masses in his struggle for German unity.

Here we see a good example of the functioning of the reciprocity principle in the life of a nation-state. The individual citizen loyally works for and supports the state, and the state reciprocates by creating decent living standards for him and his family.

The virtue of competition between nations. Universal literacy, individual freedom, economic welfare – all impact on the loyalty a people will feel towards their country – and the relative power of each nation. In the period of nation-state competition of the 19th century, each state sought to

surpass their competitors in these fields. Competition forces one to perform better; monopolization breeds stagnation.

Nation-states do not have a monopoly on waging war. There were devastating wars before nation-states appeared; the Thirty Years' War, fought on religious and dynastic grounds, wiped out about a third of 17th century European populations. And multi-national empires throughout history have been keen on military conquest. Competition between nations can have a peaceful and constructive character, which was evident to a large extent in the century that followed the end of Napoleon's imperialistic dreams in 1815, and ended with the outbreak of World War I.

The 19th century's rapid advances in mass education and the growth of the news media, transportation and information technologies opened the way to integrating the masses into the life of the growing national states. This was the social, political and cultural upheaval that the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset deplored in his *The Revolt of the Masses*. This Spanish thinker regretted that the standards of European high culture were being debased by mass culture in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But his was a reactionary view. Taken to its logical outcome, this line of thinking would accept that the European masses should remain illiterate and exploited by feudal lords.

The newly-created national education systems of 19th century Europe instilled pride in national achievements and the desire to attain new triumphs for future generations. State support for national culture, generous financing of public buildings, monuments, parks and urban renewal in general raised the stature of the nation states in the eyes of their citizens. During the second half of the 19th century,

the European capitals and major cities became visibly more attractive. Paris acquired its magnificent boulevards, Vienna was made grander with its *Ringstrasse* and Rome built its Altar of the Nation. For many Europeans the ideas of national pride and solidarity brought meaning and stability into their lives, which had been disrupted in the beginning phases of the industrial revolution.

Of all political formations recorded since the fall of the Roman Empire, it would be difficult to find political entities whose achievements exceeded those of the 19th and early 20th century European nation-states. The latter clearly outperformed the archaic political units which were founded on the principles of feudalism or monarchism. Within their defined borders, national states accumulated and organized an optimal level of resources and power. The elites of these states realized that the greatest possible sources of power available to them were their people, and especially the broad masses which were motivated to actively participate in national life.

By contrast, only a tiny minority of the inhabitants of feudal or monarchical political units was politically conscious and active. The word of the king or duke often was interpreted as the law. The written word and education were relegated to the sphere of influence of the clergy. The majority of the illiterate subjects of these traditional states remained passive objects of exploitation, bound to the land, and poorly informed about the political and economic issues of their polities.

The nation-states regarded each of their citizens as a valuable element of power. The European states, organized on the principle of nationalism, surpassed all other political

associations that appeared after the Roman Empire in their solidarity, vitality, productiveness and creativity.

Although many contemporary historians condemn the Great Power rivalry of the 19th century, one must nevertheless admit that it was this very competitive environment which stimulated European economic development, investment in infrastructure, technological advances, social welfare, popular education and national culture. The 19th century was the century which saw Europe at the pinnacle of its power in the world.

A durable national identity fosters unity and strength.

If an individual's intellectual contribution to the community is to endure, then the community must maintain a relatively stable composition. Only an association steadfast in its constitution will ensure discrimination and continuity in the pursuit of its goals, which is essential for sustained accumulation of strength. By contrast, a society comprised of heterogeneous elements will find long-term planning and joint action more challenging. This kind of community will prefer individual freedom over national consolidation.

The ambitious individual may reason that if the mind can conjure up infinite possibilities, then they must be attainable. This imagined, infinite creative power may explain why many people living in heterogeneous societies are so attracted to abstract freedom. For freedom seemingly offers infinite creative possibilities.

But assembling a mass of information or dabbling in many fields will only dissipate force. A person cannot simultaneously become a nuclear physicist, a psychologist and a concert pianist. A vital factor, the will, is needed to

compress the mass of impressions crowding the mind into a defined pathway that leads to strength.

Mass immigration undermines the basis for European welfare systems. The active individual is obliged to channel available time and energy into building up only selected unions and avoiding the dispersal of force. Indiscriminate aims, unbounded ambition and misplaced affection dissipate force.

These are among the worst errors that human beings can commit. German Chancellor Merkel is certainly guilty of having made these grave mistakes by inviting millions of impoverished Third World inhabitants to come and enjoy her country's social security largesse. One of the worst consequences of this open door approach is that it undermines the principle of reciprocity found in the nation states.

The universal right to immigrate, recently contrived by the UN, threatens the reciprocity principle of European nation-states. It implies that European citizens who for decades regularly pay into their national welfare systems should not expect to receive their fair share of pension payments when they retire. Even now tens of billions of euros, if not hundreds of billions of state aid, are being appropriated to new arrivals who have contributed nothing to the functioning of social welfare systems in European countries.

Chancellor Merkel worked assiduously for 15 years to undermine the national idea in her country and in Europe in general. She was raised as a Christian by her devout parents and simultaneously as a good Marxist by her East German Communist educators. Now she serves global oli-

garchic interests. Is there a contradiction here? Not really, if one considers that all three doctrines aim at one fundamental goal – the unification and control of all mankind.

The futility of the New World Order. Hopefully the reader will agree that the dream of global unity is unrealistic, given what has been written above about the nature of man as a perpetually intervening force. The fusing of national identities into a universal mass consciousness would only result in the forfeiture of cultural values and experience accumulated over centuries – an unpardonable loss. This amalgamation would not produce harmony, for the denationalized elements would continue to act in accordance with their natures and form new associations for the pursuit of power and resume competition.

History shows that individuals have always banded together into an astounding variety of groups, which as associations of dynamic people, inevitably came into conflict with other associations pursuing limited resources. Man achieves his potential by associating with other individuals. But man's greatest threats also originate from other people, as unpleasant as this insight may be for sincere internationalists.

Our greatest opportunities and simultaneously our biggest threats come not from the natural world – the earthquakes, tropical storms and tornadoes – but people and groups of people. What did President Trump worry about the most when he was sitting in the White House? Was it the cold winters in Minnesota or the hot summers of Washington, D.C.?

Primarily, a US President, or any other political leader, must deal with people exercising their will to power. Trump had to placate his campaign funders and blue-collar supporters, while simultaneously confronting the ambitions of the Democrats, the Russians, the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Iranians. Even if we agree with Biden, Merkel and Ursula von der Leyen that climate change is the greatest threat facing humanity, we must admit that this problem is a man-made phenomenon. Moreover, it is a consequence of the globalists' will to power – their determination to integrate the Third World into Western industrial civilization.

Chapter VII: **The Will to Power and Unbridled Egoism**

A life devoted to self-aggrandizement might appear to be in accord with nature, which sanctions the will to power. But in reality, overweening individualism cannot lead to the happy outcome that Aristotle conceived as the ultimate goal of man's life. Power serving exclusively egotistical ends is relatively short-lived and thus of a lower order of magnitude.

Socially conscious criminals. Over the course of 15 years, Pablo Escobar and Carlos Lehder of Columbia together built up a vast cocaine smuggling enterprise that earned them an estimated 60 billion in assets, measured in today's USD. Escobar is considered one of modern history's wealthiest criminals, but the crime empire that he and Lehder created was not destined to survive for long.

In 1987, Colombian National Police apprehended Lehder and extradited him to the US. A few years later, Escobar was hunted down and killed by Colombian law enforcement agents. The wealth that these two men amassed was either confiscated by government authorities or divided up between family members or appropriated by criminal associates. Although the Colombian cocaine business still flourishes, the structures that Escobar and Lehder created have been supplanted by other mechanisms run by new drug lords.

One reason why both drug kingpins survived as long as they did was that, early on in their careers, both men realized that naked self-aggrandizement was not a viable option in their perilous business. Covering the flanks of their in-country operations, Escobar and Lehder worked to build up a measure of popular approval among the poor of Colombia. Escobar spent millions on housing for slum dwellers and, exploiting the good will generated by this largesse, won a seat as a member of the Columbian Congress. The cocaine king even hoped to eventually become President of Columbia. Escobar's funeral in late 1993, was attended by 25 000 well-wishers and supporters. Carlos Lehder was also politically active. He founded a radical political movement and gave interviews in which he portrayed his drug smuggling operations as part of a broader war against US imperialism.

Robber baron philanthropy. By the early part of the 20th century, John D. Rockefeller had succeeded in monopolizing nearly the entire US petroleum sector, thereby becoming the first billionaire in US history. Rockefeller's high-handed dealings, his ruthless elimination of competing oil refining and marketing companies, his bribery of US legislators and government regulators, made the oil baron one of the most vilified business figures of the time. The muckraking writer Ida Tarbell exposed the more scandalous features of Rockefeller's climb to the top in her *The History of the Standard Oil Company*. This well-known work of investigative journalism fed popular revulsion against Rockefeller's overbearing methods, which threatened to involve the US government in serious legal actions against his monopoly power.

Reacting to a growing chorus of public criticism, this overbearing oligarch began remaking his public image by launching philanthropic initiatives. He began pouring increasing amounts of his wealth into support for medicine, education, churches and missionary work abroad. Rockefeller funded the establishment of the University of Chicago. Some biographers note that this oil magnate spent half his career building up the Rockefeller fortune and the second half giving it away through philanthropy.

Other ruthless oligarchs showed remarkably similar tendencies. Among his other gestures of largesse, the financier J.P. Morgan donated valuable art works to the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. In 1937, Andrew W. Mellon, a financier and long-serving Treasury Secretary, established the National Gallery of Art in Washington, D.C. with a major donation of art treasures, many of which were purchased from the financially hard-pressed Bolshevik regime. In the 1930s, Edmund James de Rothschild gave away 40 000 engravings and drawings to the Louvre Museum in Paris.

We might very well ask why people driven by a ferocious thirst for personal wealth wind up sharing so much of it through philanthropy. Since we have previously identified the will to power as the overriding instinct of life, we must recognize that the obsession with making money is only a specific subset of the dominant drive. The instinct to acquire ever more power inevitably draws the protagonist into a broader sphere of interaction with people that goes well beyond the world of pure money-making.

The social nature of high-grade power. It is in the field of interpersonal relations that the aspiring millionaire will encounter the greatest opportunities, and the great-

est threats. Thus, anyone hoping to amass a great deal of wealth will learn the importance of the art of managing people. A fabulously rich person must possess, or at least pick up, some management skills, if only to prevent his advisors and associates from taking advantage of him. At the highest summits of economic or political power, the prominent personalities must know how to cultivate among their followers a sense of trust, credibility, confidence, or at a minimum, a commonality of interests.

The process of accumulating money, or any power for that matter, follows the pattern of an upward spiral. Wealth is not only a highly-desired end; it also represents a means for acquiring more power. Therefore, the more assets one collects over time, the more tools will be available for further advances. Countless self-improvement guides make the same point: the hardest part of getting rich is earning the first million USD. Similarly, those who undertake careers in corporate or government bureaucracies will discover that the first few years of service are the hardest. This is a proving period in which the beginner must demonstrate his competence and establish personal contacts which will open many doors in the coming years.

In sum, the person who follows his innermost instinct and accumulates power in a robust and focused manner will find himself deeply involved in developing contacts with other people and groups of people. A businessman, politician or bureaucrat will be obliged to strenuously cultivate relationships with those who might be useful in their careers. The top flight government or corporate operators must resign themselves to work schedules crowded with telephone calls, staff meetings, appointments, receptions and seminars. Their typical workweek exceeds 62 hours by some estimates.

Success in harnessing the power of other individuals, however, is not a one-way street. A leader must not only win over adherents or clients by offering them convincing advantages, he is also compelled to keep his subordinates satisfied by guaranteeing them a steady flow of rewards. In short, the price for obtaining high-grade power is slavish dedication to the interests of others 24 hours per day.

The highest-quality power is long-lasting. The great effort demanded in expanding the sphere of personal interactions inescapably carries with it the cost of time expended for this end. Here we can observe in a general sense how the concepts of mass (or quantity) and time revolve around each other, drawing the power seeker into an upward turning spiral.

In order to gain power, the subject must invest a very significant quantity of his life energy in fortifying selected associations of people. This is how the process of fusing individual identity into associations begins. Through continuing interactions with a group, the individual becomes a part of a greater whole. As the individual transfers more of his life substance to the association, he also transposes his will to power to the members of a group. Hence the association is impelled to grow stronger just as the separate individual must continually build up his strength by pursuing profit, gain or advantage.

The really significant associations and institutions can accomplish more than one person precisely because they are comprised of numerous individuals. An organization can do more than just one person, but its extended membership also represents a heightened level of durability

with respect to the encroachments of time. It can lose one or two members through resignation or death, but the rest of the association will be there to continue the corporate life of the group. The collective will to power it derives from its constituent parts will impel it to grow.

The University of Chicago, the National Gallery of Art and the Rothschild art endowment at the Louvre Museum have all survived John D. Rockefeller, Andrew W. Mellon and Edmund James de Rothschild. Irrespective of the social damage these personalities caused in their lifetimes, their cultural contributions nevertheless remain and soften the contours of their public images.

Anyone who has contemplated the nature of power will recognize that a short burst of energy typically does not reflect power of a high order. More often, power is inextricably linked to durability – the capacity to oppose the environment projected far into the dimension of time.

Time exists in the interactions of matter and energy, which we may designate as events. As a dimension of existence, time is a measure of the quantity of events – the revolutions of the earth around its axis, the seasonal migrations of birds, the late summer harvests of wheat or US Presidential elections, for example. An extended period contains within itself a greater mass of manifested power than a brief interlude. Consequently crass individualism is blind to an essential element of power – the capacity to endure. The personal achievements of those who consistently violate generally accepted rules of play will likely not survive much beyond their lifetimes. As such, excessive individualism ultimately leads the self on a descending path to weakness.

Individualism: a persistent by-product of civilization.

Yet civilization itself and its attendant process of urbanization seem to foster an individualistic outlook. It could very well be that the individual's habit of self-sacrifice for others, which underpins social cohesion in any society, rests on a kind of moral capital that man accumulated when he lived in self-sufficient agricultural communities.

According to Fernand Braudel, the noted French historian, for centuries the vast majority of Europeans spent practically their entire lives in essentially unchanging farming communities. Until the end of the 18th century, few rural inhabitants travelled more than 50 km from their birthplace during their entire lives. From the time of the Roman Empire to the French Revolution, the proportion of rural to urban inhabitants remained at a steady 90 percent.

Before the Industrial Revolution and the great exodus from farming villages to the expanding factory towns, a typical European had been accustomed to live surrounded by his large family and neighbouring kin. European rural folk could count on their family and neighbours for help in performing farm work and providing psychological support. Core family solidarity and mutual assistance traditions flowed more or less without interruption from one generation to the next.

Children inherited their parents' land, work skills, outlook on life, aesthetic preferences and moral precepts. At a very early age they also learned the reciprocal nature of giving and taking in a long-term context. In return for their upkeep, they were expected to perform the lighter farm work for their families. There simply was little room for an individualistic approach to life. The common struggle

to survive in a harsh environment focused attention on the commonality of interests of the family, which was a more or less a self-sufficient economic unit.

As Europeans increasingly became urbanized in the 19th century, however, they began drawing on this social capital, which gradually gave way to a self-centered way of life and to the alienating atmosphere of the city. As working conditions in the new cities improved and as mass literacy spread, Europeans could devote more time to study and self-improvement.

The fundamental relationship between children and their parents was altered, since urban families no longer required the work of their children as essential contributions to their economic welfare. As the residents of the growing towns and cities emerged from poverty, they assumed a more permissive attitude towards the younger generation. Parents gave their offspring what they could without requiring compensation in the form of grinding farm chores. Children were encouraged to learn a trade or study hard and improve their minds.

The phenomenon of children who grow up to become self-assertive individuals is associated with industrialization and an urban model of life, which now predominates in most of Europe and North America. Fewer than 10 percent of the populations of modern European or North American countries live in rural communities – a proportion which represents a complete reversal of millennia of human experience. No doubt the transition away from agricultural labor to industrial work fortified the ideas of individual liberty that gained traction in the early 19th century.

Initially, life in the new industrial settlements was marked by fragmentation, anonymity and indifference. Unprecedented urban growth as well as alternating periods of economic expansion and depression exploded earlier expectations of continuity. For these reasons, social and political stability in the growing European cities came under increasing stress. Crime, overcrowding, epidemics, prostitution, gross exploitation of factory workers were just a few of the social ills afflicting entire industrialized regions and countries. Outbreaks of revolutionary violence in Western Europe followed in regular succession, including the bloody uprisings of 1830, 1848 and 1870.

Family solidarity and mutual assistance traditions brought over from the farm, helped shield the newly-urbanized Europeans from the worst abuses of concentrated economic power. The Christian clergy also contributed to the re-establishment of a measure of intimacy and a community spirit by founding urban parishes for the benefit of the uprooted peasants. But it was becoming apparent that new political ideas would be required to re-establish social cohesion.

The rise of individualism and the fall of birth rates.

Demographic experts note a correlation between the level of urbanization and labour mobility, on the one hand, and the stability of social groups and families on the other. The shift from agricultural to urban communities is associated with a rising divorce and falling birth rates. Abandoning traditions of farm communities, the individual becomes accustomed to living for himself. A city dweller does not require a multitude of children and relatives to help with the farm work. This is one reason why the societies which have achieved the highest levels of urbanization and mobility are those which are growing older at the fastest rates.

A person establishing a family cares about the transmission of his vitality to another generation. He believes that his life has meaning. Young parents must invest a significant part of their creative energies in supporting and raising children. For many this will provide the best opportunity they will ever have of influencing their society in a meaningful way. A person who does not have faith in the durability of his legacy will be oriented more to himself and sensual gratification.

The symbol of 20th century industrial civilization could very well be the automobile, the embodiment of fervent aspirations of many and a pillar of the mobile society. The automobile provides instant gratification of the power urge, easily overcoming time and space limitations. That is why some observers have remarked that modern man is more inclined to maintain two autos in his garage than raise two children at home. Modern consumerism narrows the concept of human power to the momentary sensual realm of the individual. One enjoys the pleasures of the here and now for oneself. The consumer seeks personal enjoyment and comfort; the acquisition and demonstration of wealth fortifies the individual's social position.

But by abandoning hopes of establishing a family, playing a constructive role in the community or participating in the political process, the individual disarms in the face of more resolute forces. As he liberates himself from social ties and obligations, the individual does indeed attain some personal freedom, but he also forfeits true power, if we interpret power as the capability of exercising lasting influence on one's human environment.

Nationalism restores social solidarity for a time.

It was no accident that liberal democracy, socialism and nationalism emerged as the dominant political ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries. Each in its own way attempted to revive the sense of community, which had been lost in the dark tenements and back alleys of factory towns. Social democracy sought to cushion the impact of ballooning disparities in income and welfare, which triggered resentment and undermined solidarity. Liberal democracy offered constitutions, parliaments, expanded suffrage and a free press to give the individual, at least formally, the means by which he might shape public life in mass societies.

At the time nationalism emerged as the most potent unifying force in part because it reflected already existing sentiments of affinity based on common languages, culture and long historical interaction. But it also managed to articulate a much wider sphere of European aspirations than the other newly emerging currents of thought. Nationalist convictions, allied with liberal democratic ideas, successfully attacked aristocratic rule and undermined multi-national empires.

Nationalism satisfied the individual's need for continuity and purpose in a time of uncertainty. It posited the idea of a people as an organic whole encompassing past, present and future generations – all working towards shared goals. Nationalists exhorted the members of a national community to take pride in their past achievements and seek new accomplishments for the benefit of posterity. For many Europeans these ideas rekindled hopes of finding meaning in their uprooted lives.

Unfortunately, subsequent historical events eliminated the national idea as a potent, binding force in Europe. At the conclusion of World War II, two universal doctrines, US free market liberalism and Soviet Communism, were grafted onto the body of European political thought. The universal doctrines, which the superpower conquerors transplanted on the ruins left behind by the war, did not produce durable communities. Instead, they helped to bring forth a mass of atomized individuals pursuing individual ends. Social fragmentation, caused by industrialization and effectively counteracted by nationalism for over a century, resumed its course. Individualism is now firmly planted into the European psyche.

How the intellect gets disconnected from its social milieu. Universal doctrines and industrialization played important roles in cultivating the individualistic traits that impede unified responses to the modern threat of globalization. But there are certain inborn characteristics of the mind that tempt man to overestimate the significance of the self. In order to gain a better comprehension of how modern man becomes an individualist, increasingly detaching himself from social obligations, we must turn our attention to the workings of the human brain. What concerns us most at this juncture is the stupendous power of the mind. This is the instrument that allows man to dominate all the other living beings on earth.

We can explain how the mind becomes detached from common concerns by noting that, in general, means and ends often merge into each other. The means to power, especially if they are of great potency, often become ends in themselves. As we have already noted, a person

aiming at the highest echelons of power may believe that his success will serve as a vehicle for personal aggrandizement. But the aspirant to power will eventually discover that his career will absorb the greatest part of his time and energy, leaving only limited opportunities for the enjoyment of the fruits of his labors.

The pre-industrial history of Europe highlights many examples of a balanced attitude regarding the proper role of an individual's mind. The cultivated mind was seen as both a means regarding its service to God, the throne and the community in the medieval era and increasingly as an end with respect to the individual in possession of an educated intellect in later periods. Beginning in the early part of the 19th century, however, we observe that rising literacy and increasing leisure time have contributed to shifting this balance towards the view that individual consciousness and welfare are the overriding reality.

The extraordinary capacity of memory to accumulate power. The more developed living creatures – which have acquired a greater range of functions – possess more powerful nerve centers, or brains in the most highly developed cases, to coordinate the actions of a variety of organs. The expanded sphere of possible actions surpasses the capacity of inherited traits in the genes to automatically guide appropriate responses.

Thus the need for intelligent choice emerges, and the brain comes forward as the enabler of appropriate alternatives. Of course the brain must first be filled with experience obtained either directly or through the upbringing of parents or other adults. Some large mammals like mother bears stay with their cubs for a year and one-half or longer,

during which time the offspring have a chance to learn the requisite skills for living on their own. Most bird species spend several weeks teaching their young how to fly; and then the latter must fend for themselves.

By contrast, humans require nearly two decades of nurturing before they can be considered adults. Experience in turn requires memory to serve its owner. As the more highly developed organism observes successful behavior – for example, the correct method of capturing prey – it converts impressions of bodies and force in play into mental representations, or neurological impulses, and stores them in memory. Neurological impulses, being reflections of matter and energy in action, retain their character as force, but in an altered state: as stored energy.

The more advanced animal species are able to gather together knowledge and experience of varying degrees of sophistication. This is potential power, for experience vastly improves the capacity of the organism to oppose the environment. By means of memory, living subjects have the ability to make use of previously expended force.

Knowledge and experience are thus potential force waiting for the individual will, and favorable external conditions, to reconvert the representation into physical reality. Stored information can act to provide the brain with appropriate pathways through which the organism will then channel its living force for optimal results.

As forms of energy, knowledge and memory are dynamic captives of the mind, exercising a continuing influence at different levels of mental activity. These impulses can remain at an unconscious level or emerge in the conscious parts of the mind if their magnitude reaches a critical mass.

Man's decisive advantage against other living beings. If all living beings seek to appropriate as much power as possible, why do human beings accumulate more of it than any other plant or animal species? What accounts for man's superiority over other forms of life? What explains the immense power of the human being?

The answer to this question must be traced to the capacity of man's brain to transform the visible, perceptible interplay of matter with energy into neurological impulses. Although interactions between matter and energy – for example, the collision between two automobiles – occupies space and time, the human brain can compress this sight to a microscopic level, file it and then immediately restore it in the mind's eye.

An individual who has experienced the destructive power of a hurricane will long retain an image of it in memory. Should the victim of this storm find himself in the path of a hurricane again, he will instantaneously know what to do.

An amazingly large quantity of impressions of the world can fit into a person's mind. Even such stupendous events as the eruption of Vesuvius in ancient Rome or the vast destruction of World War II can be accommodated in an individual's mind in a represented form through history books and other channels of communication. No other living being is capable of gathering so much potential force in one compact place.

In a strange sense the workings of the mind parallel the functioning of money. As we already discussed, money can compress vast quantities of physical wealth and power

into a represented form. Money needs very little space and can be moved, converted or mobilized quickly, while the reality of physical power will imperiously resist attempts to alter it. Hence man is obliged to transform real power into a represented mode, which will then be more susceptible to manipulation by the intellect.

It is for this reason that the human being's activities, his drive to attain power, apparently differ so much from the behaviour of other living beings. If the lower forms of life expend the greater part of their energy towards the collection or capture of food, then it is noteworthy that the inhabitants of technically advanced nations spend more time acquiring knowledge and skills than directly securing physical nourishment. Thus we see that physical nourishment and information are both continually appropriated resources that permit our lives to go forward.

By enhancing his knowledge of the world, the individual human being extends his power, much as animals acquire more strength by securing food. Feeding by its nature is a limited function because it involves the ingestion of real, physical objects that have mass and weight and thus cannot be absorbed by an organism in infinite quantities. By contrast, learning approaches the immeasurable in that the objects this activity appropriates are light, insubstantial and represented, being separated from their physical attributes. There is seemingly no limit to the amount of information a person can acquire.

The role of imagination. But as amazing as this faculty of representation is, it does not yet fully account for man's superiority with regard to other living beings. It is also necessary to discuss another unique quality of *homo*

sapiens, which can be called his imagination or creativity. The latter consists of the following: (a) man is able to disassemble phenomena into their components and reassemble them without regard to their time and space limitations and (b) he can attach invented qualities to these represented components of reality.

By contrast, manipulating real, physical objects or forces is not easily accomplished. For example, we cannot divert the flow of a river with just our hands. But once the mind has transformed the perceived physical world into represented components, it becomes possible to reverse the course of a river, at least within the confines of an engineer's mind.

Hence the imagination can conceive of man going forward or backward into time, regaining his youth or changing his gender. The authors of stories and myths are free to regale us with visions of flying carpets, talking horses and mountains of gold. In a practical sense, however, human creativity opens the way to titanic achievements and can literally move mountains.

A child observing the flight of a bird can dream of some day flying, though his physical characteristics prevent him from doing so without external help. But a grown man may be able to take practical steps towards the realization of this ambition.

It would therefore appear that we have nearly accounted for the superiority of man vis-a-vis other living creatures and his ability to mobilize seemingly unlimited quantities of power. Once again, the key factors are the following: (a) the transformation of perceived force into represented, potential energy in a compact and usable form; (b) its

accumulation in great quantities and (c) the restructuring of represented phenomena through the imagination.

The vulnerability of the isolated individual. Yet, as we have indicated previously, there is still another key factor that accounts for man's prominent role on earth. The lone individual is an unusually vulnerable creature. It is unlikely that the typical urban inhabitant of our times – isolated and without the wonderful inventions of civilization or any reserves of food – could survive in a wilderness for more than a few weeks. Should adverse weather intervene, he would probably perish even sooner. To man's shame, a tiny field mouse could survive on its own for much longer than he.

In reality, the power of the individual human being is mainly potential power contained in one person's brain. In order to turn this potential energy into manifested force, man needs material instruments and other people with their available physical and mental properties. The pre-historic inventor of the first axe clearly needed flint and a wooden stem to bring his conception into reality. Once it was created, the primitive axe could become a significant factor in human development only when large numbers of tribesmen learned how to produce and use them, especially against other tribes that lacked such devastating weapons.

The overestimation of the self. Intellectual power which can relegate an individual's physical nourishment to secondary importance might easily imagine itself as standing higher than material phenomena. The overestimation of the self is a constantly recurring and costly error in human life. Unfortunately, the development of civilization itself, which is closely tied to the accumulation of knowledge, has a harmful

tendency to turn civilized people into individualists incapable of sacrificing a part of their lives for common goals.

Since at first glance the gathering of information appears as an individual enterprise, an intellectual may conclude that his accumulated wisdom is entirely due to his own efforts and as such can be considered his private property. Having acquired intellectual prowess, the educated individual might imagine that he has no further need for the many associations of people that helped him on his way to maturity or the community in which he grew up and from which he obtained a large measure of his knowledge. Highly educated people also have a tendency to feel superior to those lacking in educational experience and consequently will underestimate the contribution of low-skilled individuals to the common welfare.

It is true that a talented person's intellectual achievements cannot be realized without individual effort and talent. But the effort that an individual invests into his education represents only a tiny fraction of the work invested in him by his parents and educators, and those who educated the educators in a long progression extending over the centuries.

Most of the things we take for granted have been given to us by previous generations. In a physical sense the books that an intellectual makes use of are the product of centuries of technical improvements passed on from one generation to the next. Some of the aspects of the printing process that Gutenberg perfected even date back to the later Roman era.

At the same time, the great inventors and thinkers of history could not have devoted themselves to years of

study and contemplation without the contribution of less talented individuals. The worker bees, as it were, helped create the material, economic and security foundation that made possible the leisure time required by the great minds for their creative achievements.

The most significant ideas must find their way from the represented to the physical domains. The living creatures with the most advanced intellect, human beings, have accumulated such a quantity of representations of objects and forces that the latter seemingly overshadow the reality of the physical foundation of life. Since the represented objects have no weight and occupy virtually no space, there apparently is no barrier to their infinite expansion in the brain. Instead of regarding life as primarily a function of the interplay of real bodies and force, civilized man increasingly thinks of existence as the life of the mind, spirit, or soul, which in reality is his individual ego and representation of the outside world.

But if consciousness is mainly the reflection and representation of real forces and matter of external origin, then it must be emphasized that the conscious existence of the individual is more representation and potential rather than reality and true power. The individual is in possession of some real strength, but not as much as he would like to think. Most of the real power with which the individual will contend throughout his life comes from his social environment.

The ideas that an individual may possess can be potent, but their power is only potential force, which needs a material medium – mainly other human beings and the physical and intellectual forces they command – to become reality.

In the long run, man cannot ignore the cardinal law of life, which requires all living beings to struggle for power that is rooted in physical reality.

But if a hyper-developed consciousness and the capacity to think are the special characteristics of a human being, and if the intellect considers itself as a fundamentally individual phenomenon, then how can all of this be passed on to succeeding generations? Are we to think only of crude physical existence as the true reality of our being, which is to be defended against the corrosive work of time?

The solution to this problem must be sought in the distinction between real and potential power. Yes, the mind should continue striving for knowledge, but it should not do this only for itself. A major part of Intellectual exertions should also benefit the associations of which the individual is a part, beginning with the family, continuing on to the work organization, local community and ending with the national community. For it is the collective, and the physical living beings which comprise it, that will give the ideas of an individual concrete reality, durability and power.

Consciousness and thought should help to consolidate the formations to which the individual attaches himself and which form and nourish the person. Through service to groups of people and the wider community, the intelligence of man finds a channel by which it attains physical, perceptible reality. In this way the individual and the potential become the social and the real.

A durable society with a developed collective identity will become the home of a distinctive culture contained in the body and spirit of real, physical human beings. This

culture will live as long as the conscious members of the community remain alive in a biological sense.

Although individual consciousness will cease at the end of a person's biological life, his conscious gift to society will be manifested as conscious reality in the living, physical members of the community and the social power they command. Transmission of an idea, a suggestion, a doctrine or a culture proceeds in a manner analogous to the relaying of the life force of primitive living beings, echoing physical reproduction. Socially consolidating ideas resemble seeds. The potential force of a transplanted idea expands exponentially by taking root in new individuals, who by their nature are capable of further propagation in turn.

By way of illustration, a good teacher of English in the public school system of Lithuania could expect to train up to 1 000 students over a thirty year career. After retiring, this teacher can take satisfaction in knowing that her exertions will continue helping hundreds of young people in their professional lives and in other spheres for decades into the future.

The power of the human intellect can be self-defeating. The potential power of man's intellect is indeed a wonder to behold. Some neuroscientists maintain that the brain is the most complicated organ in the universe, having more than 100 billion neurons, each of which is connected by up to 40 000 synapses to other neurons. This means that the mind's opportunities to creatively reconstruct phenomena are roughly comparable to the number of interconnections between its neurons. In other words, the possibilities are virtually limitless. And from this vast and almost unimaginable

ble potential power the individual may draw the mistaken conclusion that he is free to conceive of and pursue an unlimited number of opportunities.

The naively ambitious individual may reason that if the mind can conjure up infinite possibilities, then they must be attainable. This capacity to imagine infinite creative power may explain why many people become attached to abstract freedom as the guiding principle of individual or social life. For freedom seemingly opens the door to infinite possibilities, to the realization of the individual's apparently boundless potential.

But here is an example of evolution outrunning the basic life instinct. The marvelously powerful human brain creates too many seductive pathways of opportunity, thereby often overtaxing the capability of the will to power to correctly assess which will lead to consolidation and which will dissipate strength. Gathering together a mass of undifferentiated information, dabbling in unrelated fields or constantly changing one's social milieu will only dissipate force.

The vital power of the will. A vital factor, the will, is needed to compress the mass of impressions that crowd the mind into a defined pathway leading to strength. Memory gathers and transforms past force into potential energy, thereby making it possible for the intellect to create a profusion of new functions, values and choices. Thinking of himself as God-like, man occasionally imagines the range of his prospects as unbounded. But it is the will, concentrating attention on the one, or the few goals, which brings increase, profit, gain, or a surplus above and beyond the energy expended in their pursuit.

The will to power is the thread of continuity which links us to all the other living beings on earth, including the most primitive and simple. It is the supreme command to grow or perish, which the earliest forms of life imparted to man through the course of evolution.

Unlimited growth of the individual is not possible. The individual living being, no matter how elaborately developed its functions, cannot grow indefinitely as an individual. Each increment of mass and power increases the demands placed on the directing and coordinating faculties of a coherent system. At some point, unceasing growth would create an unwieldy mass, incapable of supple responses to a changing environment. Moreover, the wear and tear of daily life will age the organism and its component parts.

The greater the mass and complexity of a living being, the greater will be the chances that the aging process will affect a significant organ of an individual living being, and therefore undermine the organism as a whole. Consequently, each species tolerates individual growth only to a particular magnitude that is optimal for that species.

But the expansive nature of life, its unceasing need to act on the external, cannot surrender. Concentrated force demands an outlet. Living individual beings that have reached maturity (that is, optimal accumulation of power) find that outlet by breaking out of the shell of individuality. Among the most primitive organisms, the individual living units split into two copies of the original.

The unity of growth and reproduction. If we carefully examine the brief lives of extremely primitive organisms, we will see in the clearest manner the close affinity between

growth and reproduction in living beings. The original organism simply becomes two organisms virtually identical to each other. The original force of the one is thereby doubled. There can be no alienation of individuality since the unicellular creatures have no capability of sensing their individuality. They do not perceive, but are forces which need to expand. They do not think; they act in opposition to the external world.

For the individual organism, reproduction opens up vast opportunities for the pursuit of power. The lone organism is limited by its solitariness and mortality. Procreation offers the chance to by-pass death for a time through immersion in the life of the species, which in comparison to the individual, is nearly limitless.

Although death deprives an individual creature of its consciousness as an individual being (to the extent a living creature has this quality), reproduction allows an essential part of individual existence to continue. It is the power to overcome the environment in a manner specific to the species, which the individual organism borrows from the species and which it returns to the species by means of reproduction.

Through procreation, this power not only endures, but can increase well beyond the scope of an individual being's life. That is why the reproduction impulse can be stronger in some species than the instinct of individual self-preservation.

Sigmund Freud's overestimation of the sexual drive. Within the context of evolution, the instinct to increase power and reproduce predates the faculty of the consciousness of self in highly developed individual organisms. Thus the development of man's intricate mental functions should be

regarded as refinements of this basic instinct. Freud believed that the sexual drive decisively influences a person's consciousness and is more powerful than conscious thought.

The human intellect's capacity for rational thought must therefore have inherited the trajectory of the original impulse. According to Freud, sexual energy is the motive power behind a person's inclination to improve his mind, accumulate knowledge and create. Humanity's highest achievements and civilization itself are merely products of this primal urge. In his *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud taught that over time human societies learned to repress, control and re-direct this instinct towards more elaborate pursuits.

But civilization, which represses the sexual drive in order to advance, also imposes a heavy cost to the human psyche. Thus, persons whose upbringing is associated with sexual repression will be more prone to psychological imbalances than individuals who live in primitive societies that Freud believed were more tolerant with regard to promiscuity.

We can appreciate Freud's insights into the relationship between the intellect and the basic human drives. But we believe that the sexual instinct cannot be the primary motive force of life. Mating and the rearing of the young among the more developed living creatures claim only the smaller portion of the expended energy of mature organisms. Moreover, some living forms reproduce asexually.

More importantly, it is obvious that civilized societies, which surrender to the dictate of sexual passions and return to a primitive form of association, will fall victim to external aggression by assertive, disciplined and technically more advanced societies.

The circumscription of the sexual drive within traditional norms in reality is all about containing the destructive potential power of sex with respect to durable human associations. It should be apparent that a promiscuous attitude to sex in the family and in a working environment could undermine the cohesion of a family or a working enterprise. Since the highest forms of power are associated with long-lasting associations like the family, it will be seen that the unrepressed sex drive will tend to weaken a society. At an individual level, it should be evident that a young person obsessed with sensual gratification will lose the opportunity of developing self-discipline and learning the benefits of focused and sustained effort.

Decadent civilizations die and are replaced by vigorous cultures. Hence, decadence cannot be the primary motive of life. We must conclude that Nietzsche was right in asserting that the will to power is at the top of the hierarchy of primal instincts.

Chapter VIII: How Europe Lost Its Commanding Position in the World

The superpowers eclipse the European nation-states. Despite the intense political rivalry among the European Great Powers, Europe in the 19th century managed to avoid the widespread destruction of the 20th century's two World Wars. The 19th century after the end of the Napoleonic Wars was a time of relative peace compared to the 20th century. As Henry Kissinger noted in his *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22*, European armed clashes of that century tended to be of local significance and short duration. The outcomes did not represent total defeat for the losing side.

It was only later when rivalry among European states was subsumed into global competition involving continental powers, such as Russia and the US, that military conflicts assumed a total aspect. Although recurring tension and periodic clashes characterized the period after the Congress of Vienna, the major European nations never seriously contemplated the total elimination of their strongest rivals. It was tacitly accepted that competition should remain at the margins, observed Kissinger.

The former US Secretary of State did not expand on this intriguing observation, beyond stating that the major

players of that time were interested in maintaining stability. We might elaborate on this idea. It could very well be that the European Powers restrained themselves in their pursuit of power because they felt a common responsibility for the continuation of European culture and civilization.

By contrast, during World War II, the Soviet Union and the US were not as inhibited in their aspirations, possibly because their ties to European culture were more tenuous. Indeed, their goals were of a universal stamp, and they regarded the Western European theatre of war as only one of several. World War II represented a fight to the death between opposing ideologies and civilizations. Moreover, this war was incredibly devastating because the new continental powers could employ previously unimagined quantities of human and economic resources for war making. At the end of World War II, wide swathes of Europe, with its bombed-out cities, resembled the surface of the moon.

The essential difference between World War II and earlier European armed conflicts was that two non-European powers (the US and the USSR) emerged as the victors. Beginning in 1945, these two enormously powerful continental states proceeded to entrench their enormous influence in the political, economic and cultural spheres of European life. The US and the USSR, both organized on the basis of universal principles, aimed to extend their sway not only over Europe but also over the rest of the world. Europe had become just one of a number of geographic regions into which the superpowers projected their power and competed for influence. Europe was no longer the center radiating power and influence over the four corners of the earth. Instead, its status declined to

being a playground (a very important one, to be sure) in which the US and USSR vied for influence.

The superpowers entrench internationalism in Europe. Although during the Cold War the US and USSR appeared to be implacable enemies, these two global powers nevertheless had one thing in common – both sought the re-education of Europeans in the spirit of internationalism. Universal doctrines are essential ideological weapons for powers which harbor global ambitions. In striving for global dominance, the superpowers projected worldviews tailored for everyone, without regard to affiliations of race, nationality or religion.

The Soviets labored indefatigably in Eastern Europe, using a combination of murder, terror, mass deportations, comprehensive indoctrination and material inducements. In the West the Americans threw their colossal economic weight behind the project for a united Europe, drawing Western European economies into the global trading system that later gave rise to a standardized consumer culture.

Caught in the vise of these two continental giants, European political elites in essence ceased their earlier efforts to integrate the individual in national communities. Urged on by their superpower overseer, West European elites turned their attention to the propagation of internationalist and individualistic values, the development of a consumer society and the competition for foreign markets.

The US nuclear umbrella and military presence in Europe relieved the West Europeans of much of the economic burden of protecting themselves against the threat in the East. This released huge reserves of national wealth

for the post-war prosperity boom. As a result, the individual was free to indulge himself, pursuing wealth, comfort, status, variety and amusements on a grand scale. One gets the impression that in liberating Western Europe from a great part of the responsibility for self-defense, the US also unburdened Western Europeans of a sense of seriousness regarding the fate of their national communities.

Generally speaking, national ideals were jettisoned in the 76-year period since the end of the War. The individual's atomization with regard to family and community – which had been effectively slowed down during the ascendancy of 19th century nationalism – resumed its course. For quite some time Western European demographic problems such as declining birthrates appeared distant threats and insignificant to pleasure-loving sophisticates. The dissolution of the power of national states did not unduly upset the ordinary European – until the 2008-2009 financial crisis exposed the fragility of postwar prosperity.

European statesmen inadequately assess global power shifts. The Europeans' loss of sovereignty in 1945, was a direct outcome of the asymmetry of power between the individual Europe states and the enormous resources mobilized by the US and USSR. Although Great Britain and France seemingly could draw on the wealth of their enormous colonial holdings overseas, the populations of their colonies nevertheless suffered from low levels of literacy, technical skills and organizational abilities. This, in addition to the colonials' diverse loyalties as well as heterogeneous ethnic and linguistic characteristics, greatly reduced the value of the colonies as sources of military strength.

Thus, despite their control over tens of millions of square km of African and Asian territories, as well as hundreds of millions of African and Asian subjects, the major European colonial powers were no match individually for the US or USSR. The growing imbalance in strength – between the US and the USSR on the one side and European states on the other – should have been obvious to the political leadership of both France and Great Britain in the run-up to World War II.

To be sure, London and Paris were aware of this fact at an elementary level and sought to harness the Soviets' growing military power. Already in 1935, France had begun a military cooperation relationship with Moscow against Nazi Germany. In 1939, the British military followed in the footsteps of the French and held consultations with their Soviet counterparts on a common military front against Germany.

There were earlier signs that these two European Great Powers were conscious of the enormous, tectonic shifts under way in the global structure of power. Mid-way into World War I, London realized it was stuck in a ghastly stalemate and could not hope to defeat Wilhelmine Germany without drawing the US into the war. Intense British diplomatic activity was undertaken to gain American support for the Allied cause. Two million US soldiers dispatched to the West European battle fields tipped the scales in favour of the Allied cause.

Well before World War I, major French banks had begun massive investments in Tsarist Russia in the late 1880s. Financial involvement in the Russian economy gradually dovetailed with the diplomatic efforts of the Third Republic to cement a military alliance with St. Petersburg against

Berlin. The French military command placed great hopes in the “Russian steamroller” as they planned *revanche* for their defeat at the hands of Prussia in 1870.

Britain and France clearly understood that the US, Tsarist Russia, and later the USSR, were in possession of gigantic economic resources, and thus potential military power. But until the outbreak of World War II, it appears that officials in London and Paris mistakenly considered these continental giants as instruments for their own ends, rather than as budding superpowers poised to displace their standing as Great Powers. Perhaps it was the status of Britain and France as colonial empires that led their statesmen to overestimate their power. French and British officials apparently thought that, whatever the outcome of the world wars, France and Britain would remain Great Powers and compete more or less as equals with the US, Tsarist Russia, and later, the USSR.

Throughout the period from the signing of the Entente Cordiale in 1904, to World War II, Britain and France focused their combined diplomatic, economic and political power on blocking Germany’s bid to become the dominant power on the European Continent. London and Paris believed that the key to preserving their sovereign Great Power status was to be found in the European theatre of diplomatic and military competition. And it was the rising economic and military power of the German Reich that was perceived as the greatest threat to their standing as powerful, independent players. Unfortunately, the end result of colossal French and British sacrifices in two European wars was the achievement of satellite status with regard to the US.

Should we consider this outcome as a spectacular diplomatic failure? Should France and Great Britain then not have supported Germany with its more limited ambitions for European hegemony rather than the USSR, which openly preached world revolution?

Before passing judgement on the perceived myopia of British and French statesmen, we should pose yet another question, thereby extending the scope of our inquiry. Why is it that the three Great Powers of today, the US, China and Russia, were elevated to their commanding status in significant part through massive financing by European capital?

International finance displaces national interests, becoming a Great Power in its own right. In the beginning of this book we discussed how heavy Western investments into the People's Republic of China helped transform that country into an economic colossus, which is already posing military challenges to the West. Tsarist Russia may well have remained a predominantly rural country, were it not for the massive financial assistance it received from French lenders from the 1880s to the start of World War I. By the outbreak of World War I, Russia had already overtaken a number of European countries in important industrial sectors. In 1913, Russia was already the fifth largest industrial nation, just behind France. The Soviet Union could thus build on the industrial foundation it inherited from the Tsarist regime to become a superpower under Stalin.

During the period 1870-1914, the United States was the world's largest recipient of foreign investment. In this regard, as a magnet for foreign investment, America's position was analogous to that of China in the period from 1980 to 2021, when its economy climbed to stellar heights. In

the US case, British capital accounted for the lion's share of foreign lending. Most of America's railroad construction, for example, was financed by British banks, although other European countries' financial institutions also participated.

Should we then regard Britain's heavy involvement in the industrialization of the US as a colossal blunder, particularly in light of the two wars that the British Empire fought against its erstwhile colony? Viewed from the vantage point of Great Britain's global power position as a state and its sovereignty, the answer would have to be yes. Obviously, the US succeeded in dethroning the UK as one of the most powerful actors on the world stage.

But it would be more provocative to ask if the decision to build up America's industrial capacity was really made by British statesmen, i.e., the leaders who should have been concerned about protecting the global predominance of the British Empire over the long term. If we study the rise of the British Empire – which is occasionally called the ramshackle empire – we will be struck by the seemingly haphazard way it grew to encompass such a heterogeneous collection of tribes, nations and civilizations spread over six continents.

Acquisition of new colonial territories was quite often prompted by commercial considerations. In reality, British expansion was driven by the merchant, industrial and financial elites who moved in on new openings for trade, lending and investment as the opportunities presented themselves. There was never any long-range strategy of imperial expansion that British statesmen might have developed. The political leadership allowed the initiative to pass into the hands of the mercantile elites. It was the merch-

ants and bankers who created the geostrategic realities for Great Britain. The flag followed trade, as the saying goes.

Taking into account that so much British investment was intermingled with American finance and industrial capital, the British reaction to the loss of power vis-à-vis America was relatively mild. Those who had invested heavily in US stocks, bonds and real estate did not experience any expropriation of wealth. Instead, the profits of British investors increased substantially together with the growth of the US economy after both world wars.

Hence we can observe an instance of a historically significant divergence of interests between the financial and industrial elites of the European nation-states on the one hand and the long-term, national interests of those states on the other hand. If it is now recognized that a major impetus of World War I was British fear of German competition in foreign trade, then it must be admitted that British commercial interests probably had a hand in arousing suspicions of German expansion in official London circles.

As we previously noted, the ideological opponents of nationalism like to place the blame on provoking wars squarely on so-called national egoism. This accusation has served the globalists well in discrediting the ideas of national interests and national sovereignty, but it is not supported by historical experience.

One can argue just as well that it was the egoism of international finance that caused and prolonged World War I. The financial oligarchs of Great Britain and France – and to a lesser extent those of the German Reich and other European states – fuelled what is sometimes referred to

as the first surge of globalization between 1870 and 1914. The frantic expansion of world-wide trade, investment and acquisition of overseas colonies created international tension and spurred a fateful arms race between the navies of Great Britain and Wilhelmine Germany.

In their pursuit of overseas economic expansion, the major financial, trading and industrial interests gradually detached themselves from national considerations and acquired an international outlook on life. Increasingly the major banks and corporations began regarding the world market as their true home rather than Great Britain, France and, perhaps to a lesser degree, the German Reich of Kaiser Wilhelm II. Britain continued to lavish massive amounts of resources on its colonial investments, the navy, the colonial administration, while its investments in social welfare programs lagged behind those of Germany. The British working classes became ever more radicalized by the enormous gulf between its living standards and those of the financial and mercantile elites profiting from economic exploitation of the colonies.

A very telling example of this momentous shift in power relationships is provided by the biography of Cecil Rhodes, the diamond magnate who spurred the British colonization of Southern Africa. Rhodes settled in South Africa as a youth and within 15 years had become one of the chief producers of rough diamonds in Britain's Cape Colony.

His diamond venture received a strong impetus from Baron Nathaniel Rothschild, who made major investments in diamond extraction and helped Rhodes found the renowned De Beers enterprise. Rhodes became a parliamentary deputy of Cape Colony and by 1890, was its Prime Minis-

ter. He combined his political and private financial power to expand personal control over a considerable part of southern Africa. The diamond oligarch engaged a private army to conquer about 1 million sq. km of territory in what is now Zimbabwe and Zambia. He even named a part of this land after himself, i.e., Rhodesia, which is what Zimbabwe was called before it achieved independence.

Rhodes, his financial backers and political associates took an increasing interest in the territories controlled by the Dutch-speaking Afrikaners after major gold deposits were discovered near Whitwatersrand. Cooperating closely with Alfred Milner, the Governor of Cape Colony, Rhodes did everything possible to destabilize the independent Afrikaner states of the Republic of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Rhodes even personally organized and equipped the notorious Jameson raid, an armed incursion of mercenaries, which was part of a broader miscarried putsch.

Eventually Rhodes and Milner succeeded in provoking a bloody war with the Afrikaners, known as the Boer War of 1899-1902. This colonial war involved the transporting of as many as 500 000 British troops to the southern African battlefields and led to the loss of independence of the Boer republics. At an international level, the British intervention against the Afrikaners severely strained relations with Wilhelmine Germany, not least because the German Reich had established its own colony nearby in what is now known as Namibia. The interventions of Rhodes and his associate Milner in effect precluded German hopes of expanding their colonial holdings in southern Africa. The Boer War thus contributed significantly to the deterioration of British-German relations in the run-up to World War I.

Rhodes' early death prevented him from realizing even more audacious enterprises, including his famed Cape to Cairo Railway, which would have necessitated major British territorial acquisitions across Africa from Egypt to Cape Colony. Beyond Africa, Cecil Rhodes contemplated world domination by the Anglo-Saxon races. This would have required a reform of the Empire into a federated state, involving tighter control of its far-flung colonies – and an eventual readmission of the United States into the British Empire.

When he died in 1902, Rhodes' wealth was estimated to be nearly one billion USD (measured in present-day dollars). Nathaniel Rothschild and Alfred Milner were named trustees of this estate. Milner, who had a following of his own of young colonial officials, known as Milner's Kindergarten, continued to work on Rhodes' vision of a more tightly administered British Commonwealth and closer ties with the US. He and the influential members of the Milner Kindergarten founded the Round Table movement, which promoted these two grand concepts. Milner himself later became a highly influential British official, later serving as Colonial Secretary and War Secretary during World War I.

Among the significant spin-offs of the Round Table was the nearly simultaneous establishment of two authoritative think tanks, the Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs in Great Britain and the US Council on Foreign Relations, which have promoted closer trans-Atlantic ties for a hundred years. Philip Kerr, a member of Milner's Kindergarten, later served as the British Ambassador to Washington, D.C. at a critical time from 1939-40. He played a key role in convincing the Roosevelt administration to offer Lend-Lease assistance (equivalent to 124 billion USD today) to his country, which

had suffered a series of calamitous losses at the hands of the German armed forces. US-British relations remained strong enough to win the war, but the victorious outcome for the Allies did not save the British Empire.

The German philosopher Oswald Spengler, writing in his book *Man and Technics*, underlined what he considered to be the myopic view of the West regarding the economic relations developing between the Great Powers and their colonies. Spengler grasped the idea that the West was pursuing economic policies that were harmful to national interests, but he seemed to attribute this to objective historical tendencies, rather than to long-term planning by powerful elites.

What Spengler referred to as the disastrous “dissemination of industry” at the close of the 19th century, we have already identified as the first surge of globalization. This period also coincided with the consolidation of financial and industrial power in the hands of a relatively small group of international financiers. Unlike Spengler, who is best known for his majestic *Decline of the West*, these financial interests were not overly disturbed by the sagging prospects of European states with regard to their colonies.

Already during the first swell of globalization, the financial circles of London and Paris were building the foundation for a world trading zone and thinking of global hegemony. The British and the French empires administered, or at least exercised some form of political control over, more than 50 million sq. km. of the earth. As massive financial flows from London and Paris penetrated the US and Tsarist Russia, the financial oligarchs could very well contemplate an endgame phase of their move towards control of the world’s economy.

The idea that America and Russia could slip out of the financial orbits of London and Paris probably seemed a distant prospect, given that dependence on foreign financing generally was understood as a prelude to political dependency. Any move by the recipient country that could harm the interests of the financial capitals could theoretically be countered by turning off the money spigot.

The process of building financial, trading and industrial interconnections created a new comprador class at the receiving end of the financial largesse. Some of the new partners that British and French capital found in the developing economies over time grew to become major international players in their own right. The close links between the London and Paris branches of the Rothschilds with the American House of Morgan and the Rockefeller interests are a good example of this important historical trend. Out of this close financial collaboration between the Rothschilds, Rockefellers and Morgans developed an intermingling of international capital, whose aspirations transcended national interests and were global in scope. The American capitalists bolstered the French-British financial ruling classes by adding to their spheres of influence the enormous wealth of the United States.

By the time World War I began, the close relationship between American and British financial interests soon manifested itself in President Woodrow Wilson's decision to bring the US into the war on the side of France and Great Britain.

Two key advisors to Wilson on questions of war and peace were Edward Mandell House, a cosmopolitan financial operator, and Bernard M. Baruch a Wall Street banker. House was an exceptionally close, informal aide to Wilson.

He maintained strong ties with British-American financial circles and was instrumental in founding the previously-cited Council on Foreign Relations.

Baruch had important levers of influence over the US President since he played an essential role in organizing and financing Wilson's presidential bid in 1912. Baruch was appointed by Wilson to head the War Industries Board, which organized the economic mobilization for the war effort. After the war Baruch accompanied Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference, where he continued advising the President on the emerging post-war order.

Wall Street financial circles agitated for US military support for the Allies, since many American financiers had on their own initiative already lent billions in USD to Britain and France, even before the US became a belligerent. To a significant extent, America's declaration of war against Germany could be explained as a move to save the investments of US bankers in the Allied cause. Without US military intervention, the Allies probably would not have defeated Germany. And this outcome could very well have impacted disastrously on the US financial establishment.

In the period between the two world wars, Baruch forged close personal and political ties to Winston Churchill, whose mother, it should be recalled, was the daughter of an American financier. Baruch helped Churchill escape from the clutches of financial ruin in consequence of the future Premier's unsuccessful ventures in financial speculation. During World War II, Baruch again was active in advocating US support for the Allies. He was an important advisor to President Roosevelt, who appointed the financier as a special advisor to the Director of the Office of War Mobilization.

The victory of France, Britain and the US in World War I allowed the globalists of that time to take a first step towards creation of an embryonic political organization of the world by establishing the League of Nations. Nevertheless, this first attempt was ultimately rejected by the US Senate, and the globalists had to wait for the end of World War II, at which time conditions had ripened for the creation of the United Nations.

One can assume that the French investors were expecting that an important part of Tsarist Russia's ruling class might also be drawn into their orbit in the same way that American capital linked up with British finance. Unfortunately, the Bolshevik Revolution upset their grandiose plans. For the revolutionaries proceeded to a mass appropriation of virtually all private property, including foreign investments.

A highly relevant question today is whether Western capital will succeed in absorbing Chinese elites and convincing them to become part of the ruling globalist club. Although the PRC officially subscribes to Communism – which is the antithesis of capitalism – about one hundred of the country's roughly 5 000 parliamentary deputies are billionaires (denominated in USD), with several hundred more owning assets in excess of 100 million USD. On the face of it, an increasing number of Chinese decision makers are finding that their personal fortunes are intimately connected to the global system of trade and finance. Theoretically this should make them sensitive to any deterioration in relations with the US and the West generally.

Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that President Xi Jinping wants China to achieve a position of global pre-eminence without deferring to Western elites. At the same

time, wealthy Chinese are among the most active globally in exporting their wealth abroad. The total amount of private Chinese assets stashed in so-called offshore tax havens probably runs to trillions of USD. Assets are being moved abroad presumably to protect them from the PRC, should the latter revert to egalitarian, Communist policies. A key question now is whether President Xi is another Stalin preparing his country, the PRC, for a domestic tightening of central control and a decisive thrust against Western hegemony.

The preceding paragraphs have hopefully highlighted the principal shortcoming of European leadership during the period 1870-1939, i.e., the surrender of national, political power to a financial oligarchy intent on global domination. Could European leaders have acted otherwise to prevent the erosion of national sovereignty and the decline in the vitality of European societies of our time? Should European statesmen have pursued nationalization of major industrial enterprises, banks and foreign trade during this crucial period of global power displacement?

One could find good arguments in favour of greater state intervention in the economies of European nations during the years 1870-1939. More attentive monitoring or stricter regulation of what the Marxists call the commanding heights of an economy could possibly have steered European economies toward greater alignment with national or European regional interests rather than with those of international finance. The enormous wealth that was exported abroad to build the globalists' financial empire could have been channelled to improve domestic infrastructure or to reduce poverty among the working classes of France and Britain.

By contrast, the Russian Bolsheviks understood very well the relationship between economic and political power. That is why these totalitarians did not long delay in nationalizing practically the entire economy of Russia after overthrowing the Tsar. The Bolsheviks' comprehension of the political ramifications of economic power helped them to gain victory in the struggle for power. Unhappily (for the Bolsheviks), excessive governmental control over the economy of their multinational empire ultimately proved to be the Achilles' heel of the Communist system.

One problem that politically conscious European patriots faced in the past, therefore, was their inadequate appreciation of how economic power flowed into the domain of national policy formation. Rising economic indicators, which often reflected increased foreign trade and investment, were generally seen as positive signs of growing national strength. The nationalists were slow in understanding how the growing wealth of their countries' banks and mercantile interests would give the latter a dominant influence over national policies. As we have seen in the previous passages, the interests of the oligarchic elites and the policies that they advocated eventually had tragic consequences for the European nation-states.

Could Nazi Germany have transformed Europe into a superpower? What concerns us here is the transformation of Adolph Hitler, the German nationalist, into a declared defender of European civilization. Enormous German losses on the Eastern front, the failure to knock out the USSR in 1941-42 – before the US mobilized its overwhelming economic might – convinced the German National Socialists that their country's demographic and economic power was inadequate to the task of opposing continental powers.

German propaganda and official statements tellingly shifted the emphasis away from justifying the war as a defence of German interests. After the failure of German forces to take Moscow and Leningrad in the winter of 1941, Nazi propaganda increasingly referred to the titanic clash as a desperate struggle for the preservation of European culture against Bolshevik barbarism and Western plutocracy. Some European states had become allies of Germany; the Nazi leadership was hoping to expand its base of support on the continent by exploiting fears of a Soviet victory. But the change in emphasis came too late to have a decisive effect.

Some of the more insightful historians of World War II have argued that the conflict was preordained from the start. Germany, as a mid-sized country about the size of the US state of Montana, could not by itself take on its continental-sized rivals.

Oswald Spengler initially welcomed the ascension to power of Hitler, presumably because he saw in the rise of a strong Germany the chance to prevent the collapse of Western civilization. Spengler had a lengthy private conversation with Hitler in 1933, but he came away from the meeting unimpressed. After this encounter, Spengler criticized the Fuehrer for „building castles in the sky” and overlooking the overwhelmingly powerful international forces that would mobilize against Hitler’s expansive plans. Spengler was opposed to Nazi racial rhetoric and the regime’s fixation on narrow German interests, which he believed would inhibit the formation of a broad coalition in defence of occidental interests.

In fact, during his career Hitler made frequent public references to Germany's acute shortage of land and over-population. He bewailed the "injustice" of Britain owning 40 million sq. km of territory, while Germany had to make do with slightly less than 500 000 sq km. The German Chancellor made speeches in which he condemned the post-World War I proliferation of small states in Central and Eastern Europe which "ruthlessly" severed long-established pre-war commercial links existing within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the German Reich. Such statements could not have been warmly received by Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs and other Eastern Europeans who had waged determined struggles for independence from imperial rule before 1918.

It is fascinating to read the Lithuanian news accounts of Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor in early 1933. These reports were nearly uniformly negative and dwelt on the Nazi regime's interest in territorial revision in Europe, and in particular the port city of Klaipėda (Memel). In fact, German-Lithuanian economic and political relations plummeted following Hitler's rise to power. Eventually, in March 1939, the Fuehrer confirmed the Lithuanians' worst fears at the time and moved in to triumphantly seize the 2 600 sq. km of Klaipėda's territory.

Just one month later, when the Germans realized that a military clash with Poland was becoming increasingly likely, they began a belated charm offensive aimed at drawing Lithuania into a joint military intervention against the Poles. Lithuania had a drawn out territorial dispute with Warsaw over the Polish seizure of its capital, Vilnius, and Germany hoped to exploit this conflict for its own ends. The Lithuanians might easily have been persuaded to take back

their historical capital by force during the German invasion of Poland, were it not for the ill will generated by the Klaipėda issue. In the end Lithuania chose to remain neutral.

At this point the Nazi regime lost interest in Lithuania as a potential ally and gave in to Stalin's urgings that the country be removed from the German sphere of influence to the Soviet sphere. This was agreed upon during negotiations on revising the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in late September, 1939. Had Lithuania remained in the German sphere of interest, as was foreseen in the original Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, it would have served as a useful springboard for the German offensive against the USSR. The June, 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union would have commenced from starting positions 200-300 km closer to Moscow.

When the German Wehrmacht launched Operation Barbarossa, Russian forces initially showed signs of reluctance to fight for Marxist ideals. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops surrendered to the invading Germans in the first weeks of fighting. But as news of the brutal treatment of Russian POWs and civilians in the occupied zones percolated through, Russian fighting resolve toughened. In occupied Lithuania and Ukraine, the German administrators maintained an ambiguous or hostile attitude concerning Lithuanian and Ukrainian aspirations for independence, thereby discouraging many from joining in a common struggle against the Soviet Union.

The Nazi regime's attitude to Eastern Europeans was in some ways analogous to the attitude of West European imperialists towards their colonial subjects. At best, the Eastern Europeans and inhabitants of Western colonies were regarded as objects of exploitation. At worst, the lands

that they populated were considered as suitable locations for colonization, which would be attended by major population displacements, or ethnic cleansing.

This kind of thinking may have allowed imperialists to maintain control while their wards remained largely illiterate and thus politically passive. But with the spread of mass literacy throughout the world, there emerged local elites determined to acquire political independence from their imperial overlords. By the start of World War II, the small Eastern European countries between Germany and Russia had made impressive strides in eradicating illiteracy and had developed a strong sense of local nationalism. Thus, the Nazi regime's frequent public references to the need for more German *Lebensraum* alienated millions who would have been happy to see an end to the menace of Stalinist terror. By 1941, National Socialist racial ideology and imperialist attitudes had fallen far behind the march of history.

By contrast Germany's strongest opponents, the US and the USSR, relied on concepts derived from universal values like freedom, justice and equality. Great Britain, itself an empire, and materially supported by Australia and large parts of North America, Africa and Asia, also made use of universal appeals that played on the civilizing role of British rule. The Germans as a people (or Volk) fought ferociously – naturally more fanatically than the African or Asian colonial subjects of France or Great Britain. But eventually, as in World War I, mass and the superiority of numbers overwhelmed them.

World War II marked not only the defeat of Nazi Germany. Germany went down, but so too, did the rest of the nation-states of Europe. The continental-sized powers, sho-

red up by their universal doctrines, triumphed over German nationalism. Now the only way that the European nations can avoid cultural assimilation through Western or Eurasian globalization is to form a common front against globalization.

We are not talking about the current European Union, which is merely an instrument of Western globalization. The EU elites are clearly intent on totally assimilating the European peoples through the promotion of a massive influx of tens of millions, if not eventually hundreds of millions, of poverty-stricken African and Asian migrants.

Our globalist enemies have seized the reins of power and now control enormous masses of people and the material resources of entire continents. Their mighty propaganda apparatus constantly reminds Europeans about the vast destruction of both world wars and the alleged role that European nation-state patriotism played in unleashing these disasters. This demoralizes European patriots and makes them more receptive to the appeals of universal doctrines like Marxism and neo-liberalism.

Too many well-intentioned Europeans are ready to condemn what they are told is “national egoism.” The frequent references to the tragic outcomes of the wars also make the subtle point that European nation-states are too weak to oppose the will of the empire builders.

If the European nation-states were to regain their sovereignty in the future, they should at all costs avoid any thought of territorial revisions. The renewal of territorial claims would greatly harm the interests of a Europe of national states situated in a world of giant superpowers. Continental-sized countries outside of Europe would cer-

tainly exploit tensions arising from territorial disputes to block effective collective security arrangements. Any political force advocating territorial revision in Europe would be pursuing short-term advantages that would be disastrous for all Europeans in the long term.

The Gdansk/Danzig issue of 1939 ought to serve as a clear warning about the potential of even small territorial disputes to draw into European affairs much stronger powers which are not necessarily interested in perpetuating European nation-states. In the 21st century Europe is not strong enough to ignore this danger. European nation-states were already standing on the abyss in 1939, and the danger signals were apparent to Spengler in 1918.

Chapter IX: Reversing the Decline of European Nation-States

A successful nationalist movement cannot be guided by free-market orthodoxy. For over two centuries the principles of free market economics played a crucial role in Western countries. Theoretically, laissez-faire capitalism was supposed to protect private economic actors from governmental intervention, thereby ensuring free competition. Unfortunately, this hands-off stance worked only for a time. It eventually opened the door to an unprecedented concentration of economic power in the hands of a restricted circle of oligarchs. This conglomerated economic power in private hands spilled over into and eventually swallowed up the political power of European nation-states and the US.

The financial oligarchs – who manipulate their trillions in the financial centers of Wall Street, London, Frankfurt, Paris, Hong Kong and Singapore – staunchly uphold freedom, i.e., their freedom to operate without government “interference” in economic matters. It would appear that in defending the idea of the free market, the financial elites are looking out for our interests. For in their narrative, free markets are often associated with the principle of individual liberty, without which, of course, there would be no democracy.

But appearances can be deceptive. The oligarchs, their paid media and the professional economists are not at all fighting some kind of a rearguard action against the

putative menace of state control. In reality, their voice is decisive when it comes to the most important aspects of policymaking. They are the powers that be. When the elites condemn government intervention, they are not thinking of protecting our freedom, rather, they are demonstrating an increasing unwillingness to consider social and national interests in economic policymaking. The business and banking magnates are less and less inclined to share any meaningful power with the plebs.

The chief threat that European nations confront now is the globalization process, which is promoted by the Western oligarchs. It is true that in the future the Eurasian economic integration model pursued by China and Russia could pose a danger. But, for the present, its impact on European societies is not as profound as that of Western globalization.

Thus, the most important task of European nationalists will be to wrest economic and political power from the super-rich empire builders and return it to the nation-states. This can only be accomplished by mobilizing mass support. Only the force of great numbers of politically conscious people can counterbalance the vast power of the globalists. Since the great majority of ordinary citizens are mainly concerned about their personal, material well-being and not the great political questions of our time, nationalist parties and movements should disseminate programs that to a very considerable extent should embrace economic themes. Active state intervention in economic affairs should figure prominently in the rhetoric of genuinely nationalist parties. Economic policymaking cannot be abandoned to the continued domination of the oligarchs.

Nationalists must highlight the economic damage caused by globalization. What is the key to winning the hearts and minds of European voters? First of all, we should realize that the typical European is a product of our consumerist societies and therefore is mainly interested in bread-and-butter issues, personal security and comfort. Consequently, a viable nationalist ideology must clearly explain to the citizens of European nation-states why they have experienced a half-century of stagnation and decline in their living standards. The voters should be informed that the systemic parties and national governments have been co-opted to serve the globalization project, and that the national elites no longer regard the material well-being of ordinary citizens to be priority concerns.

We have already discussed the globalist-engineered transfer of wealth from Europe and the US to China and other countries, which the globalists are trying to fully integrate into their one-world empire. The outsourced jobs must gradually be repatriated to Europe, and investments out of the European economic area must be steadily curtailed and redirected to restore European manufacturing capacity.

There is no reason why the great mass of consumer products purchased in European countries and the US should on a daily basis be shipped 7 000-10 000 km from the People's Republic of China to Western destinations. Shortening transportation links from producers to consumers would significantly reduce the consumption of transportation fuel, thereby significantly mitigating the environmental impact of economic activity.

This fundamental readjustment of manufacturing and trade relations can only be accomplished by national

governments which are guided by national interests and not the imperative of building the New World Order. A modern nationalist ideology will demonstrate to the individual concerned about his personal welfare that a nation-state can protect his economic interests against the deprivations of international finance.

The concept of individual freedom that the globalists are marketing abroad is fudging the boundary between social reality and fantasy. The global masters of the checkbook are trying to recruit new adherents by holding out the promise of a paradise of unlimited choices. As they integrate ever larger masses of people into ever larger political/economic entities, the one-world hegemonists are urging young people to pursue their dreams in the world at large. This open-minded attitude, however, does not reflect noble intentions. In reality the globalists are more interested in enlarging their freedom to choose, and not the freedom of choice of the broad working masses.

For it is precisely the uncontrolled movement of labor and capital that permits the large banks and multinational corporations to act without restraint towards workers and the democratically-elected national governments. Liberal immigration and foreign investment policies give employers the opportunity to lower wages and also gradually dismantle social security systems, which were brought into this world by none other than the nation-states. If mobile capital determines that the level of labor market flexibility is not to its liking, it can move to another country, where workers' interests are not respected. Sometimes it is enough to merely raise the threat of relocating, and the employers' demands will be promptly satisfied.

International finance has taken advantage of the economic stagnation that is afflicting Spain, Italy and Greece to demand wholesale cutbacks in social protection. Employers in the EU are constantly looking for ways to keep more of the profits for themselves, while unloading the social costs of their activities onto the shoulders of society.

Before the onset of globalization, European nation-states reined in this kind of anti-social behavior by the wealthy. But now that multinationals and big banks have become stronger than nation-states, the lone individual finds it harder to defend himself against international capital without the help of a national government or a self-assertive national community. As the politically conscious individual weighs the options and chooses whether to become a citizen of the world or stay true to his country of birth, he should bear in mind the nature of the new world order in process of creation and the long term prospects for his personal interests.

The one-world enthusiasts are creating a global business climate which will be characterized by an extremely flexible labor market. The emphasis will be on extracting short-term financial benefits for the super-rich while evading long-term commitments to the workers or society. In the ideal world of the international oligarchs, national governments would be excluded from any influence on the bilateral relations between employers and employees.

A self-assertive national community should demand the right to form a strong, national state, which would serve as an effective bulwark protecting the individual from the abuse of power by the globalist moneyed interests. A truly independent state, organized in accordance with the national idea,

will enunciate clear criteria by which the people will be able to judge its performance. The national state will proclaim as its highest calling the strengthening of the national community. This will allow its citizens to judge independently whether their state will grow or decline in terms of population size, employment opportunities and purchasing power.

The economy is an integral part of a national community. Economic life cannot be regarded as standing outside of common concerns, as a purely private field. Economic activity aims at ensuring the most basic, material needs of a people, without which physical existence is impossible. Without a national economy, or a regional European economic space built on autonomous national economies, there can be no viable nation-states.

One may be antagonistic to nationalism and claim to be a free and sovereign individual shaping his future without the need for a “paternalistic” state. One therefore proceeds to build a career, a house, and family life, which are held to be sufficiently ambitious areas of self-realization. But free market globalism, which claims for itself the prerogative of major economic decisions, has decreed that industrial enterprises need to be outsourced to China. Throughout North America and Europe, international capital has devastated countless communities by transferring well-paying productive employment to low wage countries.

Millions of individuals and families have thereby been uprooted and forced to look for alternative employment, sometimes in foreign countries. Families become separated as spouses or children are obliged to move out or face unemployment. Home values in such depressed communities lose much of their invested value.

This is the price of global economic integration, which disguises its excesses behind slogans of freedom of choice. In reality, the current economic crisis shows how little freedom or power the individual has without a strong intermediary between himself and international capital.

Living solely for one's family is not enough. An individual's investment in a family is open to risk if he does not defend the community in which this family must live. Globalism has amply demonstrated that it is capable of scattering families by undercutting the economic foundation of communities in Europe and North America.

Nor should one rely too much on trade unions and professional organizations. Globalism has shown that it can successfully neutralize the power of labor unions as well by threatening to move or actually moving productive activity away from countries with well-organized work forces to countries with weak trade unions. A focus on professional interests, to the exclusion of the international context in which economic associations must operate under the globalization regime, leaves the citizen vulnerable to many unforeseen threats.

The globalists will help us create the conditions for success. The victory of nationalism in Europe and America will depend on two factors: (a) the speed with which the global free market order will create intolerable material conditions for large masses of people, and (b) the forms which nationalist parties or movements will assume in response to the spreading crisis.

If what has been written in earlier chapters concerning the will to power is correct, then international financial interests will continue to consolidate their holdings of global

wealth at the expense of the rest of unorganized humanity. It is impossible to gauge at what precise point this will bring a catastrophic crisis to the present political order in Europe and the US.

The current power relationships will remain basically intact so long as a critical mass of people remains dependent on the present international division of labor and so long as significant numbers of Europeans believe that international cooperation will eventually improve their economic prospects. Mass discontent will arise from objective conditions; political writing or public speaking will not decisively motivate masses of people who are not expecting any drastic decline in their material welfare.

But this does not mean that European patriots should sit back and wait for objective conditions to ripen. Significant opposition to globalization is already manifesting itself among those most affected by outsourcing and mass migration. It is therefore incumbent on politically conscious patriots to actively cultivate ties with the dispossessed and seize new opportunities as they present themselves.

But if nationalist parties will continue clinging to economic orthodoxy in the face of growing disorder, then their share of popular support will remain severely restricted. This conservative position could only strengthen the standing of the internationalist Marxists, who have not resigned themselves to ideological defeat. The great majority of people is chiefly concerned about its material position in life, and rarely looks beyond personal, family or professional affairs, except in moments of economic collapse, external dangers or political crises.

Full employment must be the first priority in the economic programs of the new, nationalist opposition forces. Nationalization of major enterprises should be initiated, if that would be the only way to maintain this policy. A nationalist government ought to create an optimal business environment for small and mid-sized private enterprises, which under the globalization regime have often fallen victim to international corporations and retail chains.

The second priority must be maximum utilization of national material resources and local labor to satisfy national and European regional markets. Foreign trade should be allowed, but not to the extent of creating a dangerous dependence on foreign markets and imported resources. The third priority should be protection of the demographic base of the nation by encouraging a sufficiently high birth rate and by ensuring good employment opportunities for young people.

The national community stands above economic associations. The new patriotic elites must develop for the benefit of their followers a concept of a hierarchy of associations in which the contemporary individual can express himself and find continuity as well as meaning in his life. The new nationalists should propagate a worldview in which the national community will stand at the apex of the many associations that make up the life of a typical individual of modern industrialized societies. The individual should be urged to regard his daily work not just as a means for self-advancement, but as service to the national community. Service to the nation must be considered as one of the highest aims of an individual's life.

These assertions may strike some as an expression of outdated or narrow thinking. At present the stronger ten-

dency is to regard economic interests as supreme. Economic activity and economic associations are commonly regarded as the most important spheres of life in the Western democracies. It is true that economic activity is concerned with the physical basis of an individual's life. But the term economic interest, as it is commonly used in public discourse, obscures a narrow conception of individual welfare, which is individualism. The rise of purely economic interests to pre-eminence in our time generally comes at the expense of common interests. Reversing this trend in favor of strengthening one's commitment to community concerns is the best way to ensure the dignity, freedom and power of the individual.

Private economic associations cannot serve or account for the totality of human life, especially at the beginning and end of individual existence. For no economic enterprise will assume a substantial part of the burden of raising and educating young people, often for as long as the first 16-22 years of a person's life. The education of a young person is not simply a matter of building a few schools and pouring money into them. Parents, close relatives, family friends, neighbors, educators, indeed the entire community, participate in socializing youth in an enterprise of patience, self-sacrifice and love.

In recent decades employers also have demonstrated a progressive tendency to largely evade responsibility for an employee's welfare in the period of his life after retirement, which represents on average another 10-15 years. Thus the economic interests, which regularly claim a decisive voice in policy making in most Western countries, insist

that the public pay for the education of their employees and workers, and support the latter after they have ceased to be useful to their employers.

In addition, private, economic associations exploit a variety of positive qualities of their employees and of the societies in which they happen to be operating. Among these are discipline, respect for law and order, traditions of hard work, honesty and social solidarity. Such attributes are very unevenly distributed around the globe, and they are not created out of thin air.

The absence of these non-material qualities is a major reason why economic activity in many Third World countries is not making headway. An African country such as Mozambique may be rich in natural resources, but rampant corruption from the top of society to the bottom is severely retarding economic growth and opportunities for the mass of its impoverished inhabitants. At the same time, a tiny country with a poor natural resource base such as Switzerland has maintained one of the highest material standards of living for generations.

A favorable business climate does not arise overnight; it must be consciously, energetically and unceasingly promoted by more than one generation of a national community living and equitably sharing the burdens of life in a circumscribed territory. Without social cohesion and a public spirit, a country's infrastructure of roads, railways, electricity lines, schools, public health facilities will not be well developed. Public safety will not be guaranteed. Official corruption might block entrepreneurship in countless ways.

That is why it should be entirely unacceptable that the owners of an economic enterprise, on which a community depends for its livelihood and which in the past nurtured the economic association in many ways, should feel they have the right to transfer production to a low-wage country, and thereby cause major damage to the community. At the same time, a trade union should not have the power to inflate working wages so much that an enterprise becomes unprofitable and faces bankruptcy.

Nor is it acceptable that a community, which has financed the education of a young physician, should be deprived of his services the moment he graduates and decides to work in another country for a higher salary. This kind of gross exploitation of the national community by the young doctor is only possible in a state which espouses individual freedom, or rather, individualism, its 21st century incarnation, as the supreme governing principle. If the highest ideal of the state would be the strengthening of the national community and state, then no argument could arise in this case. The community would have a powerful ethical and legal basis challenging the young person's right to leave without at least having provided some compensation to the community.

But the true purpose of the national community is not repression of young people and their aspirations for a better life. On the contrary, the elimination of youth unemployment should be one of the priority goals of European nationalism. Instead of repressing an individual's drive for personal self-realization, the national community wishes to open a maximum of opportunities for self-expression, especially among the young.

Educating the individual in the spirit of national solidarity. In order to satisfy the individual's needs, the national community must receive the full support of the individual. Indeed, service to the nation must be considered as a crucial dimension of the life of the individual member, if he expects the former to accomplish great things and satisfy his most important needs. The challenges and tasks are enormous. Not the least of them is the creation of a sustainable economy in place of the present house of cards based on speculative capital. The active opposition of the internationalists will only be overcome through a commensurate level of commitment by the widest possible strata of the national community.

Both tendencies – the increase of the power of the nation to overcome the greatest difficulties, and the strengthening of personal commitment to the national community – are interdependent and self-reinforcing. The greater the individual attachment to the national idea, the stronger will be the collective force. This virtuous circle can be set in motion only by a leadership which itself is committed to the national community and is guided by a nationalist ideology adequate to the challenges of our time.

The unsustainability of consumerism and individualism. Until the chronic stagnation following upon the 2008-2009 recession, consumerism had succeeded in distracting masses of people away from the potential inherent in their social nature. If the post-war festival of material plenty, economic security, variety, and growing leisure were to continue for another generation, it is likely that European nationalism would have never recovered as a viable political force.

The decline in living standards that commenced with the introduction of turbo-globalism in the 1970s was gradual and hence barely perceptible at first. Over the succeeding decades, however, it became increasingly difficult to mask the receding prospects for buoyant growth. At the dawn of the new millennium the supranational authorities found themselves confronted by the first manifestations of organized nationalist opposition in a number of Western European countries.

In fact, we are now living at the tail end of the expansive post-war period of consumerism and individualism. Seen in the context of the entire history of man's civilized life, this period is brief, perhaps only an isolated episode. The furious energy and restless mobility of our age were made possible by the relentless exploitation of non-renewable material resources such as oil and something outside the material realm – the remains of social cohesion inherited from traditional agrarian communities.

This material and spiritual capital has been squandered to a great extent. Before the economic crisis had gained momentum, the seductive power of Western consumerism and egoism seemed irresistible to a majority of the hundreds of millions of consumers that comprise the countries of Europe and the West in general. For a relatively short time, Western democracy and free market economics seemed to offer the individual previously unimagined levels of personal wealth and freedom.

But now that price inflation and the restrictions being implemented to contain climate change are biting, the range of choices is narrowing. The ruling classes are now increasingly resorting to undemocratic methods of control,

signaling that the good times are drawing to a close. In the coming decades the relevant question will be one of meeting basic, material needs. Exhortations to develop selfless devotion to the nation, which seemed unfashionable until recently, will sound more convincing when it becomes clear that there is no alternative to group solidarity and self-sacrifice. The arguments for nationalism will become more appealing as individualism and universalism convincingly demonstrate their bankruptcy.

A dynamic concept of the nation. Nationalists must clearly comprehend the object of their chief concern, namely the national community. One usually hears definitions of what constitutes a nation that rely heavily on outwardly visible or distinctive traits. In Lithuania the most widely used definition would have it that a nation is an association of people linked together by an assemblage of attributes such as a common language, shared history, folk art and customs.

If we stop to think that we are trying to apprehend not a stationary object like a Baroque church, but phenomena imbued with extraordinary dynamism, namely people, we will see how little such a description can tell us about the national community. If someone were to describe Mozart, the composer of immortal operas, symphonies and piano concertos, merely as a thin, short-statured musician, we would object that such a description would be entirely trivial since it ignored his prodigious creative force. Similarly, the habit of thinking of a nation as a static concept, as an eclectic collection of attributes, ignores its enormous potential.

The problem already surfaces in the very phrasing of the question. Instead of asking what the nation is, we

should be thinking about what it does, or better still, *what it could be capable of doing* as an organized and motivated association of dynamic people.

Thus, a flawed understanding of the nation can obscure processes which can be fatal to the vitality of the national community. Vytautas Landsbergis, the veteran leader of the Lithuanian Conservatives, exploits his professional ties to Lithuanian music and national symbols to create the impression that he is a nationalist at heart. In reality, his actions have done more to strengthen internationalist tendencies in Lithuania than those of any other local politician.

Many intellectuals in Lithuania tend to equate the concept of nation with national culture and especially with the Lithuanian language. Lithuanians take pride in the conservative character of their language, which has changed the least among all the other living Indo-European languages. The fact that so many of Lithuania's leaders of the Sąjūdis rebirth movement were intellectuals and cultural figures explains why the idea of the nation is so thoroughly permeated with a historical, cultural, linguistic and folk art content. At the same time, many ordinary Lithuanians have difficulty grasping the connection between their inadequate material circumstances and the steady erosion of national sovereignty.

Having been conditioned to associate national independence with a national flag, separate government institutions and the restoration of Lithuanian as the state language, many Lithuanians still believe that their state is independent. Therefore, if Lithuania is independent and mass unemployment has coincided with the attainment of formal independence, then they reason that poor eco-

conomic performance must be a consequence of independence. Many ordinary Lithuanians do not understand that their independence is merely formal. It is precisely the relative absence of local control over the country's economic policies that accounts for the poor standard of living of the majority of Lithuanians.

What is the nation or national community (in the sense of the German word *Volk*)? It is an association of people which cooperates in building up its collective strength vis-a-vis the external world. From the point of view of the individual, the national community is an extension and a magnification of his power. By serving his nation, the individual shares his vitality with many other members of the national community, some of whom will continue living, strengthened by his contribution, even after his physical death. Our conception of the nation and its inherent need to grow stronger provides the individual with the overall direction and discipline which are needed to enhance his personal power.

The inevitability of opposition in human affairs. To recapitulate, all living beings, including man, are a peculiar kind of matter continually generating force, which seeks out opposition in the external, from which it draws resources for growth. Since the appropriation and consolidation process, like life in general, is ceaseless, and since many kinds of resources are limited, it can be seen that sooner or later living organisms will bump into each other and be forced to compete for resources.

Human associations, which acquire tendencies inherent in their component parts, therefore will quite predictably run up against other groups pursuing the same or analogous resources. Not least among the sources of

power that are continually being fought over by rival associations are people, or new members. What is history if not an unending chronicle of conflicts among various human formations? At all times and in every locality in which man has dwelled, viable human groups have manifested a consistent tendency to grow – opposing, absorbing or eliminating other associations which pursue resources within the reach of one or more of their rivals.

If this is true, then it is also evident that the age-old dream of uniting mankind in peace, justice and freedom is nothing but a mirage. And if opposition in human relations cannot be banished from the earth through empire building, would it not be better to concentrate human energy on building up the strength of long-established nation-states by augmenting their potential in the arts, urban and rural beautification, the sciences, national economy and social welfare?

“Easier said than done,” a skeptic might interject. Nevertheless, it is a fact that the enormous destructive power of nuclear and biological weapons is such that waging wars among highly industrialized state actors is becoming a nonviable option. Thus, objective, technological factors will increasingly force policymakers to channel human aggression into non-lethal fields of competition.

History shows that empires are capable of absorbing small nations with their collective identities and loyalties, thereby eliminating conflicts among the latter. But the problem of man’s drive for accumulating power never has been, and never can be solved by the imposition of imperial power. The cutting off of the channel of growth of a nation and its inhabitants is in itself a grave loss involving the work, self-sacrifice and aspirations of many generations.

Conquering and assimilating foreign populations will open the door to private accumulation of wealth within the expanding empire and the abuse of power in a domestic context. Human nature explains why men ruthlessly appropriated power, either through foreign military campaigns or through domestic exploitation of labor. And since most of the power within the reach of human beings resides in other people, it can be seen that individuals and groups lacking energy and organizational aptitude will always be at risk of becoming the instruments for the acquisition of power by the more ambitious. History shows this time and again. We do not need Marx's ponderous *Das Kapital* to understand that the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger is a constant in human relations.

If domestic oppression is worse than the anticipated results of foreign conquest, the people will refuse to offer up their lives in defense of their prisons. Successful empires have shown that they can establish a *Pax Romana*, or similar such periods of extended peace, although the price of achieving eternal peace usually involves unending wars.

But it is precisely the relative absence of external threats which unshackles the drive for individual, family and class aggrandizement, creating gross inequality and leading to subsequent exploitation of the mass of the people. As we have seen already, the global domination of finance and corporate capital in recent decades, the virtual absence of serious opposition to the super wealthy, has given rise to ever more avaricious forms of appropriating social wealth.

Nationalism and the intellectual. Nevertheless, a modern nationalist worldview cannot concern itself solely with the material needs of the politically passive majority of

a nation. Although mass support is essential in defeating the globalists, sheer numbers will not suffice. There is an even more important factor leading to eventual success, namely a well-thought-out strategy and comprehensive worldview.

Masses of desperate people can be manipulated. Globalist agents regularly infiltrate mass movements and try to divert discontent into safe channels, or they undermine unity by promoting factions. Such distracting and divisive tactics will have fewer prospects for achieving their ends, if patriots clearly mark out the way forward. A nationalist movement must therefore develop a comprehensible idea of who the enemy is; what his strengths and weaknesses are; what resources the patriots are capable of mobilizing and what long-term goals should be pursued.

A successful struggle against the architects of globalization will be led by an organized minority of politically conscious patriots. The nationalist leaders will be highly motivated and effective if they elaborate and share an attractive, alternative model of human association that offers broader, social prospects for self-fulfillment than the global model. A contemporized European nationalism, a doctrine that will take into account the geopolitical and economic realities of our time, can provide the thinking individual with meaning in life in an increasingly chaotic world. The very word "nation," which derives from the Latin word "*nation*", or birth, evokes the ideas of natural harmony and continuity that are associated with the renewal of life.

In searching for a meaningful purpose in life, one inevitably runs into the concept of durability, for no great expenditure of time and effort ought to be directed at merely ephemeral objects. Most young people spend years of

university study in the expectation that their investment will provide them with knowledge that will sustain them throughout their lives.

The situation is analogous with respect to durable institutions, i.e., those which have come into being thanks to the efforts of many successive generations. The plain fact that long-lived associations have received so much more from their members over time than improvised associations allows the former to provide more valuable benefits than hastily constructed entities.

Edmund Burke, the Irish-born political theorist and statesman, was one of the first thinkers to perceive that long established institutions and practices – which rest on the accumulated experience of many generations – would be stronger than newly created associations. That is why Burke condemned the French Revolution of 1789, in his *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. Burke was convinced that the age-old institutions of the monarchy, aristocracy and the Church would have guaranteed a better future for the French than the program of radical changes championed by the revolutionaries.

Burke was probably wrong about insisting on the continuation of the *Ancien Regime*, but he was correct in a more fundamental sense. The British statesman understood that the uninterrupted life of institutions and nations ensures gradual accumulation of experience, which is the best way to ensure progress.

By contrast, revolutionary interventions block the continuity of movement and the process of accumulation, diverting and dispersing energy into many new paths. The victors of a totalitarian revolution would in effect have to start from

zero. If one assumes that great achievements in thought and culture rest on the foundation of accrued experience – the contributions of many earlier generations – then revolutionary improvisation will generally represent a waste of vital energy.

It will be recalled that the French Revolution led to very wasteful civil disturbances, a reign of terror and, ultimately, the devastating Napoleonic Wars that dragged on until 1815. It would also be difficult to find any redeeming qualities justifying the carnage inflicted by the Bolshevik revolutionaries on the Russian people and other European nations.

Certainly, long-established civilizations, religions and institutions can over time become dysfunctional, as was almost certainly the case with the institution of divine right monarchy in Europe. Growing prosperity and spreading literacy over the centuries had brought to the fore a wide strata of Europeans willing and able to make their influence felt in governing their states. Thus, the old order inevitably gave way to newly emerging social forces. Had the French kings and aristocrats showed more flexibility towards the new rising classes, as their British counterparts did, then perhaps the human tragedies associated with the revolution could have been averted.

The most valuable asset that living organisms possess is their vital energy. Optimal use of available strength should be counted among the greatest virtues; waste of energy should be considered among the worst offenses. And the waste of the labour and achievements of earlier generations for the benefit of transient purposes in the present is the worst sin of all.

We might compare the utility of past experience and accumulated knowledge with the usefulness of the bicycle,

which man invented to increase his power of locomotion. The bicycle demonstrates how energy expended by a bicyclist (force spent in the past) can enhance the power which he needs to apply in the present. Its construction is such that physical force can be guided into a constricted pathway, which returns a significant part of spent energy for renewed use. A few revolutions of the wheel are enough to build momentum and greatly strengthen the force of the bicyclist as he surges forward. At the same time, a person who follows a steady regimen of progressively longer running sessions will find that covering a 10 kilometer running course is much easier at the end of the training program than it was in the beginning.

Only frequent transmission of intense and related impressions to the mind over an extended time will facilitate retention and accumulation of knowledge or skills. A young pianist will practice for as long as 6-8 hours each day over a decade or more before he can consider himself a competent performer of classical music. Learning of any kind is achieved through the repetition of specific actions, which permits an accumulation of representations of these past actions in the brain. This builds momentum in the future and the power to overcome personal limitations.

The enduring attraction of European classical art. Artistic achievements, such as the glories of Italian Renaissance painting and sculpture, likewise rested on sustained interaction between a restricted sphere of masters, students, patrons and their descendants over more than a century. The renowned Michelangelo, who painted the Sistine Chapel ceiling, served as an apprentice in his adolescence to the painter Domenico Ghirlandaio. The latter, in turn, was a student of Andrea del Verrocchio, who also

taught Leonardo da Vinci some of his artistic skills. Albrecht Durer, the great German painter, made several extensive visits to Italy where he established close contacts with many Italian Renaissance artists like Raphael and Leonardo da Vinci. Enriched by his experience in Italy, Durer went back to his native Germany and helped propagate many of the Italian classical motifs he absorbed during his visits.

German classical music provides another good example of how artistic excellence depends on an unbroken transmission of influences and skills among a small circle of talented individuals. Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart learned how to play musical instruments and compose musical pieces at a very early age thanks to the unceasing efforts of his father, Leopold Mozart, who served as the musical director at the court of the Archbishop of Salzburg. As an adult, Mozart associated closely with the composer Joseph Haydn, whom he considered a significant influence on his artistic development. Conversely, Mozart had a profound influence on Ludwig van Beethoven, who was 14 years younger than Mozart.

Haydn for his part regarded the music of Carl Philipp Emanuel Bach as a very important inspiration for his own compositions. C.P.E. Bach learned about music from his father, the more notable Johann Sebastian Bach. The latter, in turn, was the son of yet another musician, Johann Ambrosius Bach.

The flowering of Italian Renaissance painting and sculpture as well as classical German music extended the influence of Italian and German artists on standards of beauty into our time. By contrast, modernism essentially declared war on centuries of accumulated artistic skills, aesthetic sensibilities and traditions. It embraced the momentary, the

subjective, the improvised and the functional – all of which reflect the fragmentary, sensual and socially detached character of our age.

The struggle to restore sovereignty to the European nation-states can be regarded as an embrace of what is durable, an affirmation of continuity. For the individual nations contain within themselves vast stores of knowledge and experience that passed from one generation to the next over circumscribed channels. Much of what is valuable in European culture developed along restricted regional or national pathways. The distinctive characteristics of national cultures were caused and perpetuated by geographic factors, language diversity, historical experiences, uneven levels of wealth and education as well as national rivalry.

Cosmopolitan observers might regret the fact that regional and national art, knowledge, experience, traditions and tastes have not yet completely merged into a common European or global amalgam. But we know that tension between rival centers of power can be beneficial. It can awaken a competitive spirit and innovation. Moreover, we have already discussed how focusing on what is the specific or the particular is often preferable to dissipating energy over indiscriminate fields.

The national community transcends the brief lifetime of the individual. At a deeper, or perhaps a poetic, level, the commitment to serve one's nation can be considered as the intellect's rejection of death. The will to power inherent in the less self-conscious living beings overcomes the death of the individual organism through instinctive reproduction. Analogously, man's intellect, whose functions inherited the same power acquiring trajectory of

the primitive living beings, should therefore consciously search for channels that will project its vital energy, unbroken, towards a distant future. The nation-state, which was created to ensure the continuity of the national community, can serve as the contemplative individual's bulwark against the finality of biological death.

Why should we spend our lives building something, accruing wealth or knowledge, when we know that death will ultimately deprive us of the enjoyment of our gains? Although our purpose is the attainment of a better understanding of life and what we want to achieve in our lifetimes, we will be obliged to pause here and deal with the subject of death. One way to evaluate the worthiness of life goals is by confronting them with their antithesis. We may rephrase the question as to what we desire most intensely into its antithesis. In other words, what is it that we want the least, or fear the most?

This is a good approach because it embodies the very important concept of opposition, which, unfortunately, seems to stalk our will at every turn. If we could more accurately assess the forces that will certainly attempt to frustrate our will, we will stand a better chance of formulating realistic, desirable and achievable life goals. There is no greater obstacle to our will than death.

The apparent futility of life. A pessimist will say that there can be no happy outcome of life, for death will sweep away everything in its path. Therefore, nothing really matters. A mediocrity will argue that, since death is absolutely certain, there is no point to great exertions, of reaching for the stars. In the end death will level us all. A devout

Christian may see this physical world as merely a prelude to the all-important, spiritual afterlife. Why, then, should we exhaust ourselves in an unseemly struggle for power, riches and glory in a finite, doomed world?

It is true that death extinguishes our consciousness for all time. But this apparent finality is not as final as it may seem. For when we die, many of us will leave behind hundreds of people, or possibly thousands, who will have been in some way affected by us during our lives. The effects of our previous actions will take up residence in other persons, many of whom will continue living after we die. In a real sense, our actions will reverberate well into the future.

Probably the least desirable thing that we want is death. It is what most of us fear above all else. Yet nobody can actually say what it is like to be dead. We believe that death is oblivion, which is a state of being unaware. Thus, how can a totally unaware person explain the state of personal oblivion to his living associates? Obviously this is impossible.

But we might try an analogy. Could it be that the oblivion which we will face after our death will be very similar to the unconsciousness that we experienced for decades and centuries before our birth? Does this comparison help us to better understand death?

Can we experience unconsciousness? If we can talk about it, as we are now doing, then experiencing unconsciousness must be possible. When we wake up in the morning, we can truthfully say that we have just experienced unconsciousness. On the other hand, we can discuss the wonderful properties of flying saucers and time machines, but these are imagined objects, not physical reality. We

may wish to have a lengthy conversation with Alexander the Great. Similarly, we may fervently desire an afterlife, a blissful paradise of unending delights.

So we are left with the sober realization that the physical world containing millions of other conscious people existed without us for many thousands of years. This same world, modified somewhat by our actions, will probably continue its existence for many more thousands of years after we leave the scene. We knew nothing of the world before we were born, and we will know nothing about it after we die.

Thus we observe a reality outside ourselves that is infinitely greater, and vastly more powerful, than we are. In terms of human history, we are but one of many millions of links between the past and the future. Should this realization of our insignificance dishearten us?

The best way to challenge the apparent finality of biological death is by recognizing that our lives are played out not just within the confines of individual being, of our personal perceptions, but in a broader and more significant field of inter-actions with other people.

It is within this interplay of forces between the active, conscious individual and his living and material surroundings that we will find an opening to a better understanding of the purpose of our lives. A dynamic concept of our conscious existence will give us sharper insights into the challenge that death poses to our psychological well-being.

If we were to contemplate our existence in the broadest possible context, we would see that we are a tiny part of the immense universe, which is a field in which the separate

parts remain in perpetual interaction. Thus the destruction of objects in the universe cannot occur in isolation. No element in the universe disintegrates without impacting on other elements, and this also applies to human mortality.

In effect, the deconstruction of an object is the transfer of its energy and contents to other objects. Nothing escapes from the universe. Everything remains in an unending process of transformation.

Our world is a part of the ever churning universe and is unconditionally subject to the same physical laws that apply beyond the boundaries of the biosphere. We, as human beings, who eons ago evolved from simpler living beings, likewise obey the same natural laws that apply to everything else on this planet. The jurisdiction of natural laws on our planet is total, absolute and pervasive. It may often be the case that the supernatural exists in the minds of those who cannot psychologically cope with the severity of natural laws.

Consequently, living our lives in isolation is impossible. We are constantly interacting with our environment, which in large measure consists of people with whom we are in contact. A very substantial part of the energy that we expend is directed at other persons, whom we are continually trying to influence, or rather, change. Whether we realize it or not, we spend much of our lives trying to shape the will, desires, attitudes, feelings and thinking of other people. We are thoroughly social beings.

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TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF NATION-STATES

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